"",'liiiiii'iM""!    '■ti?!'!Lii«.'i'W""iii'i— '■   rii  i  I  ,■ a; 


"THOU 
^HAT  TEACHEST 
;.     ANOTHER      I 
TEACHEST  THOU  NOT 
THYSELF?" 


Southern  Branch 
of  the 

University  of  California 

Los  Angeles 

Form  L  I 

\o5\ 


'( 


i 

i 


This  book   is  DUE  on   the  last   date   stamped   below 


X    A 


^1975 

SEP  ^ 
SEP  I  ^  1926 

JUL  6     19*1 

0^"''  T  ^  1927 

^yyr  8  6  i9fT 


192  J 


Hf/jv  ,  .    iQ-:^^      <pj 


NOV  2  6  1943 
NOV  29  1946 

kJAiM  2  9  194? 
'JflN      4  195. 


3EP^  0  1362  _  ■^>  ^ 


JAN   27   l^^^l        i|pT)JtK   ■' 
REC'DMUT 


-9-15»)(-8,'24 


THE     CONNECTION 


BETWEEN 


THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY 


A    CONTRIBUTION   TO   PEDAGOGICAL    PSYCHOLOGY 
ON  THE  BASIS  OF  F.   W.  DORPFELD'S  MONO- 
GRAPH "  IJENKEN  UND  GEDACHTNIS" 


'/^V 


WITH  AN   IN 


SQWi^&f^URfcALbUHi 


G.    STANLEY    II.VIy.L,j|^^^,.  ^,      . 

President  of  Clark  University 


BY 

HERMAN  T.  LUKENS,  Ph.D. 

DOCENT  IX  CLARK   fNIVEKSITY 


BOSTOX,  U.S.A. 

D.  C.  HEATH  &  CO.,  PUBLISHERS 

1895 


CorVKKiHT,   1806, 

By  Hekman  T.  huKEXS. 


TTMMiBAi-iiv  iir  C.  J.  I'rrri'.KH  *  Son,  Boston. 

F»W»«W">BK   BY  S.   J.   I'ABKinLI,  &  CO. 


STATE  NOfiJWALSCH.H,. 

PREFACE. 


A  SHOKT  time  ago  a  teacher  complained  to  tlie  author 
that  she  could  not  get  any  real  help  in  her  school-work 
from  reading  ps3'chologies  and  books  on  education.  It  is 
hoped  that  the  following  book  will  give  help  to  such  teach- 
ers, not  only  by  the  central  idea  that  stands  out  so  promi- 
nently, but  by  its  copious  illustrations  and  descriptions  of 
mental  phenomena,  as  well  as  by  the  practical  applications 
in  the  last  chapters.  The  teacher  needs  descriptive  j^si/chol- 
ogy  far  more  than  metaphysical  psychology. 

Even  a  few  simple  exercises,  such  as  those  recommended 

on  page  5  for  grammar  school  pupils,  would  greatly  help 

teachers  toward  appreciating  the  character  of  the  mental 

processes  with  which  they  have  to  deal.     Observation  work 

^  thus  begun  will  be  found  so  interesting  and  attractive  that 

J   it  will  easily  lead  to  further  introspection  and  study  of  the 

**>  laws  of  association  (cf.  pp.  41,  42).     But  still  more  help 

will  be  gained  if  teachei's  will  watch  how  their  own  pupils 

think  and   reason.     Make  notes  of  the  observations,  and 

compare  them  with  such  records  as  those  reported  in  the 

Pedagoijical  Seminary,  vol.  ii.  pp.  358-396. 

There  is  nothing  in  all  of  this  that  any  bright  teacher 
cannot  readily  understand.  But  the  mistake  is  too  fre- 
quently made  of  supposing  that  whatever  the  teacher 
learns  she  must  forthwith  tell  her  pupils.     Nothing  could 


iv  rUKl  ACK. 

U"  more  fatal  to  good  toachiii;-:  tlian  to  attempt  to  make 
the  chilli  think  logiciilly,  or  k-aru  lessons  by  the  Herbartian 
forin:U  stei>s.  Jiut  every  teacher  should  know  how  chil- 
ilrvii  do  think,  and  what  the  necessary  steps  in  acquiring 
knowKnlge  rtnilly  an-,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  out  of  the 
way  anil  not  hinder  the  pupil's  progress,  as  well  as  to  be 
able  when  necessary  to  givi*  just  the  help  that  is  needed. 

The  monograph  treatment  is  eminently  adapted  to  a 
work  of  this  kind.  Two  of  the  most  helpful  and  sugges- 
tive lKK)ks  for  teaehers  are  already  published  in  this  form : 
llaih'stiK'k's  Jlahlt  and  Its  Importance  in  Education,  and 
I-oiige's  Apperception.  It  is  earnestly  hoped  that  others 
will  follow.  Until  the  chief  points  in  school-work  are 
thus  treated,  we  cannot  expect  any  firm  basis  for  a  general 
work,  nor  would  i\w  teachers  get  much  assistance  from 
such  general  reading.  For  self-instruction,  the  teacher 
needs  clearness,  fulness,  and  practical  apjjlicatio^is.  These 
are  the  qtialities  aimed  at  in  a  monograph. 

The  (Jerman  monograj)h  on  which  the  following  work 
is  ha.s«'d  grew  out  of  round-table  conferences  in  a  teachers' 
reading  circle  formed  for  the  purpose  of  study  in  educa- 
tional psychology.  In  writing  a  book  for  American  teach- 
ern  I  havi;  tried  to  keep  true  to  the  best  ideals  in  the 
fJ**nnan,  while  at  the  same  time  being  perfectly  free  to 
a«ld  to,  omit,  or  modify,  any  statement  or  ideas  whatever. 
When  I  visited  Kector  Dorpfeld  in  ISOO,  to  talk  over  these 
and  other  matters  with  him,  he  not  only  gave  me  full  per- 
niiHsi«.n  to  translate  his  work,  but  urged  me  to  make  any 
chiuiges  and  a/lditions  1  saw  tit.     Thus  it  has  come  to  pass 


that  this  work,  while  quoting  very  largely 'trom  Dorpfeld's, 
and  being  based  on  it  so  far  as  its  essential  central  idea  is 
concerned,  is  yet  in  no  strict  sense  a  translation.  When- 
ever better  ideas  have  been  found  elsewhere,  they  have 
been  unhesitatingly  substituted.  The  explanation  of  the 
common  origin  of  the  two  laws  of  memory,  for  instance,  is 
radically  opposed  to  the  view  expressed  by  Dorpfeld  and 
all  other  Herbartians.  But  I  do  not  believe  in  the  Herbar- 
tian  view  on  this  ])()int,  and  hence  have  re-written  that  i>art 
entirely.  The  same  is  true  of  many  other  less  important 
parts.  All  of  the  bibliographical  references,  and  likewise 
many  of  the  illustrations,  are  additions. 

On  the  other  hand,  everything  that  was  essentially  Ger- 
man and  local  in  its  allusion  has  been  omitted.  For  the 
many  controversial  points  with  other  German  educators,  and 
long  explanations  applicable  to  religious  instruction  in 
Germany  only,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  German  work. 
It  is  now  in  its  fifth  edition,  in  the  present  issue  of  the 
Collected  Works  of  F.  W.  Dorpfeld,  11  vols.  Giitersloh  ;  C. 
Bertelsmann,  1894-1895.      Dorpfeld  died  in  October,  1893. 

In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  thank  President  G.  Stanley  Hall 

and  Dr.  Wm.  H.  Burnham   for  their  encouragement  and 

help  in  the  work  of  revision  and  of  publication.     I  am  also 

greatly  indebted  to  the  following  friends :  President  Charles 

De  Garmo,  Dr.  C.  C.  Van  Liew,  Dr.  Charles  A.  McMurry, 

and    Dr.    Frank    j\[.    McMurry,    for   valuable   suggestions 

while  the  book  was  passing  through  the  press. 

H.  T.  L. 
Clakk  University,  June,  1805. 


TABLE    OF   CONTEXTS. 


I'Ac;  !•: 

Pkefack i'i-v 

IXTKOUrcTiox,  by  rrosidcut  G.  .Slaiilfy  Hall ix 

CHAPTER  I. 

Preliminaky 1~^ 

Statement  of  the  TroWLMii,  1. —Orientation  and  p:xi)lanatiun  of 
Terms,  3.  —The  Study  of  Psychology  in  the  Elementary  School, 
5.  —  Clearness  of  Ideas,  7. 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  Processes  of  Thought  and  Memoky S-:'.8 

A.  Of  Thought,  8-24. 

Comparison,  8. —Conceptions^  9.  —  Spontaneous  Concepts,  .11. — 
Judgment,  12.  — Reasoning,  14.— Graphic  Syllogi.sm,  17.  — For- 
mation  of  Sense  Percepts,   19.  — Elements  of  Thought,  'Jl.-?*- 
->  Simple  Ideas,  2:5.  —  Pibliograpliical  Note,  24. 

B.  Of  Memory,  24-38. 

Definitions,  25.  — Examples,  2().— Memory  in  Conception,  28.— 
In  Judgment,  ;^.  — Spontaneous  Judgments,  .31.— Memory  in 
Reasoning,  3.3. —In  Perception,  :i4.  — Apperception,  3.5. —  Sum- 
mary, 3G. — Bibliographical  Note,  ;i8. 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Laws  of  Thought  and  Memoky 30-88 

A.  Of  ?J EMORY,  .39-."):'>. 
Derivation  of  Laws  of  Association,  .39.  —  Ari.stotle,  39.  — Des-    • 
cartes,  43.  —  Herbart  and  the  Recent  Writers,  4.5.  —  Relative  Im- 
portance of  the  Two  Laws,  49.  —  Bibliographical  Note,  52. 
vii 


viii  TABLK  OF  CONTEiSTS. 

PACK 

B.  Ok  TiioroHT,  ri.Wl8. 

Plff«»npiict»  bt'twiH'n  tho  Law.s  ot  I'sychology  iiud  those  of  Logic, 

"*  <i«>ii(<tio  Orilor  of  t'miiiiiirison,  .liulgment,  :intl  Conception, 

rii«»  Sinj;li«  Tlumjjlit-rroci'Sii,  'u.  —  SuiRTordinato  iiuil  Sub- 

'     luvpts,  M.  —  Exiimplcs.  .V.I.  —  Chiltlreu's  Use  of  Lan- 

I.;inj;uu;;i<  not  a  Truo  Mirror  ot  tlio  Mental  Processes, 

•  •">.       riiv  Law  tif  Concept ii>n,  7'_'.  — Causes  of  Spontaneous  Judg- 

iiiviilK,  7.1.  —  Exaniple.s,  74.  —  Disappointed    Exi)ectation,  77. — 

Tlirvf  Forms  of  Jud^nient.s,  .so.  —  Comparison  of  Laws  of  Tliouglit 

and  \(oiiitirk',  8'J.  —  Imagination,  Hi. 

IMI.M'TKK   IV. 
Al'IM.K  ATIOV  T»»  PKDACJOr.Y      .      .      .      ..L 89-127 


.vl- 


I. imitations,  M>.  —  Steps  in  Aciiuiring  Knowledge,  00.  —  Memory 

ill  Appen-eption.  !>.J.  —  Ways  and  Means  of  Committing  to  Mem- 

■"        -of  .Mumuriitiiig.  !>".  —  Ivelative  Value  of  liational 

\s.s<Mi:itiuM  in  Intensity,  Extent,  and  Direction, 

-1   ■ill. iMi  Mils    Mi-nioriziiig,    102. — Immanent  ^Memorizing, 

III7.  — Two  Kornis  of  Hepetition.  lO'i. — Treatment  of  Iveviews, 

M-.  — Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Mechanical  Repetition, 

lU.  — lift  S«TV ice  sometimes    Indispensable,   11!). — Ilecapitula- 

liiMi,  121.  —  Mnemonics.  l'_';t.  —  Elibinghaus's  Experiments  on  the 

Mviiior)',  1U5. —  Hihliograpliy  of  tho  Herbartian  School,  127. 

CMAl'TEIl  V. 

Il.M-^TItATIOXS      TAKKN       I  l!(»M      TIIK      SUBJECT.S      OF     TUE 

('(  ItUKl  I.IM 128-1.58 

Kirxt  Kxiiiiiph!  — History,  12K-141. 

*^         d  Kxiiiiiple  — Natural  Science,  141-14.">. 

Exiiiiipli-  —  .Sideeti<ins  to  bo  learned  by  beart,  14.'')-148. 
l-.Miiui  Example  —  Arithmetic,  HS-L^S. 

CIIAPTEll  VI. 

Hrw.: ...:  '    -Mi.fsioN 159-10.5 

likVKHKSCm  LWT  OK   UUUKH 1G6-109 


INTRODUCTION. 


Dr.  Hermax  T.  Lukkxs,  to  whom  we  owe  tlie  presenta- 
tion in  so  attractive  English  form  of  this  most  noted  work 
of  one  of  the  best  German  teachers  of  pedagogy,  and  wlio 
as  I  write  has  just  been  advanced  in  Clark  University  from 
the  position  of  Honorary  Fellow  to  Docent,  is  one  of  the 
most  accomplished  and  promising  men  in  that  choice  group 
of  young  Americans  who  have  studied  Education  in  a  post- 
graduate and  professional  way  in  Europe  and  at  home,  and 
have  deliberately  chosen  the  work  of  teaching  pedagogy  as 
their  calling.  Unlike  too  many  members  of  this  group, 
Dr.  Lukens,  although  thorouglily  trained  in  Herbartian 
pedagogy  and  in  sympathy  with  it,  does  not  regard  it  as 
tlie  consummate  formidation  of  educational  theory,  nor 
attempt  to  apply  its  ruln-ics  blindly  and  without  change  to 
the  very  different  material  and  environment  of  American 
pedagogy,  but  has  felt  it  necessary  to  supplement  Herbart, 
both  by  modern  child-study,  and  by  some  practical  acquaint- 
ance with  experimental  psychology.  It  is  this  that  makes 
Dr.  Lukens  competent  to  present  us  with  a  condensed 
digest,  instead  of  a  literal  translation,  and  to  enrich  these 
pages  with  copious  and  valuable  notes  that  render  this 
volume  more  valuable  than  the  original.  This,  and  many 
other  signs  of  the  times  pointing  in  tlie  same  direction,  sug- 
gests how  speedily  our  country  is  outgrowing  its  excessive 

ix 


X  INTKOOrcTlOX. 

ivveiviice  for  the  (.Herman  siu'culatois  of  half  a  century  ago. 
Thht  thoro  ;nv  still  some  to  whom  it  seems  the  acme  of 
phiK>s«>phi<'  or  petlagogio  attainment  to  interpret  the  tomes 
of  those  great  and  useful,  but  now  obsolescent,  writers  is  a 
note  c»f  provincialism  from  which,  if  all  indications  do  not 
fail,  we  are  siK)n  to  be  emancipated. 

Save  healtli  alone,  there  is  no  more  important  and  prac- 
ticjil  topic  for  teachers  to  stud}-  than  that  to  which  this 
little  lMM»k  is  devoted.  Its  subject-matter  is  presented  in  a 
clear  and  elemental  manner  sure  to  have  speedy  fruit  in 
the  s<'ln>olr«H»m,  and  it  is  worthy  the  attention  of  all  prac- 
tical teachers,  to  whom  I  have  no  hesitation  in  recommend- 
iiig  it.  I  cannot  forebear  laying  still  more  stress  than  does 
Hector  D<')rpf<dd  on  the  distinction,  not  only  between  imma- 
nent and  intentional  memorizing,  but  between  immanent 
and  intentional  thinking.  The  latter  is,  of  course,  chiefly 
dealt  with  in  books,  but  the  former  is  incalcAilably  more 
imiMtrtant;  and  to  know  something  of  the  mysterious  nature 
of  memory  and  of  thought  is  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  the 
new  study  of  children. 

G.  STANLEY  HALL. 

I    •    \HK    iNIVKItSirY, 

Woin  K!*TKit,  .Mass.,  S<j,t.  17,  JS'J5. 


STATE  NUfiJttALSCHixw 

THE 

OOlSrjS'ECTIOK  BETWEEN  THOUGHT 

A]SrD   MEMORY. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PRELIMINARY. 

There  are  undoubtedly  iiiuny  more  books  written  al)out 
the  memory  than  about  any  other  faculty  of  the  human 
mind.  Great  power  of  retention  is  fascinating  to  most 
people  and  easily  appreciated.  The  ''  memory  doctors  " 
are  accordingly  numerous,  and  reap  a  rich  harvest,  not- 
withstanding repeated  exposures.  Thinking  is,  however, 
somewhat  more  ditficult  than  remembering,  and  therefore 
less  attractive  for  most  of  us.  But  every  educator,  at 
least,  is  interested  in  both  divisions  of  our  subject,  and 
must  come  to  some  conclusion  in  his  own  mind  as  to  the 
relation  that  these  two. activities  should  bear  to  each  other. 
For  centuries  past  many  questions  relating  to  thought  and 
memory  have  been  discussed  with  great  warmth  and  ear- 
nestness. Which  of  these  two  faculties  is  the  more  im- 
portant for  culture  ?  Should  the  memory  be  cidtivated 
more  at  one  period  of  life,  and  the  development  of  the 
thinking  powers  be  left  for  another  period  ?  Is  the  great 
importance  given  to  memory  a  hindrance  to  productive 
thinking  ?  Or,  vice  versa,  does  the  too  early  cultivation  of 
the  thinking  powers   weaken  the  memory  ?     There  is  no 

1 


2  THOUGHT    AND    MEMORY. 

topic  «>f  instruction,  ami  no  probloni  of  moral  education 
into  which  tliese  considerations  do  not  enter  at  all  periods 
of  tl>o  child's  development. 

AltiiouK'h  our  theme  end)raecs,  to  be  sure,  two  subjects, 
yet  the  jxiint  of  view  for  their  consideration  is  merely 
the  r,/ation  in  which  they  stand  to  each  other.  Accord- 
ingly, there  is  no  need  of  presenting  either  all  that  is  known 
about  thought,  nor  all  that  is  known  about  memory,  but  of 
each  subject  only  so  much  as  is  requisite  in  order  to  explain 
the  relation  between  these  two  mental  activities  —  first  of  all 
j»sychologically,  and  then  ai)plied  to  practice  in  the  school. 
In  the  second  phu'e,  it  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  it  is 
mainly  the  practical  field  of  ai)plication  that  gives  the  sub- 
ject its  broad  extent.  Let  us  take  an  analogous  example  in 
physics.  The  laws  of  gravitation  govern  the  material  world 
of  the  whole  universe.  Nevertheless,  the  conception  of  the 
fon;e  of  gravitation,  together  with  the  most  important  gen- 
end  laws  relating  thereto,  can  without  difficulty  be  made 
intelligible  by  the  helj)  of  well-chosen  illustrative  examples, 
together  with  something  of  the  practical  application  of  these 
general  laws.  It  would  be  quite  another  thing,  however, 
to  trace  out  their  application  in  all  directions  and  ramifi- 
cations, —  in  the  field  of  astronomy,  geology,  meteorology, 
etc. ;  further,  of  architecture,  mechanics,  navigation,  and 
the  many  other  applied  arts.  What  is  possible  in  physics 
will  j)n)bably  ahso  Ix;  possible  in  psychology. 

Let  us  note  once  more  our  j)roblem  distinctly.  In  the 
psyoliological  portion  of  our  work  we  have  to  consider  the 
thinking  j»r<x'e.s8  as  well  as  the  memory,  in  so  far  as  is 
necessary  to  explain  their  mutual  relation;  the  practical 
application  neeils  to  be  f(jlh)wed  only  as  far  as  is  requisite 
on  the  one  hand  to  make  tlie  above  results  still  somewhat 


STATEMENT   OF   THK    IMtOHLEM.  6 

clearer,  and  on  tlie  other  hand  to  help  the  reader  to  think 
for  himself. 

The  mental  processes  or  activities  are,  as  is  well  kno^s•n, 
divided  into  three  main  classes,  —  activities  of  cognition 
(intelligence),  emotion  (feelings),  and  volition  (desires  and 
will). 

The  consideration  of  our  theme  will  have  to  do,  for  the 
most  part,  with  the  activities  of  cognition;  first,  because 
thought  and  memory  of  themselves  belong  to  this  class, 
although  they  stand  in  very  close  relation  to  both  of  the 
others ;  secondly,  because  the  feelings  and  desires,  being 
more  vague  and  indefinite  in  their  very  nature,  present 
much  greater  difficulties  to  closer  observation  and  intro- 
spection. 

Knowledge  begins  with  perceptions  through  the  five 
senses,  — sight,  hearing,  smell,  taste,  and  feeling  (touch, 
muscular  sense,  etc.).-'  This  is,  however,  not  to  be  un- 
derstood as  if  the  sense  impressions  forthwith  produced 
actual  perceptions.  They  result  first  of  all  only  in  sensa- 
tions. A  perception  does  not  form  until  a  sensation  has 
been  frequently  repeated,  and  only  after  certain  other 
psychic  processes  have  taken  place. 

The  reader  should  notice  from  this  that  the  formation  of 


1  "Whoever  wants  to,  can,  even  hei'e  at  the  outset,  plunge  headlong  into 
philosophical  and  theological  speculations,  with  all  their  old  and  all  their 
new  controversies.  Sensualism  here,  idealism  there,  and  so  forth.  Let 
the  reader  remember,  therefore,  once  for  all,  that  we  are  going  to  concern 
ourselves  with  facts  of  experience  in  psijchology  —  not  in  how  far  meta- 
physical doctrines  can  he  spun  from  them,  but  simply  in  so  far  as  they  are 
able  to  give  clearness  and  support  in  our  pedagouical  practice.  In  this 
sense  we  may  accept  the  old  dictum:  Nihil  est  in  intellcctn,  quod  antea 
non  fuerit  in  se?isw,  understanding  it  to  mean.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
intellect  that  docs  not  presuppose  sense-perceptions. 


4  THOUGHT    AND    MILMOUY. 

clear  jH-n-eptions  is  far  from  bi-ing  so  simi)le  as  it  at  first 
view  seems  and  is  generally  considered.  If  a  teacher  is 
in.,  hly  familiar  with  the  subject  of  the  origin  of 

.^.;  ,.  he  n>av  assume  as  certain  that  in  instruction 

he  will  lUJike  many  mistakes,  even  in  the  very  first  stages 
»»f  the  lesson,  in  particular  by  expecting  more  of  the  pupil's 
power  of  iHTception  than  he  is  capable  of.  A  step  farther. 
If  such  a  knowledge  of  psychology  is  required  in  order  to 
give  even  an  object-lesson  jjroperly,  where  things  can  be 
presentinl  immediately  to  the  senses,  how  much  more  neces- 
sarv  is  it  when  the  object  must  be  represented  in  language, 
iu  which  case  the  imagination  must  assist. 

Hesitles  the  senses,  the  mind  has  still  another  source 
of  knowledge.  The  senses  make  report  only  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  outer  world  ;  i.e.,  of  the  things,  properties, 
prtK-esses  (and  their  relations)  in  the  world  of  matter. 
They  say  nothing,  on  the  other  hand,  of  the  phenomena  in 
the  mind.  These  latter  processes,  belonging  to  the  world 
of  spirit,  make  themselves  known  immediately  through 
consciousness.  Thus  the  mind  gains  ideas  not  only  of  the 
things  and  processes  outside,  but  also  of  the  phenomena  of 
its  own  inner  life,  especially  of  ideation  itself,  of  feeling, 
exercise  of  will,  and  the  relations  existing  between  these. 
IIjiw  else  would  the  science  of  psychology  be  possible  ? 
And  all  the  (jther  sciences  of  mind  —  logic,  ethics,  law, 
thcoh^gy,  jx'dagogy,  i)sychiatry,  a'sthetics,  philology,  etc.  — 
'•     ■   'ssentially  from  this  second  source. 

:<•  is  a  8i)ecial  reason  why  pedagogy  should  turn  its 
lu  to  this  sec(»nd  source  of  knowledge.     Those  sub- 

t  the  curriculum  that  have  most  directly  to  do  with 

'T-forming,    as    literature    on    its .  humanistic   side 

and  history,  belong  in   so  far  to  the  held  of  psychology. 


THE   STUDY    OK    PSYCHOLOGY.  6 

This  is  shown  by  the  vast  array  of  names  and  expressions 
there  met  with,  that  refer  to  mental  qualities,  states,  and 
processes.  The  usual  method  of  presentation  aims  to 
bring  these  concretely  before  the  pupils'  minds  by  the  his- 
toric events,  and  by  associating  these  latter  with  events 
in  the  experience  of  the  pupils.  But  the  teacher  must  be 
concerned  to  see  to  it  that  meanwhile  this  second  source 
of  knowledge  in  the  pupil's  mind  is  actually  at  Avork;  i.e., 
that  the  words  call  up  corresponding  processes  and  states 
in  the  mind.  The  teacher  can  do  considerable  to  help  in 
this  in  two  ways,  the  first  of  which  is  applicable  through- 
out the  whole  course,  from  the  lower  grades  up ;  the  second 
is  only  possible  in  the  upper  grades. 

The  former  work  will  be  accomplished  if  the  teacher 
directs  the  pupils'  attention  to  psychic  processes  and  states 
as  they  occur  in  the  lesson,  and  does  his  best  to  make 
them  definite  and  distinct.  Three  objects  will  be  gained 
by  this  :  first,  this  kind  of  instruction  will  be  in  the  highest 
degree  in  tlie  interest  of  character-building;  secondly,  the 
pupil  learns  to  be  observant  of  his  inner  life ;  and  thirdly, 
he  is  collecting  in  this  way  a  desirable  store  of  psycho- 
logical material  and  expressions  for  use  later. 

The  second  part  of  the  work  consists  of  a  number  of 
separate  lessons  in  psychology,  using  the  material  collected 
as  above.  In  these  lessons  nothing  more  is  needed  than 
an  arrangement  and  review  of  this  material  by  topics; 
e.g.,  expressions  of  knowing  (to  deliberate,  to  consider,  to 
find  out ;  silly,  wise,  ingenious  ;  judg- 
ment, question,  statement,  etc.) ;  expressions  of  feeling  (to 

mourn  ;    sad,    desperate  ;    joy,    sorrow, 

etc.),  and  expressions  of  willing  (to  resolve  ;  stub- 
born   ;  purpose,  etc.).     Rightly  managed,  this  may 


G  THOUGHT   AND   ISIEMORY. 

witli  profit  be  beguu  with  children  of  ten  or  eleven 
years. 

The  jieroeptions  of  sense  from  without,  together  with 
thuso  of  consi-iousness  from  within  the  mind,  form  the  fun- 
dainentjU  stock  in  trade  of  the  intellect.  Out  of  this  raw 
material  the  soul  creates  new  forms  of  knowledge,  —  con- 
cepts and  imaginary  ideas,  judgments  and  conclusions.  We 
may  compare  the  intellectual  activities  of  the  soul  to  the 
commercial  and  industrial  activities  of  the  people.  We 
di.stinguish  here,  (1)  original  production,  which  by  agricul- 
ture, mining,  etc.,  furnishes  raw  material ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  (2)  manufactures,  which  make  the  raw  goods  into 
sometliing  better;  and  lastly,  (o)  commerce  and  transpor- 
tation, which  effect  the  exchange  of  goods  of  both  kinds 
Ix'tween  different  regions.  In  this  comparison  we  would 
call  the  sense  perceptions  (together  with  the  inner  per- 
ceptions) the  intellectual  raw  production,  and  the  other 
activities  beyond  these,  mental  manufacture  and  commerce. 
Now  we  are  going  to  include  all  of  these  higher  activities 
of  knowledge,  with  the  exception  of  imagination,^  under 
the  name  of  "thinking."  Ordinary  usage  gives  to  the  word 
a  wi<ler  .sense;  e.g.,  in  the  expressions,  Who  would  have 
tlidiight  it  (exjiccted  or  imagined  it)  ?  Think  of  yourself 
in  my  place!     What  do  you  think  of  my  new  hat? 

The  word  "  concept "'  is  also  used  in  several  different 
senses.  In  tlie  following  pages  it  is  always  to  be  under- 
stwKl  as  equivalent  to  '<  general  notion."  Conception  is 
employed  as  the  name  of  the  process  by  which  concepts 
are  formed. 


'  Tti  a  wMor  Honso.  iniacination  i.s  inclnded  in  thinking,  since  it,  too, 
i'l<Ms;  but  th(;H(!  ,ire  never  abstract,  if  the  imagination  alone 

■  1. 


USK    OF    TERMS.  7 

"  In  all  thought  the  greatest  heaiity  is  the  greatest  eleamess." 
These  arc  very  nearly  the  words  with  which  Keclor  Dorpl'cld  began 
a  conversation  w  ith  nie  in  the  sunuuer  of  l.S!>0,  when  1  visited  him 
to  consult  about  the  subject  of  this  work.  Every  one  will  do  well 
to  bear  this  advice  ever  in  mind,  and  never  be  satisfied  with  a 
thought  until  it  is  followed  out  to  its  logical  conclusions,  and  is  as 
clear  as  it  is  possible  to  make  it.  Confusion  of  ideas  is  fatal  to  all 
sound  work.  In  an  article  by  Fullerton,  Oh  Siniienesn  and  Identiti/, 
in  the  Publications  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  No.  1,  there 
are  enumeratti.l  and  illustrated  no  less  than  srven  different  meanings 
of  the  word  ''same,"  which,  one  would  think,  shouhl  certainly  keep 
the  "same"  meaning  better  than  any  other  word  in  the  language. 
Yet,  as  the  author  points  out,  this  very  term  has  led  to  a  host  of 
misunderstamlings  and  false  reasonings  in  systems  of  philosophy. 
Most  of  the  prolonged  and  fruitless  discussions  in  which  we  engage 
are  based  on  a  difference  of  use  in  our  words,  and  the  consequent 
misunderstandings  they  occasion.  This  is  especially  true  of  the 
mental  sciences. 

The  use  of  the  word  "concept"  adopted  in  this  book  agrees 
with  that  of  the  great  majority  of  writers  on  psychology,  both  in 
this  country  and  in  England.  Indeed,  I  know  of  but  two  conspicu- 
ous exceptions.  These  are  De  Garmo,  in  his  translation  of  Lind- 
ner's Psychology;  and  secondly,  perhaps  following  this  use  of 
concept  as  equivalent  to  idea  in  its  generic  sense,  M.  K.  Smith  in 
her  translation  of  Ilerbart's  Psychology.  I  call  attention  to  this 
difference  in  use,  to  prevent  confusion. 


ClIAri'KIJ    IT. 

TirE    PROCESSES   OF   THOUGHT    AND    MEMORY. 

A.    (>i-  Thought. 

As  already  explained,  avc  understand  by  ''thinking" 
(^iii  the  nariDwer  sense)  all  of  those  intellectual  activities 
which,  out  of  the  raw  material  of  the  senses  and  inner 
]x?rcei»tions,  produce  new  material ;  viz.,  higher  (abstract) 
ideas.  These  at^tivities  are  usually  divided  into :  compar- 
ing, distinguishing,  forming  concepts,  judging,  reasoning, 
etc.  This  division  is  not  wrong;  but  if  we  examine  these 
pHK-csses  closely,  we  shall  find  that  they  all  agree  in  hav- 
ing essentially  to  do  with  ideas,  and  differ  only  in  the  man- 
ner t>f  presentation. 

Let  us  examine  these  processes  singly.  For  simplifica- 
tion we  will  take  the  comparison  of  two  objects,  say  two 
plants,  tliat  are  not  present  to  the  senses.  In  order  to 
iouipare  them,  they  must  be  so  well  known  that  their 
mental  images  can  be  distinctly  recalled  to  consciousness. 
Thereupon  those  jjroperties  are  sought  out  in  which  the}'^ 
lioth  agree.  When  these  are  found  and  noted,  —  i.e.,  pre- 
s«M»te(l  to  tlie  mind  singl}',  — the  process  of  comparison  has 
in  so  far  reju'lied  its  end.  It  is,  so  far  as  w^e  are  now  con- 
'  ■■■'"•d,  tlje  same  as  if  the  objects  themselves  were  pres- 
•'»  tlie  sen.ses.  In  the  latter  case  the  qualities  of 
tin-  objects  would  be  presented  in  the  mind  more  vividly; 
l.,!t  i.tlifTwise  the  ])rocess  is  the  same. 

"  will  take  next  the  forming  of  conceptions;  and  first 
8 


FORMATION    OB^   CONCEPTS.  d 

the  so-called  class-t-oiicepts  (species,  kind,  family,  order, 
class,  etc.).  The  word  "mountain,"  for  instance,  is  asso- 
ciated in  the  child's  mind  at  first  with  the  perception  of  a 
single  elevation,  which  he  has  seen  and  whicli  he  was  told 
was  a  mountain.  Later  he  becomes  acquainted  with  sev- 
eral more  such  elevations,  —  small  and  large,  wooded  and 
bare,  steep  and  gently  sloping,  rocky  and  sandy,  etc. ;  all 
are  called  mountain.  Now,  since  those  qualities  wherein 
these  elevations  differed  came  into  consciousness  only  in  a 
few  cases,  perhaps  only  once,  while  those  common  to  all 
occurred  in  every  perception,  and  therefore  by  this  fre- 
quent repetition  became  clearer  and  more  firmly  impressed, 
therefore  as  a  result  we  find  very  naturally  that  those 
qualities  occurring  seldom  have  withdrawn,  as  too  weak, 
from  consciousness,  while  those  common  to  all  have  come 
forward  in  consciousness,  and  become  distinct.  Finally, 
these  latter  alone  remain,  and  are  the  content  of  the  con- 
cept. But  a  concept  may  be  formed  on  the  basis  of  even  a 
single  observation,  whenever  any  one  or  more  qualities  in 
a  new  object  stand  out  with  such  prominence  as  to  fasten 
the  attention  on  them,  and  thus  separate  them  from  the 
other  qualities.  The  first  time  a  child  sees  a  giraffe,  he 
undoubtedly  forms  a  concept  that  serves  him  even  if  he 
never  sees  another.  But  such  concepts  are  almost  sure  to 
be  faulty.  The  mental  process  is  purely  spontaneous  and 
involuntary.  Language,  although  not  the  cause  of  the 
process,  has  favored  it  very  much.  In  the  instance  cited 
above,  the  fact  that  two  or  more  different  things  bore  the 
same  name  (naountain)  aroused  the  attention,  and  so  led 
to  a  clearer  apprehension.  Secondly,  the  result  of  invol- 
untary comparison  was  stop  l)y  step  fixed  in  language,  and 
so  gotten  ready  for  use.     Of  course  the  child  has  not  l)een 


10  THOrr.HT    AND    MK.MOl'A'. 

of  any  of  these  ])syehie  processes,  not  even  no- 

; ^    ...a  tlu-  nu'uninj;  of  the  word  -mountain''  has  been 

gradually  i-hunj;ing,  h>sing  one  after  another  the  specific 
•  ;  iitifs.  ami  streni,'thenint,'  into  clear  consciousness  those 
i.:i)nion  to  all.  Nor  has  he  noticed  that  the  word  has 
narrowed  its  nieanin;j:  (t-ontent),  while  it  has  broadened 
its  application   (^extent). 

AU)ve  is  sh«)wn   the    involuntary,   spontaneous    rise    of 

general  notions  or  concepts.     To  be  sure,  this  mode  of  pro- 

"    It'    alone   will    never  bring  the  concept  to  full    com- 

■  iiess.  For  even  if  really  so  nuiny  examples  presented 
tliemselves  for  observation  that  all  the  differing  qualities 
.  '  Id  W  eliminated,  and  only  the  similar  ones  retained,— 
.'. :.  i  li  would  be  expecting  a  good  deal,  —  still  these  latter 
are  sehUim  all  distinctly  noticed.  It  is  very  seldom  indeed 
that  we  can  enumerate  them  separately.  But  besides  this 
a  second  (b'tieiency  is  possible.  Among  those  qualities 
rightly  recognized  as  common  to  all,  may  be  found  some 
insignitieant  ones;  i.e.,  such  as  do  not  change  the  nature 
of  the  «'oiicept.  whether  they  are  included  or  excluded. 
\  higically  contplete   concept  must,    however,   omit    such 

iiiticant  characteristics,  and  retain  only  such  as  are 
.rial.  In  order,  therefore,  to  bring  to  a  conclusion 
tTiLS  process  of  conception,  and  give  rise  to  entirely  clear 
and  correct  concepts,  something  additional  is  necessary. 
This  is  a  conscious  and  voluntary  investigation,  so  as  to 
get  rid,  on  the  one  hand,  of  all  the  accidental  character- 

iiid,  on   the  other  hand,  to  bring  into  clear  con- 

>  all  those  that  remain  and  are  essential  to  the 
jtt.     Thus    in    concepts   of    classes,  or   in   particular 

■  l>t«  of    individual   characters,   for   example,   if   it   is 
1    what    bidongs    to   the   essential    characteristics   of 


spontanp:ous  con'ckpts.  11 

S(jme  lii.st()ii(uil  personage  (Soc-rates,  Napoleon,  etc.),  or 
of  English  nationality,  this  conscious  and  voluntary  part 
of  the  work  assumes  a  greater  prominence. 

From  the  above,  it  seems  clear  that  only  in  the  field  of 
science  can  we  expect  to  find  proper,  logically  complete 
concepts.  The  chief  intellectual  intercourse,  even  among 
people  of  culture,  has  to  rely  on  the  spontaneously  formed 
general  notions,  which  are  never  perfectly  definite,  and  fre- 
quently contain  something  Avrong.  This  accounts  for  many 
misunderstandings  and  vain  disputations.  It  is  further 
phiin  that  all  words,  excejat  proper  names,  denote  not  prop- 
erly perceptions,  —  unless  it  be  when  the  child  hears  the 
word  for  the  first  time,  —  but  general  notions  (concepts). 

Next  to  the  formation  of  concepts,  comes  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  relations  between  things  or  processes,  of  which 
the  causal  and  mathematical  relations  are  the  most  impor- 
tant. Here,  too,  we  nuike  use  of  the  word  "  conceive " ; 
and  we  shall  find  thinking  in  this  case  also  is  only  a  par- 
ticular way  of  presenting  ideas  in  consciousness.  We  Avill 
take  an  example  of  the  causal  relation.  What  is  the 
origin  of  our  conception  that  cold  is  the  cause  of  Avater 
changing  into  ice  ?  In  the  beginning  it  is  quite  sponta- 
neous. It  is  noticed  that  with  a  greater  degree  of  cold, 
ice  appears ;  and  again,  that  when  the  cold  disappears  the 
ice  vanishes.  This  is,  however,  still  by  no  means  sufficient 
to  give  rise  to  the  conception  of  a  causal  connection.  For 
there  are  no  innate  ideas  waiting,  as  it  were,  for  outer 
stimulus  in  order  to  make  their  way  into  consciousness. 
The  sequence  of  those  two  phenomena  (cold  and  ice)  is 
observed  not  only  once,  but  again  and  again.  This  regular 
and  invariable  sequence  of  these  phenomena  produces  the 
new  idea  finallv  that  the  one  thing  iiiiist  follow  the  other, 


12  T 1 1  ore  :nr  and  memory. 

that  till'  t'lu'  iiluiioiuriiuii  i-alls  foftli  tlio  otlior.  causes  it. 
lltTfiUK.n  tlu'  iflatioii  bi'tween  the  two  facts,  which  before 
seciueU  only  teiiipoi-al,  becomes  apprehended  as  causal  in 
its  oritjin  ;  out  of  iioat  (after)  lias  become  pvojiter  (on  ac- 
emuit  i»f,  by  means  of).  The  furtlier  details  of  this  causal 
n*l:itiun  can,  of  ctmrse,  be  learneil  oidy  by  an  investii^ation 
into  the  physii-al  nature  i>f  cold  and  of  -water.  That  the 
eont'cption  of  mathematical  relations,  as  they  occur  in 
arithmetic,  for  instance,  in  tlie  rundaiiicntal  operations,  in 
proportion,  etc.  rests  likewise  on  simjde  elementary  per- 
cr]»tit)ns,  is  shown  Nutliciently  in  the  schoolroom. 

\\\'  roiiu'  now  to  the  foiiuation  of  judgments.  In  the 
.simple  pr«»position,  *•  Snow  is  white,''  two  ideas  are  in  con- 
sciousness,—  sul)jeft  and  })redicate.  We  have  here  a 
.s<M*alled  analytical  judgment,  since  the  subject-concept 
••  .snow  "  properly  includes  in  it  the  characteristic  "  white  "  ; 
the  hitter,  in  order  to  direct  attention  to  it,  is  separated  in 
thought  from  that  comiilex.  It  is  the  same  with  the 
j»roposition,  "Mint  is  a  labiate."  The  latter  concept  con- 
tains characteristics  which  are  already  in  the  subject- 
concept  so  far  ;rs  this  is  completely  apjirehended  ;  but  for 
tin*  lime  being  it  is  singled  (mt  for  emphasis,  that  it  may 
Ik*  once  for  all  distinctly   noticed. 

Let  us  take  now  an  incompleled  judgment,  such  as  occurs 
in  lln'  qtiestion  form;  e.g.,  Ho^v  much  is  3X4?  Here 
tlie  j)redicate  idea  that  belongs  with  the  subject  is  still  to 
l»o  sought.  The  ability  of  the  i)U]iil  to  answer  depends 
f»n  wliotlier  the  percejits  of  the  numbers,  of  which  the 
l>redicute  is  comjio.sed,  are  so  clear  and  so  mobile  in  his 
mind,  that  the  idea  sought,  which  he  has  already  learned 
idding.  can  now  arise  in  consciousness.  Tf  this  takes 
subject  and   jiredicate  stand  side   by  side   in  con- 


JUDGMENTS.  1  ?> 

sciousness  :  the  judgmcMit  is  complete.  That  wliicli  wmild 
cause  the  pupil  trouble  is  uujicover  soinething  that  comes 
properly  before  the  act  of  judging  ;  for  the  latter  is  noth- 
ing else  than  an  act  of  mental  representation,  wherein  two 
concepts  (in  the  sense  of  subject  and  predicate)  stand 
together  comi)lete  in  consciousness.  (K  course  the  judg- 
ment may  be  more  complex  than  in  the  above  exanii)les, — 
if  either  the  subject  or  the  predicate,  or  both,  have  a 
more  complicated  form.      For  example:  — 

"  In  tlie  Acadian  land,  on  the  sliores  of  tlic  Basin  of  Miiias, 
Distant,  secluded,  still,  tlie  little  village  <>f  Giand-Pre 
Lay  in  the  fruitful  valley." 

Here  are  associated  with  the  subject  (the  village  of 
Grand-Pre)  certain  characteristics  (distant,  secluded,  still, 
little)  ;  and  likewise  the  predicate  (lay)  is  further,  in  local 
and  other  respects,  more  exactly  described  (in  tlie  Acadian 
land,  on  the  shores  of  the  Basin,  in  the  fruitful  valley). 
In  this  way  arises  one  complex  of  ideas  there  grouped 
about  the  subject,  and  another  one  here  forming  the  predi- 
cate. This  does  not,  however,  in  any  way  change  the  fact 
that  in  both  cases  we  have  to  do  merely  with  the  prese/ifd- 
tlon  of  ideds  in  consciousness.  Although  the  two  groups 
of  ideas  are  at  first  held  asunder  as  subject  and  predicate, 
in  order  that  they  may  be  more  sharply  examined  and 
plainly  apprehended,  yet  they  combine  again  in  con- 
sciousness to  a  compact  mass  of  ideas  which  must  be 
apprehended  as  a  whole.  The  peculiarity  of  judgments, 
therefore,  lies  in  this  :  tliat  tlie  two  ideas  or  complexes 
of  ideas  separating  at  first  as  subject  and  predicate  thus 
become  more  sharp  and  distinct,  and  therefore  combine 
afterwards  all  the  more  readily.  JudgnuMits  are,  accord- 
ingly, a  chief  means  of  niakliKj  ideas  plainer,  and  of  im- 


[.[  TllorcJMT    AND   MEMORY. 

prrfsiiKj  t/iiiii  more  Jinn  ft/  on  tin'  niimJ.  Tlu'  reader  Avill 
now  see  at  oiu-e  the  iiuportiuu-e  nl'  the  art  of  questioning-, 
as   well  as  it-s  speeial   i)uri)ose. 

It  shouhl  Ih"  renuuketl  I'luthcr.  that  when  we  speak  of  a 
'•tluni.u'ht  "  we  j^'enerally  mean  a  judgment;  but  the  ex- 
nri's.sjoii  iiiav.  in  the  wider  sense,  also  stand  for  a  single 
idea. 

We  have  y^t  to  analy/e  the  process  of  rensmihuj.  Take 
the  simplest  possible  example  :  — 

Major  premise:  New  England  belongs  to  the  United 
StJites. 

Minor  premise  :   Massachusetts  belongs  to  New  England. 

(.'oiiclnsion :  Therefore  Massaehusetts  belongs  likewise 
to  the   I'liited  States. 

-\s  is  re;wlily  seen,  to  reason  is  to  judge.  What  is  the 
differenee,  then,  between  the  syllogism  and  other  judg- 
ments ? 

Logic  says:  reasoning  means  deriving  a  new  judgment 
from  two  or  more  given  ones.  Let  us  look  at  the  matter 
entire  exactly  from  the  psyt-hologieal  side,  and  ask  what 
takes  jilace  in  our  minds  \vhen  we  reason. 

Whereas  in  the  simple  judgment  only  two  concepts,  sub- 
ject antl  predicate,  are  held  in  consciousness,  and  repre- 
sented in  tlieir  relation  to  each  other,  in  reasoning  three 
concepts  are  present,  and  therefcn-e  also  three  relations. 
Ill  tin-  ;il«)ve  example  the  three  c(mcepts  are:  New 
'"  '  id.  >Li,ssachusetts,  and  tlu^  United  States.  It  is  this 
■  xity  that  makes  reasoning  m<jre  ditfieult  than  the 
other  processes  of  thinking;  or,  in  other  words,  the  effort 
Ut  hold  in  consciousness  at  tlie  same  time  so  many  ideas, 
Ui^ether  with  their  relations,  in  ])eifect  clearness. 

In   thf   above   example    the   (piestion   is,  AVhat  political 


REASONING.  15 

relation  exists  hetwecn  Mussarliusotts  and  the  United 
States?  This  is  supposed  to  he  unknown,  or  at  least  not 
yet  fully  determined.  As  a  help  to  the  mind,  we  insert 
between  the  two  eoneepts,  "  Massaehusetts  "  and  '•  United 
States,"  which  are  for  consciousness  too  wide  apart,  an 
intermediar}'^  concept,  "  New  England/'  whose  relation  to 
Massachusetts  on  the  one  side,  and  to  the  United  States  on 
the  other,  is  already  known. 

The  reader  will  have  no  trouble  in  recognizing  that  this 
help  to  thinking  —  the  insertion  of  a  middle  concept  be- 
tween concepts  lying  too  far  apart  —  is  entirely  similar  to 
the  help  that  one  makes  use  of  Avhcu  one  is  crossing  a 
creek  or  ditch  that  is  too  wide  to  jump  over.  If  one 
succeeds  in  throwing  a  stone  into  the  middle  of  the  creek 
to  step  on,  thus  requiring  instead  of  a  big  jump  only  two 
little  ones,  the  trouble  is  avoided,  the  impossible  is  made 
possible.  Here  ive  have  the  secret  of  reasoninf/,  as  will  be 
shown  more  exactly  later.  The  above  comparison  may 
further  serve  to  call  attention  to  another  fact.  It  is  cus- 
tomary to  begin  a  s3dlogism  with  the  so-called  major 
premise ;  but,  as  in  crossing  a  creek  as  above,  the  second 
step  cannot  be  taken  before  the  first,  so  one  ought  in 
reasoning  to  begin,  not  with  a  major  premise,  but  w^ith  a 
minor  premise ;  for  the  movement  of  thought  proceeds 
most  easily  from  the  minor  premise  to  the  major  premise, 
as  is  shown  by  the  very  name  and  purpose  of  the  middle 
term. 

Let  us  call  to  mind  now  the  mental  state  after  the 
insertion  of  the  middle  term,  —  what  is  known  and  what 
is  still  sought.  Known  are  two  relations:  that  of  the 
first  term  (Massachusetts)  to  the  middle  term  (New  Eng- 
land), and   (hat  of  the   middle  term  to  the  third   (United 


1  '.  'piiorcnr  ano  memory. 

Si.aos) ;  tlio  ri'iaiiuii  ul  llio  lirst  to  the  third  is  sought. 
This  hiittT  rehitiou  must  be  contained  impliedly  in  the 
two  kuown  ones;  for  else  it  could  not  be  inferred  from 
llitMu.  l>ut  since  it  had  not  previously  been  recognized, 
the  liglit  necessary  to  see  it  must  have  been  Avanting;  and 
if  it  is  to  be  really  noticed  now,  this  illumination  must 
coiiio  to  it  from  st)me  source.  But  whence  can  this  light 
oiMu«'.  since  the  j)rocrss  is  a  purely  interjial  one,  and  there- 
fort?  cannot  rweive  help  from  the  senses  ?  Evidently  from 
the  already  known  ideas,  the  premises.  The  successful 
result  depends  first  of  all  on  their  clearness,  and  secondly 
on  whether  tliey  are  retained  in  consciousness  until  their 
light  lias  spread  over  the  third  relation.  If  this  does  not 
take  place  at  the  lirst  attempt,  it  must  be  owing  to  the 
fa«'t  that  the  full  illumination  is  wanting;  i.e.,  that  the 
pn'liniinary  ctuiditions  —  clearness  and  repose  of  the  ideas 
in  tli«>  premises  —  are  not  yet  fulfilled.  In  such  case 
those  two  ideas  must  be  repeated  and  kept  in  consciousness 
until,  on  the  one  hand,  all  indistinctness  has  disappeared 
from  thrm,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  no  more  disturbance 
is  caused  by  other  ideas. 

We  see  from  the  above  that  even  reasoning,  Avhich  at 
first  api)ears  so  mysterious,  is  nothing  more  than  a  kind 
of  mental  presentation  of  ideas,  which  is  distinguished 
from  otlier  mental  presentations  only  in  that  it  depends 
on  the  clearness  of  two  other  groups  of  ideas,  and  on  these 
n-uiaining  clear  in  cdiisciousness.  That  this  is  so,  and 
indeed  that  reas<^ning  differs  from  the  sense  perception  of 
such  relations  only  in  that  the  former  is  a  purely  internal 
prfH-fss.  while  in  the  latter  case  the  ol)jects  are  present 
to  the  senses  —  of  this  one  can  immediately  convince  one's 
self  by  representing  symbolically  to  the  senses  the  three 


f;i;Ariii<'  svLLO(;isNr. 


17 


torms  of  a  syllo^Msm,  toLictlicr  willi  their  rcUitions.  This 
symbolical  representation  is  usually  made  by  three  circles 
whose  size  and  jxisition  represent  the  three  terms  with 
their  relations.  In  this  way,  as  the  text-books  of  logic 
show,  all  the  figures  of  the  syllogism  may  be  represented 
graphically.  The  circle  may  stand  as  the  symbol  both  of 
the  content  as  well  as  of  the  extent  of  the  concepts.  The 
meaning  of  the  figures  will  be  most  easily  understood,  how- 
ever, if  the  circles  stand  only  for 
the  extent  of  the  concepts.  The 
example  given  above  belongs  to 
the  first  and  simplest  figure  of 
the  syllogism,  and  is  represented 
graphically,  as  in  the  margin. 

The  three  terms  are  here  rep- 
resented in  their  extent  by  the 
visual  image  of  the  circles.  The 
three   relations   of   size,    together 

with  that  of  inclusion  or  exclusion,  can  be  apprehended 
completely,  as  if  they  were  so  many  sense  perceptions. 
There  is,  accordingly,  here  no  possibility  of  any  difficulty 
in  apprehending  the  third  relation.  This  is,  furthermore, 
the  reason  why  the  first  example  was  chosen  from  geog- 
raphy, since  the  relation  of  size  in  the  three  terms  is  here 
of  itself  concrete.  If  the  teacher  Avants  to  make  trial  of 
the  above  drawing  with  his  pupils,  he  may  try  it  first  with 
different  words,  so  as  to  direct  the  attention  to  the  size 
only.  For  example,  the  first  circle  (^lass.)  is  smaller  than 
the  second  (X.  E.) ;  the  second  is  smaller  than  the  third 
(U.  S.)  ;  therefore,  etc.  If  he  wishes  to  make  the  process 
still  plainer  and  more  concrete,  he  may  place  three  pupils 
of  different  height  in  a  row  before  the  class.     A  is  shorter 


is  Tlloldirr    AND    MKMOUV. 

tliaii  r»,  ami  1!  is  sIiuiUt  than  ('.  H'  now  lie  asks  whether 
A  is  ;Uso  shurU'r  than  ('.  everv  one  will  be  ready  with  the 
answer,  "Yes;  certainly."  From  the  above  the  reader  will 
Ih?  eon vi need  that  irasoniii;/  irlwii  it  takes  jdace  internalbj, 
ami  icltfioiit  niitirani  hi'lji,  is  still  preciscl if  the  same  process 
as  tchrn  the  t/irer  tthjcrts  are  present  to  tlie  senses.  Further  : 
that  tlio  suet-t'ss  of  the  unaided  internal  reasoning  depends 
entirely  on  whether  the  twt)  premises  can  be  clearly  pre- 
sented and  ri'tainiMl  f(ir  a  time  uiulisturbed  in  conscious- 
ness. The  same  is  true  of  all  the  other  forms  of  the 
syllogism.  Why  these  latter  are  usually  more  difficult  does 
nut  concern  us  here. 

We  liave  now  I'xamined  in  their  main  features  the  most 
imjMjrtant  processes  (comi)arison,  conception,  judgment,  and 
reasoning)  of  the  human  understaiuling,  and  have  found 
tljat  each  consists  of  a  mental  presentation  of  ideas  in 
consciousness,  or  of  a  combination  of  new  ideas. 


iM'torc  wc  take  up  the  memory,  I  Avant  to  make  a  remark 
alxiut  sense  )»erceptions.  Although  this  may  not  seem  to 
lielong  to  our  theme,  still  it  will  later  be  seen  that  the 
al»ove  discussion,  particularly  one  point  in  regard  to  the 
formation  of  concepts,  is  thereby  desirably  supplemented. 
Tin-  mental  picture  of  a  complex  object — e.g.,  of  a  mountain, 
jiiant,  etc. —  is  usually  thought  of  as  a  mental  produet  that 
lia,s  come  all  at  once  into  existence  in  this  complexity, 
just  as  a  photograph  is  made  by  one  flash  of  the  camera. 
Of  course  it  looks  as  if  we  adults  could  certainly  obtain 
a  mental  picture  of  such  an  object  by  a  momentary  glance 
of  the  eye.  This,  however,  is  an  illusion,  but  more  es- 
pm-irilly  in  the  case  of  a  child  who  is  just  beginning  to  use 
lii.->  M  ii»cs.      For  perception  even  the  simplest  object  is  in 


FOKMATIOX    OF    SKNSF    rEliCErTS.  10 

reality  coiniKmiHl.  It  consists  of  form,  size,  color,  material, 
weijjflit,  hardness,  etc. ;  and  the  form  is,  in  addition,  com- 
posed of  elements  even  in  the  case  of  the  simplest  body, 
namely,  a  sphere.  In  a  simple  tone  we  may  distinguish 
four  elements,  — pitch,  color,  intensity,  and  duration.  Now, 
the  only  way  in  which  any  one  can  secure  a  distinct  per- 
ception of  any  complex  object  is  by  quickly  or  slowly,  or 
even  at  different  times,  examining  and  noticing  every  char- 
acteristic separately.  Furthermore,  be  it  remembered, 
every  characteristic  must  be  repeatedly  observed  before 
the  first  (obscure)  impression  can  grow  into  a  (clear)  per- 
ception. Such  a  perception  is,  accordingly,  to  be  thought 
of  not  as  a  picture  made  with  a  flash  light,  as  it  were,  but 
as  a  mental  product  consisting  of  a  number  of  simple  or 
single  ideas;  viz.,  as  many  as  there  were  characteristics 
noted.  In  short,  it  is  a  complex  of  ideas.  In  this  sense 
the  saying,  "  Our  knowledge  is  piece-work,"  may  be  applied 
here.  This  complex  appears  to  consciousness,  of  course,  as 
a  whole  or  unit,  because  the  object  is  a  unit. 

As  a  rule,  concepts  also,  as  we  have  seen  above,  are  com- 
plexes of  ideas,  but  of  an  entirely  different  kind.  In  sense 
perception  the  characteristics  combine  in  the  idea  because 
they  are  united  in  the  object ;  on  the  other  hand,  in  concep- 
tion we  have  only  definitely  selected  characteri^ics ;  namely, 
such  as  have  been  chosen  by  comparison  of  several  ideas, 
thus  separating,  first  of  all,  common  characteristics,  and 
afterward  from  these,  by  a  more  exact  examination,  the 
essential  ones.  This  knowledge  that  both  sense  percepts 
as  well  as  concepts  are  complexes  of  ideas,  should  direct 
our  attention  to  several  other  important  questions. 

1.  Why  is  a  concrete  percept  fresher,  more  vivid,  and 
nu)V('  cl'fcclive  than  tlu;  corrcspoiuling    concept,   although 


'20  riiorciiT  anp  mk.mory. 

the  lattor  is  loss  (•niiipouiKl  than  the  former?  It  seems 
uow  vt'i-v  jfenenilly  atlmitti'd  that  thought  is  always  accom- 
jKinieil  bv  iiuttor  inaiiit'ostations.  These  are,  of  course, 
more  pronouiu-ed  in  the  ease  of  sense  perceptions,  and  de- 
crease iti  intensity  more  and  more  as  the  ideas  become 
uiore  abstrai't.  In  abstrai-t  ideas  of  the  scientific  sort,  this 
motor  element  is  reduced,  it  would  seem,  to  the  mere  word, 
so  far  as  it  api)ears  in  the  innervation  of  the  muscles  of 
speech.  This  being  the  case,  it  would  seem  clear  that  the 
freshness  and  power  of  concrete  ideas  depends,  for  the 
most  part,  on  this  re-enforcement  received  from  the  motor 
element.  Some  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  all  volition,  even 
tlie  calling  up  of  the  visual  or  auditory  images  in  the  mind, 
is  cITected  by  the  innervation  of  muscles,  and  that  the  only 
jMjssible  expression  of  will  power  is  through  muscles.  So 
far  ;vs  this  is  true  it  throws  important  light  on  the  subject 
of  physical  culture,  and  gives  a  new  reason  for  muscle 
training.* 

L'.  Since  I  he  single  ideas  which  go  to  make  a  concept  are 
also  contained  in  the  different  complexes  of  ideas  out  of 
wliich  they  were  chosen,  as  well  as  in  the  other  complexes 
of  ideius  that  belong  under  this  concept,  and  since,  further, 
e;u-h  of  these  single  ideas  united  with  others  occurs  in  still 
very  many  other  complexes  which  do  not  belong  to  this 
i'oncept,  how  is  one  to  think  of  the  existence  in  the  mind 

•  Itilmt.  nloiij;  witli  many  otiiers,  accepts  as  "a  fuiulaniental  law  that 
tin-  rctlox  18  tlie  solo  tyi)*'  of  all  iioural  action,  of  all  relation,"  and  hence 
t)i;it  "<'v<'r)'  Ktatt'  of  consciousness  always  has  a  tendency  to  express  it- 
)"l(.  to  iiiaiiifrHt  itself,  by  a  movement,  an  act."  See  Ribot's  Diseases 
o/  i/ir  Will,  pHi/rhnlnt/i/  of  AUrnlio7i,  and  Diseases  of  the  Memorij,  three 
liiilf  booki  of  r_'()-'_»00  j>:it;<*s  each,  full  of  very  sn,2;g;estivo  ideas  for  every 
i<'.i<li<T.  .M  UiisirrJxTjr  has  basud  his  theory  of  association  of  ideas  ou  the 
motor  vhriiicnt  in  all  thought. 


TIIK    Kr.K.MKNTS    <)K    TII()r<;HT.  21 

of  the  siiii;I(>  ideas,  of  tlie  complexes  of  ideas,  and  of  the 
concepts  ?  In  other  words,  and  more  exactly,  docs  such  a 
single  idea  (e.g.,  round,  four-cornered,  long,  short,  broad, 
narrow,  bitter,  sweet,  learned,  smart,  foolish,  just,  etc.) 
exist  many  hundred  times  in  the  mind, —  once  pcrhajis  as  a 
single  idea,  then  so  and  so  many  hundred  times  in  different 
lower  and  higher  concepts ;  then,  again,  so  and  so  ijiany  thou- 
sand times  in  sense  perceptions,  —  or  must  one  think  of  it  in 
an  entirely  different  way?  And  how  do  the  concei)ts  and 
sense  perceptions  themselves  exist  in  the  mind  ?  This  is 
not  the  place  to  attempt  a  final  solution  of  these  (questions 
by  argument;  but  a  com[)arison  with  another  field  of  phe- 
nomena that  lies  open  to  every  one's  observation  can  i)er- 
haps  put  us  on  the  track  of  a  correct  understanding.  This 
field  of  phenomena  is  human  society.  There  are  here,  first 
of  all,  individuals ;  further,  families,  groups  of  friends  and 
relations,  civil  and  religious  communities,  cities,  towns, 
states,  nations,  federal  unions,  guilds,  railroad  companies, 
singing-societies,  missionary  societies,  and  all  the  other 
many  small  and  large  associations  for  different  ])urposes. 
All  of  these  exist;  but  liow  do  they  exist  ?  Is  the  exis- 
tence of  an  individual  of  the  same  sort  as  that  of  a  society  ? 
Does  each  human  being  exist  first  as  an  individual,  and 
then  once  more  as  a  member  of  a  family,  and  once  more, 
again,  as  a  member  of  society,  and  further,  as  many  times  as 
there  are  different  associations  to  which  he  belongs?  To 
be  sure,  we  say  the  family,  the  community,  the  state,  etc., 
exist,  and  of  course  they  do  exist;  but  what  is  it  in  each 
of  these  cases  that  exists  hodihj?  Evidently  that  whieli 
exists  as  an  actual  being  is  only  the  individual.  The 
names,  family,  circle  of  friends,  singing-societies,  etc.,  de- 
note not  actual  beings,  but  only  relations  of  bodily  beings 


22  TiiormiT  and  imemouy. 

or  iniliviihuils  to  one  another.  They  are  concepts  of  rela- 
tion. That  which  exists  in  human  societies  is  nothing 
more  than  tliese  rchitions,  and  they  exist  only  as  qualities 
of  inilividuals.  Thus,  for  instance,  friendship  has  its  ex- 
jsionce  in  the  mutual  affection  of  those  concerned,  —  the 
nation,  in  the  hiui^Muige  Avhicli  its  members  speak,  —  the 
.stH-ial  ori,'anizations  in  the  consciousness  of  common  in- 
terests, and  perhaps  also  in  sympathetic  feelings,  etc. 
These  relatit)ns  are  also  sometimes  very  well  expressed 
in  outward  forms  to  the  senses :  thus  nationality  in  the 
audildc  and  visible  forms  of  language,  the  other  associa- 
tions by  written  statutes,  by  symbols  of  recognition,  etc. ; 
but  all  of  these  are  only  si(/ns  of  the  relations  or  real  quali- 
ties of  individuals.  Moreover,  the  associations  can  also 
carry  on  all  sorts  of  work,  great  and  small,  —  present  operas 
on  the  stage,  build  railroads,  fight  battles,  spread  culture, 
etc. ;  but  the  real  power  that  accomplishes  this  work  is  not 
in  tlie  "singing-society,"  "railroad  company,''  "state," 
«*  school,"  etc.,  but  in  the  separate  children  of  men  which 
have  applied  their  hands  to  the  undertaking.  There  is,  of 
course,  no  "spirit  of  the  times,"  "class  spirit,"  etc.,  in  ac- 
tual existence  outside  of  rhetoric  and  poetry. 

Wliat  you  the  Spirit  of  tlie  Ages  call, 
Is  uotliing  but  the  spirit  of  you  all. 

Faust,  part  i.  scene  i. 

If  accordingly  one  wants  to  know  what  really  exists  in 
the  concepts,  community,  state,  etc.,  one  must  turn  to  the 
sf»j»arate  human  beings.  Thus,  a  person  may  be  by  pro- 
f«'ssion  engaged  as  a  teacher ;  the  same  person,  however,  is 
I>or]iai»s.  at  tiie  same  time,  husband,  father,  son,  brother, 
ote. ;  in  another  relation  the  same  person  helps  represent 
a  religious  and   a  civil  community;  furthermore,  a  state, 


SlMl'LK    IDEAS.  23 

a  schoolmasters'  association,  a  charity  organization,  etc. 
Notwithstanding  all  of  these  divisions  of  a  person's  life, 
the  person  docs  not  become  divided,  but  remains  as  he  is, 
—  an  individual,  iiiiHrlsihlc  ;  and  just  as  little  is  he  multi- 
plied in  number,  remaining  what  he  is, — a  single  i)erson. 

It  is  precisely  the  same  with  the  intellectual  products 
of  the  mind,  the  separate  ideas  and  their  different  com- 
binations,—  percepts,  concepts,  imaginary  ideas,  trains  of 
thought,  complexes,  and  systems  of  ideas.  (!orres})onding 
to  the  individuals  in  society  are  here  the  simple  ideas;  i.e., 
the  partial  ideas  or  characteristics.  Such  an  elementary 
idea  helps  at  one  moment,  united  with  others,  to  form  a 
sense  preception  ;  at  another  moment,  a  concept  or  an  ima- 
ginary idea  ;  and  so  from  moment  to  moment  still  other  com- 
plexes of  ideas.  Nevertheless,  it  exists  in  the  mind  only 
once,  —  just  as  a  person  exists  only  as  a  single  being.  All 
complexes  of  ideas,  on  the  other  liand,  exist  in  the  mind 
not  as  separate  things  outside  of  and  in  addition  to  the 
simple  ideas  —  or  else  each  of  the  latter  would  have  to  be 
present  as  many  times  as  it  has  entered  into  combinations. 
Notwithstanding  this,  since  these  complexes  appear  in 
consciousness  as  complete  wholes,  they  seem  to  be  separate 
things.  All  that  is  to  be  regarded  as  essentially  existing 
in  these  phenomena  —  aside  from  the  constituent  elements 
or  simple  ideas  —  are  solely  the  laws  of  association  by 
means  of  which  these  separate  ideas  are  called  into  con- 
sciousness at  the  same  time.  This  point,  —  namely,  that 
only  the  simple  ideas  are  the  proper  mental  existences; 
that,  on  the  contrary,  all  complexes  of  ideas  are  only  tran- 
sient combinations,  —  must  be  distinctly  understood  and 
kept  firmly  in  mind,  if  one  is  ever  to  escape  from  the  fog 
and   din  of  psychological  discussion.     TUit  this  also  opens 


•J  I  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

ui»  a  viow  into  tlie  woiulorlaiul  of  the  soul,  so  that  one 
lUtea  not  know  which  to  lulniire  the  more,  —  the  illimitable 
diversity  of  phenomena,  or  the  extraordinary  simplicity  of 
the  L'ontrolliug  laws. 

If  l\w  n'ador  is  at  all  Incllneil  to  follow  out  the  relation  of  logic  to 
psyihulogy,  and  particularly  of  the  different  figures  of  the  syllogism 
ill  sonso-poroeplioii  and  ahstraction,  he  will  find  a  very  profitable 
tlisiHission  from  the  Hegelian  standpoint  in  Harris's  Introduction  to 
the  Sillily  of  Philomphy,  Section  V.,  where  Dr.  Harris  "develops 
some  new  insight  into  the  nature  of  sense-perception,"  which  he 
"has  receully  discovered  after  many  years'  study  on  the  subject" 
(p.  W). 

On  the  processes  of  thought,  see  Dewey's  Psychology,  chap,  viii., 
'•  Thinking" ;  a  clear  and  concise  account.  Sully,  in  chap.  ix.  and  x. 
of  the  (hitliucs  of  Psycholoijy,  is  particularly  good,  since  his  descrip- 
tion is  from  the  psycholo</ical  standpoint,  instead  of  from  the  point 
of  view  of  loijic,  as  is  the  case  with  nearly  all  the  other  text-books. 
I'reyer's  Mental  Detelopment  of  the  Child  contains,  p.  80-83,  a  sym- 
pathetic account  of  the  development  of  a  child's  thinking  powers. 
The  formation  of  higher  ideas  is  described  in  chap.  viii. ;  the  influ- 
ence of  language  on  the  development  of  thought,  p.  159-163,  and  still 
more  fully  in  Ihtclopmcnt  of  the  Intellect,  chap.  xvi.  p.  3-33. 

The  teacher  will  find  many  clear  ideas  and  interesting  points 
brought  out  in  James's  Psychology,  I.,  chap.  xii.  and  xiii.  on  concep- 
tion, discrimination,  and  comparison.  Read  also  chaj).  ix.  on  "The 
•Stream  of  Thought." 

Baldwin  (Mental  Development  in  the  Child  and  the  Pace,  1895) 
lay.s  great  stress  on  the  motor  side  of  thought,  going  so  far  as  to 
define  conception  as  a  "motor  habit"  of  reaction.  Hence  he 
denies  all  content  to  abstract  terms,  and  claims  that  they  are  simply 
"attitudes,  expectations,  motor  tendencies."  Iloyce  seems  to  agree 
with  all  of  this. 

]5.     Of  Memory. 

The  expression  "  to  commit  to  memory  "  is  usually  em- 
ployed in  a  narrow  sense,  being  restricted  to  a  particular 
manner  of  committing;  viz.,  by  repetition.    It  is  sometimes 


THE   CONTENT   OF    MEMOllY.  25 

used  in  a  still  navvowcr  sense  to  refer  only  to  ideas  clothed 
in  words.  Wliilr  Mils  is  all  riglit  so  far  as  the  meaning  of 
the  word  is  concerned,  if  sanctioned  by  usage,  we  should, 
however,  bear  in  mind  that  tlie  word  "  memory  "  has  also 
a  nuudi  larger  meaning,  and  that  there  are  other  ways  of 
committing  to  memory  besides  rei)etition.  It  is  nowhere 
more  harmful  than  in  the  field  of  psychology  to  take  the 
traditional  and  ])()i)ulav  meaning  of  an  expression  as  a 
scientific  guide,  without  due  consideration.  For  the  popu- 
lar meaning  dates  usually  from  a  time  when  psychology 
"  had  not  where  to  lay  its  head,"  to  say  nothing  of  scien- 
tific recognition.  -  The  meaning  referred  to  above  assigns 
to  memory  but  half  its  field,  and  restricts  its  action  in  that 
field.  This  is  not  true  of  the  following  definition  taken 
from  the  Crtttitri/  Bictionari/y  "MemoYy  is  the  mental 
capacity  of  retaining  unconscious  traces  of  conscious  im- 
pressions or  states,  and  of  recalling  these  traces  to  con- 
sciousness with  the  attendant  perception  that  they  (or 
their  objects)  have  a  certain  relation  to  the  past."  The 
word  is  also  used  for  the  powder  of  such  retention  alone ; 
while  the  power  or  act  of  recalling  is  termed  recollection. 
While  it  is  in  the  larger  sense  above  that  we  use  the  word 
here,  we  must  notice  these  two  aspects  of  memory.  The 
first  has  reference  to  its  content,  the  stock  of  ideas  pres- 
ent, together  with  the  associated  feelings  and  desires ;  the 
second  looks  to  tlie  power  of  the  mind  to  recall  tliese  to 
consciousness.  Since,  however,  the  second  presupposes  the 
content  of  memory,  the  following  discussion  will  be  con- 
fined to  the  power  of  recollection.  But  the  reader  will 
please  bear  in  mind  that  the  content  of  the  memory  in-- 
eludes,  not  nu^rely  this  or  that  sjjecial  kind  of  mental 
product,  but  all  kinds  whatsoever,  every  mental  state, 
whole  or  partial,  that  has  ever  occupied  consciousness. 


•26  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

"With  this  undorstaiulini,'  avo  could  then  at  once  proceed 
to  consider  tlie  laws  of  memory  according  to  which  ideas 
are  rwalled  to  consciousness.  But  such  general  state- 
ments as  were  before  made  in  regard  to  the  content  of 
memory  ami  the  power  of  recollection  are  altogether  too 
liable  to  present  to  the  reader  many  obscure  points,  unless 
they  have  come  after  the  consideration  of  a  large  number 
of  observed  facts.  AVe  shall,  therefore,  first  present  ex- 
amples of  some  of  the  different  kinds  of  recollection. 

First  of  all,  take  those  instances  of  which  we  commonly 
tliink  when  we  speak  of  memory,  —  the  reproduction  of 
groups  and  trains  of  thought  which  have  been  intention- 
ally committed  to  memory  by  repetition ;  e.g.,  words  of  a 
foreign  language,  a  melody,  a  map,  a  literary  selection,  etc. 

With  these  the  reader  may  compare  those  recollections 
which,  while  likew'ise  very  prominent,  are  not  the  result 
of  any  intentional  committing  to  memory.  Thus  we  can, 
for  example,  call  to  mind,  as  plainly  as  if  present  to  the 
eyes,  the  ai>i)earance  of  our  father's  house  outside  and  in- 
side, witli  all  its  rooms  and  furniture ;  likewise  our  parents, 
otlier  relatives  and  neighbors,  and  the  whole  landscape  of 
the  liome  of  our  childhood,  with  all  its  roads  and  paths, 
mountains,  valleys,  woods,  fields,  and  groups  of  houses. 
Similarly  we  can  recall  with  ease  the  mental  picture  of 
other  houses  and  places  in  which  we  have  lived  for  any 
considerable  time.  The  mother  tongue  is  also  learned  in 
tliis  way,  so  far  as  it  takes  place  without  regular  instruc- 
ti(»n.  In  all  of  these  and  similar  cases  there  has  been 
a  fnvjuent  repetition  of  the  perceptions,  which  fact  is  the 
cau.se  of  the  distinctness,  fidelity,  and  certainty  of  their 
roprcKhiction;  but  the  repetition  has  not  been  intentional. 

The  exact  reverse  of  these  examples  would  be  such  re- 


EXAMPLES,  27 

production  as  takes  place  after  only  once  receiving  tlu;  im- 
pression. In  such  cases  tliere  is  neither  intentional  nor 
unintentional  repetition  to  help  the  memory.  Thus,  for 
example,  if  the  teacher  after  relating  a  story,  thereuixju 
asks  cpiestions  in  regard  to  its  main  features,  or  calls  for 
its  repetition  at  once  ;  or  if  he  calls  on  his  pupils  to  repeat 
after  him  a  sentence  or  a  verse  ;  (jr  if  a  child  after  he  has 
once  been  taken  to  a  distant  place,  then  has  to  find  his 
way  thither  alone. 

In  all  of  the  above  examples  the  act  of  reproduction  is 
prominent.  l>ut  there  are  also  mental  processes  in  which 
the  memory  plays  a  part  without  our  usually  thinking  of 
it.  These  cases  are  for  our  investigation  (piite  as  impor- 
tant as  those  above,  and  must  also  be  illustrated  by  some 
examples. 

What  is  meant  when  we  say  that  the  pupils  have  satis- 
factorily understood  what  was  told  them  in  the  history 
lesson  ?  What  is  it  that  has  taken  place  in  their  minds  ? 
"Let  us  see.  First  of  all,  the  pupils  have  heard  the  spoken 
words ;  or,  more  exactly,  they  have  had  auditory  sense 
perceptions.  In  the  second  place,  with  each  word  and  sen- 
tence as  heard  the  sense  has  occurred  to  their  minds ;  i.e., 
the  mental  pictures  of  the  things  denoted  by  these  words 
(persons,  objects,  processes,  and  relations)  have  had  to  ap- 
pear in  consciousness.  Now,  all  this  presupposes,  of  course, 
that  the  meaning  of  the  expressions  used  was  already 
known.  In  order  to  understand  what  was  related  to  them, 
the  pupils  have  therefore  had  to  recall  continually-  to  mind 
already  known  ideas.  At  the  sound  of  the  words  these 
ideas  arose  from  the  depths  of  the  mind  into  consciousness, 
and  so  grouped  and  arranged  themselves  that  tlie  story 
seemed  to  take  place,  as  it  were,  before  the  very  eyes  of 


% 


28  THOUGHT    AND   MEMORY. 

the  pupils.  This  prtx-ess  of  umlorstainliug  devieruls  accord- 
ingly on  the  working  together  of  two  entirely  different  men- 
tal proeesses  :  — 

(1.)  On  a  new  perception  (tlirough  the  ear)  ;  and 

(^L'.)  (hi  a  resulting  reproduction  of  old  ideas. 

When  we  say  that  such  an  understanding  requires  ima- 
gination, we  mean,  first  of  all,  to  say  that  the  persons,  ob- 
jtrts,  and  events,  which  the  pupils  are  to  think  of,  do  not 
stand  before  their  eyes  bodily,  and  therefore  cannot  be  per- 
ceived by  the  senses.  The  expression  merely  emphasizes 
the  second  factor  of  the  process,  —  recollection.^ 

All  that  is  said  above  in  regard  to  understanding  what  is 
orally  related  is  of  course  true  of  oral  instruction  of  every 
kind,  as  well  as  of  conversation  and  of  reading,  except  that 
in  the  latter  case  sight  takes  the  place  of  hearing.  In 
short,  the  immediate  understanding  of  language  of  any 
kind  depends  on  the  two  factors  named,  —  the  sense  percep- 
tion of  the  verbal  forms,  and  the  resulting  reproduction  of 
the  a.ssoeiated  ideas. 

We  will  now  examine  the  process  of  the  formation  of 
concepts,  to  see  what  i)art  memory  plays  here.  We  saw 
alx)ve  how  the  child  in  an  entirely  natural  and  spontaneous 
way  prm^eeds  gradually  from  the  percept  "  mountain,"  to 
the  concept  "  mountain."  AVhen  he  sees  another  elevation, 
and  says,  *'  That  is  a  mountain  too,^'  this  shows  that  the 
former  image;  must  have  occurred  to  him  again.  Even  the 
very  name  used  is  recalled ;  and  this  fact  bears  witness  that 
its  meaning  also,  the  idea,  has  returned  more  or  less  dis- 
tinctly.    When  a  third,  fourth,  or  fifth  mountain  is  seen, 

>  No  nlliiKJon  is  liere  made  to  that  free  scope  which  tlie  imi^gination 
ha*,  or  iniKht  have,  iu  such  a  case  as  the  above,  iu  picturing  the  details 
that  arc  not  described  in  words. 


MEMORY   IN   CONCEPTION    AND   JUDGMENT.  20 

this  reproduction  is  repeated  ;  for  if  it  were  not,  the  foniui- 
tion  of  the  concept  couhl  not  proceed.  All  of  this  shows 
plainly  that  even  in  the  spontaneous  rise  of  concepts, 
memory  is  an  essential  factor.  From  step  to  step  the  new 
perception  forms  the  first  factor,  and  the  reproduction  of 
the  corresponding  earlier  idea,  the  other  factor.  And  it  is 
the  latter  that  is  essential  to  the  process ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  sense  perception,  as  we  shall  see  later,  may 
in  other  cases  be  replaced  by  a  reproduced  idea. 

But  the  spontaneous  f(jrmation  of  concepts  must  be  suj)- 
plemented  by  instruction.  With  this  purpose  in  view  the 
teacher  may  have  his  })upils  observe  and  compare  two  or 
more  objects  present  to  their  senses,  or  pictures  of  such 
objects.  If,  however,  the  objects  in  question  are  already 
known  to  the  pupils,  the  comparison  might  take  place  as  a 
purely  internal  process,  relying  on  reproduction  alone.  If 
they  are  incorporeal  in  their  nature,  as  is  mostly  the  case 
in  the  field  of  mental  sciences  (e.g.,  if  peculiarities  of  char- 
acter, moral  and  religious  causes,  social  relations,  etc.,  are 
to  be  considered),  the  comparison  cannot  be  otherwise  than 
purely  internal ;  i.e.,  based  on  reproduced  ideas.  The  only 
reason  why  school  instruction  seeks  to  present  material 
objects  to  the  senses  when  they  are  being  studied,  is,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  make  the  comparison  easier ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  be  able  to  correct  any  mistakes  promptly,  —  in  a 
word,  in  order  more  certainly  to  secure  a  good  result.  Ac- 
cordingly, it  is  not  essential  to  the  process  of  conception, 
that  the  objects  be  presented  to  the  senses ;  this  process 
merely  presupposes  that  there  are  concrete  ideas  present  in 
the  mind.  They  form  the  raw  material,  out  of  which' 
something 'new  is  to  be  created ;  and  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  these  were  gained  earlier,  or  were  just  received,  or 
were  again  refreshed  by  perception. 


30  THOrciHT   AND   MEMORY. 

It  is  viTV  simihir  with  tlu>  I'onuation  oi  jmhjments.  In 
this  prDC'oss,  as  we  saw  before,  two  ideas  —  subject  and 
pmlirate  —  eonie  into  consciousness  together,  as  if  they 
belonged  together  in  this  particular  relation.  It  was 
further  to  be  noticed  that  this  separation  into  two  of  what 
was  still  to  be  thought  of  as  one,  has  the  purpose  and  result 
of  laying  greater  stress  on  one  of  these  ideas  ;  namely,  the 
predicate.  The  judgment,  "The  boy  is  writing,"  means 
essentially  nothing  more  than  the  expression,  "a  boy  writ- 
ing." There  is,  however,  this  important  difference  between 
the  two  mental  acts,  that  in  the  latter  case  the  character- 
istic "  writing  "  is  of  the  same  dignity  as  the  rest,  while  in 
the  tirst  case  it  receives  all  the  emphasis  of  a  chief  charac- 
teristic. One  step  farther.  If  this  selection  of  a  single 
feature  out  of  a  complex  idea,  as  it  is  outwardly  repre- 
sented in  a  judgment  expressed  in  language,  is  actually 
an  act  of  the  mind,  which  would  take  place  according  to 
natural  laws  even  without  the  mediation  of  language,  then 
the  formation  of  judgments  must  be  just  as  spontaneous 
as  that  of  concepts.  I'ut  if  this  is  so,  \\o\\  does  the  mind 
come  of  itself  to  adopt  this  judgment  form  ?  In  other 
words,  what  is  the  natural  and  spontaneous  process  of 
making  a  judgment?  As  preliminary  to  the  answer,  we 
may  say  at  once,  that  if,  instead  of  an  ordinary  complex 
idea  (for  exami)le,  a  boy  writing),  there  arises  in  the  mind 
a  judgment  idea  (the  boy  writes),  or,  in  other  Avords,  if  out 
of  a  complex  idea  a  single  characteristic  rises  in  conscious- 
nes.s  superior  to  the  rest,  there  must  have  been  some  im- 
pulse present  to  cause  it.  We  must  try  to  find  this  impulse. 
If  we  discover  it,  all  that  was  obscure  in  the  making  of 
judgments  will  ])r()bably  become  clear. 

There  is  one  incentive  to  tlie  making  of  judgments  which, 


SPONTANEOUS   JUDGMENT.  31 

though  artificial  in  its  iiuture,  school  practice  has  known 
from  time  immemorial ;  and  wherever  it  has  been  rightly 
understood,  it  has  been  diligently  employed.  It  is  the 
interrogative  form.  A  question  is,  as  already  remarked 
above,  an  incompleted,  half-finished  judgment;  one  portion 
of  a  complex:  idea,  whether  subject  or  predicate,  is  named, 
while  the  other  part  is  to  be  sought.  IJoth  subject  and 
predicate  may  be  named,  of  course,  in  the  question,  but 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  require  some  further  qualification 
of  the  one  or  tlie  other.  The  interrogative  form  accord- 
ingly makes  the  p\q)il  notice  an  omission  in  an  already 
known  complex  idea,  and  points  to  it  with  the  finger,  as 
it  were.  That  is  the  external  impulse.  In  the  attention 
thereby  roused  and  directed  to  this  omission,  lies  the  in- 
ternal impulse  ;  so  that  the  idea  sought  is,  on  being  found, 
brought  more  strongly  and  separately  into  consciousness. 
This  completes,  then,  the  act  of  judgment ;  for  a  judgment 
is,  as  we  must  keep  well  in  mind,  not  a  mysterious  miracle, 
but  nothing  more  than  the  simple  process  by  Avhich,  out  of 
a  conscious  complex  idea,  a  partial  idea  arises  so  strong  as 
to  gain  separate  attention.  The  interrogative  form  is  there- 
fore an  example  of  how  through  language  a  person  may 
intentionally  lead  another  to  make  use  of  the  judgment 
form ;  but  we  have  yet  to  seek  the  impulse  that  calls  forth 
spontaneous  judgment.  In  this  case  the  source  must  be  in 
the  object ;  i.e.,  some  characteristic  of  the  object  itself  must 
strike  one  prominently.  All  natural  circumstances  which 
arouse  the  attention,  —  provided  they  direct  it  to  some- 
thing definite,  —  find  their  expression  spontaneously  in  the 
form  of  judgments.  Every  good  language  lesson  will  make 
abundant  application  of  this  principle.  Teachers  have 
every  cause  to  pay  special  attention  to  that  part  of  psy- 


32  TnorniiT  and  isiemory. 

choloijy  whii'li  tivats  of  spontaneous  attention.  The  most 
prominent  of  those  incentives  to  attention  is  contrast, 
which  we  will  illustrate  b}'  a  couple  of  examples. 

Suppose  a  child  has,  until  now,  seen  only  red  roses. 
When  he  sees  a  yellow  one  for  the  first  time,  his  attention 
will  be  roused.  The  present  sense  idea  recalls  the  earlier 
imago  of  such  flowers,  so  that  there  are  now  two  ideas  in 
consciousness.  In  so  far  as  they  are  alike  they  are  taken 
in  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  no  notice  is  taken.  The 
differing  characteristic,  "yellow,"  on  the  other  hand,  which 
causes  tlie  contrast,  attracts  attention,  and  pushes  to  the 
front  in  consciousness.  Although  the  i\ew  object  is  per- 
ceived in  its  totality,  still  •this  differing  characteristic  is 
prominent,  and  therefore  gains  special  vividnessu  It  is, 
properly  speaking,  a  new  piece  of  information.  Now,  it  is 
just  this  peculiar  state  of  ideas  that  we  call  a  judgment. 
It  is  plain  to  see,  moreover,  why  the  expression,  "  a  yellow 
rose,"  in  which  the  characteristics  are  co-ordinated,  does 
not  satisfy  the  mind,  but  only  the  ^^oiVi^ecZ  judgment, 
''This  rose  is  yellow.''^  It  makes  no  difference  whether 
this  is  spoken  or  not;  for  judgment  is  a  purely  mental  pro- 
cess. Take  another  example.  A  team  of  two  black 
horses  is  passing  by.  To  an  observer  the  sight  would  prob- 
ably pro«luce  an  idea  such  as  would  find  expression  in  the 

'  The  Chinese  language  is  not  inflected,  and,  like  other  languages  origi- 
nally, operalefl  with  word  roots  of  only  one  syllable.  The  position  of  the 
qualifying  wonl  Ix-fon;  or  after  the  substantive  distinguishes  the  attribu- 
livo  from  the  judgment  form.  Thus  the  sound  ta  means,  without  any 
change  of  form,  great,  greatness,  and  to  be  great.  If  ta  stands  before 
a  HulMtantive,  it  has  the  meaning  of  an  adjective.  Thus  ta  jin  means  a 
f^reat  man.  If  tn  stands  after  a  substantive,  it  is  a  predicate,  or,  as  we 
■hniihl  »ay,  a  verb.  Tliu8ji//t  ta  (or  jin  ta  ye)  would  mean.  The  man  is 
«Ti-at.    Sec  Max   Miiller,  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language,  i.  p. 


MEMORY  IN  JUDGMENT  AND  REASONING.     33 

words,  "two  black  horses."  If,  liowcvcr,  one  of  tlie  horses 
is  white,  the  contrast  wonhl  attract  notice,  and  lead  to  the 
more  pointed  expression,  "  One  horse  is  l)lack ;  the  other 
is  white."  The  reason  fen-  the  dcjiiljle  judgment,  as  one 
sees,  is  the  fact  that  the  two  rival  objects  appear  simultane- 
ously to  the  senses,  and  therefore  have  ecpud  claim  to  be 
regarded  or  judged. 

We  now  return  to  our  t)rigin;d  point  of  view,  and  inquiie 
in  what  measure  memory  lielp^  in  the  formation  of  judg- 
ments. Tliis  depends  in  each  case  on  whether  the  two 
ideas  which  lead  to  the  judgment  are  from  immediate 
observation  or  are  reproduced.  The  former  condition,  iis 
in  the  last,  example,  above,  will  seldom  be  fultilled.  In- 
stances'suck  as  4l;^e  first  example  aljove,  in  which  one  idea 
is  a  perce[ition,  the  other  a  recollection,  are  much  more 
freqiient.  lii,  the  field  of  the  mental  sciences,  in  which 
most  ideas  are  conveyed  by  language,  both  terms  of  the 
judgment  must  be,  for  the  most  part,  reproduced  ideas. 
We  have  been  considering  the  unintentional  or  entirely 
spontaneous  judgments.  When,  however,  the  process  is 
intentional  and  meditated,  we  find  just  the  same  three 
cases  ;  only  it  is  to  be  noticed  here,  —  e.g.,  in  silent  medita- 
tion, in  conversation,  or  in  the  composition  of  any  writing, — 
that  the  reproduced  ideas  are  still  more  frequent.  Accord- 
ingly, an  abundant  supply  of  ideas  by  the  memory  is  re- 
quisite for  the  ready  exercise  of  judgment. 

It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  speak  separately  of  the 
process  of  reasoning,  since  it  has  to  do  with  judgments, 
and  its  conclusion  is  likewise  a  judgment;  and  therefore 
all  the  above  discussion  applies  equally  well  to  it. 

What  has  now  been  said  of  the  origin  of  concepts,  judg- 
ments, and  reasoning,  shows  that  even  in  these  processes 


;■;}  THOrC.HT   AXD   MEMORY. 

of  thinkiug  proper,  memory  plays  a  much  greater  part  than 
is  commonly  believed.  Nor  have  we  called  to  miud  yet 
all  the  assistiim-t!  llwit  memory  renders  in  the  process  of 
thinking. 

Wo  saw   above   that    the    understanding   produces    new 
ideas,  either  conceptual  or  judgmental  in  form.    Either  :  — 
Ftrsf,  on  the  basis  of  two  perceptions  ;  or, 
Sn'omi/f/,  on  the  basis  of  a  perception  and  a  reproduced 
idea;  or 

Thirdli/,  on  the  basis  of  two  reproduced  ideas. -^ 
We  liave  assumed  above  that  sense  perception  is  ex- 
clusively an  activity  of  the  senses,  and  that  it  belongs, 
therefore,  entirely  to  the  elementary  raw  production  of 
the  mind.  This  is,  however,  not  the  fact.  Only  in  con- 
trast to  the  new  ideas  which  are  produced  in  thought  and 
imagination  can  the  perceptions  rightly  be  called  raw 
products.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  perceptions  of  the 
outer  world  are  possible  only  through  the  senses ;  but  that 
is  not  saying  that  they  are  exclusively  a  product  of  the 
senses.  The  senses  by  themselves  never  produce  anything 
but  sensations,  even  in  the  case  of  the  practised  senses  qf 
ailults.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  a  certain  object  has 
once  j)r(Mluced  a  sensation  in  the  mind ;  wlien  this  takes 
place  later,  a  second  time,  this  new  sensation  will  recall 
the  former  one.  This  reproduction  does  not,  however, 
result  in  a  twofold  sensation,  or  double  seeing;  but,  since 
the  two  sensations  are  comi)letely  alike  in  their  content, 
they  coalesce  in  consciousness  into  one  act ;  in  other  words, 
tln'y  unite  in  result,  so  as  to  be  much  stronger  intensively 
than  the  first  sensation  was.     With  every  following  new 

'  For  tho  sake  of  brevity  we  sjieak  here  of  two  ideas,  but  of  course  in 
•very  ca»c  there  may  bo  several. 


APPEIlCErTION.  35 

sensation  coming  from  the  same  object,  this  reproduction 
of  previous  similar  sensations,  or  of  their  last  total  result, 
is  repeated,  as  well  as  their  coalescence  in  consciousness. 
As  this  composite  act  becomes  intensively  stronger  and 
stronger,  i.e.,  plainer,  it  comes  at  last  to  be  what  we  cull 
perception.  Thus,  although  an  act  of  sensation  must  be 
oft  repeated  if  it  is  to  give  rise  to  a  perception,  still  the 
real  reason  of  the  superiority  of  the  latter,  as  one  sees, 
does  not  lie  in  this  repeated  production  of  the  new  sensa- 
tion, but  in  the  resulting  production  of  the  already  present 
similar  sensations.  The  fact  that  Ave  are  not  conscious  of 
the  reproduction  in  these  cases  is  because  the  newly  pro- 
duced sensation  and  that  which  is  reproduced  are  com- 
pletely, or  at  least  essentially,  alike,  and  therefore  at  once 
run  together,  or  fuse  into  one  act  of  sensation.  Later  on, 
when  these  combined  acts  have  perfected  themselves  into 
an  objective  perception,  we  often  notice  very  plainly  that 
a  reproduction  has  taken  place ;  for  in  these  cases  we  speak 
of  "  recognition."  If  now,  as  we  have  seen,  even  the  ap- 
parently primitive  perception  receives  its  main  strength 
from  a  reproduction  of  former  sensations,  it  is  plain  that 
those  processes  of  conception  and  judgment  which  are 
prompted  by  a  transient  perception  (see  above,  p.  34)  also 
receive  this  sense  element  chiefly  from  recollection,  rather 
than  from  the  senses  direct. 

For  the  present,  let  us  lay  particular  emphasis  on  this 
fact,  that  knowledge  is  necessary  for  the  assimilation  of 
knowledge.  If  some  would  object  to  the  use  of  the  word 
apperception  in  such  an  extended  meaning,  they  will  at 
least  have  to  content  themselves  with  the  fact  that  in  all 
the  operations  of  the  mind  the  memory  plays  a  more  or 
less  conspicuous  part,  and  is  always  essential  to  the  con- 


3(»  TllorciIT    AND    IMEMOllY. 

Sfjous  processes  of  thought.  Lange  and  De  Garmo  do  not 
hesiUiti'  to  say  that  "all  learning  is  apperceiving."  The 
roprtKluced  ideas  arc  the  '' api)erceptivc  organs"  for  grasp- 
ing and  itssiniilating  the  new. 

Wo  ean  elose  our  i-nipirieal  treatment  of  the  memory 
here,  and  sum  up  the  results  as  follows :  — 

{'I.)  Mkmokv  in  the  widest  sense  is  the  mental  capacity 
of  retaining  and  recalling  all  the  sensations  and  percep- 
tion.>*,  as  well  as  all  the  products  of  thought  and  imagina- 
tion, wliether  ideas,  feelings,  or  volitions,  which  have 
cwistod  in  consciousness,  including  all  the  associations 
formed  among  these  mental  states. 

(ft.)  In  tlie  memory  we  must  distinguish  a^Jrtsstwe  and  an 
art  ire  si<le,  if  these  expressions  may  be  allowed  for  the 
time  heing.  As  apparently  resting  or  passive,  we  under- 
stand the  memory  in  so  far  as  the  ideas,  etc.,  are  unco7i- 
srioim ;  as  active,  when  these  are  recalled,  i.e.,  brought 
agjiin  into  consciousness. 

('•.)  Wliatever  of  the  content  of  memory  cannot  be  re- 
Ciilled,  or,  as  we  say,  has  been  entirely  forgotten,  is  for  the 
mind,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  of  no  consequence;  i.e.,  so 
long  as  it  cannot  be  recalled.  It  is  t\i\&  poiver  of  recollec- 
t!»n,  or  the  lu-tive  side  of  memory,  that  properly  forms  a 
subject  for  study. 

(fl.)  The  memory  is  not  a  separate  so-called  "  faculty  " 
of  tlie  mind,  in  the  sense  of  a  special,  independent  power. 
The  passive  or  resting  side  of  memory  only  implies  that 
tlnTC  are  already  ideas  in  the  mind,  living  and  existing; 
the  active  side  imi)lies  nothing  more  than  that  these  ideas, 
under  certain  definite  conditions,  can  be  recalled.  This 
jK.wer  of  recall,  however,  may  differ  much  in  the  different 
''''•'-■    '•   '"■•'   '■'•  "-vritor  or  less  with  respect  to  the  fidel- 


^mi1?'^iUHJHiALSCHi)(if 


ity  or  exactness  of  recolli'ctiofi,  ^K^frtth  *eBi»ect  to  prompt- 
ness, rapidity,  or  reliability,  after  a  Cijnsiderable  interval. 
And  this  depends  in  each  separate  case  entirely  on 
the  compactness  or  looseness  of  the  idea  in  qnestion,  and 
on  the  extent  to  which  it  is  advantageously  associated  with 
others.  The  power  of  recollection,  or  the  active  memory,  is 
therefore  an  individual  peculiarity  of  the  separate  ideas, 
and  not  a  general  power  behind  them.  If  one  uses  the  term 
power  at  all,  it  ought  to  refer  to  the  power  of  existence  of 
the  ideas  (above  mentioned),  meaning  thereby  that  they 
strive  to  become  conscious ;  and  further  referring  to  the 
individual  quality  of  the  different  ideas,  the  greater  or  less 
completeness  of  their  structure,  and  the  greater  or  smaller 
number  of  their  associations.  There  are,  therefore,  to  use 
a  paradoxical  expression,  as  many  differknt    kinds  of 

MEMORY  IN  THE  MIND  AS  THERE  ARE  IDEAS. 

The  memory  is  for  the  whole  mental  life — we  have  in 
mind  particularly  the  intellectual  side  —  of  wide  and  far- 
reacJiing  imimrtance.  Even  the  most  primitive  ideas  (the 
perceptions)  require  its  indispensable  aid;  but  still  more 
necessary  is  it  in  the  processes  of  thought  and  imagination. 
VjVithout  the  help  of  the  memory,  not  even  perceptions 
would  be  possible,  to  say  nothing  of  concepts,  judgments, 
and  reasoning,  y  The  relation  between  memory  and  apper- 
ception is  that  of  means  to  an  end ;  but  each  is  a  means 
to  the  other.  Apperception  is  the  assimilation  of  new 
knowledge,  whether  percept  or  concept,  by  means  of  the 
ideas  called  up  in  memory;  but  this  process  is,  in  turn, 
itself  the  very  best,  if  not  the  only,  means  of  storing  up 
ideas,  so  that  they  will  not  be  f orgotten^  -^_  [^^ 

It  need  scarcely  be  said  that  this  last  paragraph,  as  Avell 
as  the  whole  preceding  section,  is  not  to  be  understood  in 


38  THOUOHT    AND   IVIEiMORY. 

the  sense  of  tlie  traditional  memory  worshipper,  who  be- 
lieves that  tlie  main  object  of  the  school  is  to  store  the 
memory  with  facts  and  words.  In  the  course  of  our  work, 
the  miserable  defect  in  this  way  of  teaching  will  be  brought 
to  liglit,  as  well  as  some  mistakes  of  those  who  aim  at  just 
tlie  opj»osite. 

On  the  valuo  ami  art  of  questioning,  consult  Fitch,  Art  of 
Qurxdonini/,  and  eliap.  vi.  of  the  Lectures  on  Teaching.  For  the  de- 
pondonoe  of  nioniory  on  attention,  and  the  physiological  hasis  of 
attention,  road  Kibot,  The  Psychology  of  Attention.  For  the  most 
giMU'ralized  conoci)tion  of  memory,  see  Bering's  famous  lecture  on 
Memory  as  n  yenerul  function  of  orr/anlzed  matter,  in  No.  G  and  7 
of  The  O/icn  Court,  Chicago.  See  also  Eellf/ion  of  Science  Library 
(sanir  itul)lishers).  There  is  another  translation  of  this  epoch- 
making  address  in  Butler,  Unconscious  Meniory,  chap.  vi.  Ladd's 
Phy-Hiiiliif/iral  I'sycholoijy  expresses  the  same  ideas.  "  Every  organ 
—  inilf'fd,  every  area  and  every  element  —  of  the  nervous  system  has 
its  own  HH-niory."     (p.  553.) 


CTIAl^TETl  HI. 

THE    LAWS    OF    THOUGHT    AND    MEMORY. 

Truly  the  fabric  of  imiital  lieeco 

Rusemblos  a  weaver's  masterpiece, 

Where  a  thousand  thn'ads  one  treadle  throws, 

"NYhero  fly  the  sliuttles  liither  and  thither, 

Unseen  the  threads  are  knit  together, 

And  an  inliuite  combination  grows. 

Goethe's  Faust :  IJayaud  Taylok. 

Aftkr  reviewing  the  chief  processes  of  tlioiight  and 
memory  in  their  many  forms,  it  remains  to  discover  the 
genetic  order  in  this  manifold  complexity,  the  active  forces 
in  these  processes  and  their  laws.  "What  we  see  in  the 
world  of  matter,  -will  also  manifest  itself  in  the  realm  of 
spirit;  howsoever  wonderfully  diversified  the  phenomena 
may  be,  even  so  wonderfully  simple  are  the  laws  that  con- 
trol them. 

The  foregoing  investigation  led  from  thought  to  memory  ; 
the  following  will  begin  with  memory,  and  therefore  spin 
its  thread  in  the  opposite  direction. 

A.      Of  jNIkmory. 

Even  Aristotle  had  already  found  out  that  ideas  were  not 
reproduced  in  lawless  confusion;  i.e.,  that  it  was  not  de- 
pendent on  mere  chance,  whether  this  or  that  idea  arose  in 
consciousness.  First  of  all,  he  noticed  that  a  previous  idea 
does  not,  of  its  own  accord,  return  into  the  mind  but  l)y 
invitation ;  at  the  call,  as  it  were,  of  another  idea  which  is 

39 


40  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

already  in  consciousness.  This  was  of  itself  an  important 
discovery.  It  showed  wliat  one  must  look  for  in  order  to 
come  on  the  track  of  the  ways  and  laws  of  reproduction ; 
nanudv,  for  the  relation  existing  between  the  two  ideas. 

To  proceed  witli  his  investigation,  he  had,  accordingly, 
first  to  collect  a  fund  of  examples  in  which  one  idea  re- 
caUed  another,  in  order  then  to  try  whether  the  cases  could 
Ik"  l)roug]it  into  dt'tinite  order  under  the  given  point  of 
view.  His  task  was,  therefore,  that  of  classification;  and 
the  objects  were,  exactly  expressed,  the  different  rela- 
tions tliat  occurred  between  the  two  ideas  reproducing  each 
other  in  those  examples. 

If  he  had.  for  instance,  a  case  in  view  where  the  thought 
of  the  old  homestead  immediately  recalls  the  idea  of  the 
adjoining  trees  or  the  neighboring  house,  etc.,  —  in  like 
manner  wliere  the  thought  of  a*  certain  plant  brings  to 
njind  also  tlie  image  of  the  place  wliere  one  first  found  it, 
an<l  the  other  objects  in  its  vicinity,  —  he  may  have  noticed 
liow  all  of  these  examples  agree  in  that  the  objects  repre- 
sented by  the  associated  ideas  are  near  together  in  place. 
With  the  discovery  of  the  common  characteristic  in  these 
cases,  some  order  seemed  already  to  come  into  the  chaos, 
and  the  investigator  could  further  assume  that  the  dis- 
covery he  h;ul  made  would  also  shed  light  on  other  cases. 
Tliis  hypothesis  lia<l  now  to  be  tested.  Accordingly,  a 
number  of  otiicr  examples  were  sought  of  oljjects  near 
togetjjcr  in  place;  and,  as  before,  the  ideas  in  question  were 
found  to  reproduce  each  other.  This  seemed,  at  least,  to 
esUiblish  a  firm  standpoint  from  which  to  look  out  over  a 
t^dentbly  large  part  of  the  field.  However,  there  had  been 
found  (.ther  examjiles  which,  though  very  similar,  still  did 
not  quite  exactly  fit  into  the  hypothetical  class  ("  near  in 


Aristotle's  laws  of  association.  41 

place").  Thus,  fur  instance,  that  tlie  thought  of  an  absent 
friend  recalls  tlie  idea  of  the  place  where  we  have  last 
spoken  with  him.  Here,  to  be  sure,  the  two  objects,  our 
friend  and  this  place,  have  been  together;  this  contiguity 
was,  however,  not  constant,  but  only  accidental.  This  must 
have  led  the  investigator  to  the  further  knowledge  that  in 
tliis,  as  well  as  in  the  former  examples,  the  decisive  point 
is  not  in  the  objective  hebuj-Uxjathev,  but  in  the  subjective 
bel>i(j-seen-to(jt'.ther  ;  not  in  the  contiguity  in  space,  but  in  the 
contiguity  in  time,  —  in  a  word,  in  the  simultaueousness  of 
perception.  This  new  discovery,  being  approved  by  further 
trial,  showed  the  first  hypothesis  to  be  insuiiicient.  The 
latter  had  helped  the  investigation  upon  the  track,  but  had 
not  reached  the  goal ;  it  was  not  entirely  false,  but  the  de- 
cisive point  was  lacking ;  it  contained  only  half  the  truth, 
not  the  whole. 

Of  course  it  does  not  make  any  difference  whether  the 
Greek  psychologist  went  to  work  in  just  this  way  or  not; 
his  investigation  resulted  in  a  classification  into  four  kinds 
of  relations.  And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  all  cases  of  recol- 
lection, however  varied  they  may  at  first  view  appear,  may 
be  divided  into  these  four  categories,  as  any  one  can  try  for 
himself  if  he  will  take  the  trouble. 

These  four  forms  of  recollection  are  as  follows  :  — 

1.  Simultaneously  formed  ideas  reproduce  one  another. 
(Examples  above.) 

2.  Ideas  in  continuous  scries  reproduce  one  another, — 
most  easily  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  formed.  Ex- 
amples :  The  words  and  sentences  in  a  selection  committed 
to  memory ;  the  stations  and  stages  in  a  journey  ;  the  events 
in  a  story  that  has  been  heard  or  read ;  the  occurrences  in 
one's  own  life,  etc. 


42  THOUGHT   AND   ISlE.MOllY. 

3.  Similar  ideas  reproduce  one  another.  Examples:, 
Liko-soundiiiLj  exinessions,  as  in  rhyme  and  alliteration; 
similar  historii-al  facts  (thus  David  and  Jonathan's  friend- 
ship recalls  that  of  Damon  and  Pythias;  the  giving  of  the 
law  by  Moses,  the  legislation  of  Lycurgus  and  Solon,  etc.). 
Here  belong  also  the  cases  in  which  a  thought  calls  up 
a  comparison ;  further,  that  reproduction  which  helps  to 
form  clear  i»ercei)tions  out  of  sensations,  and  that  also  which 
leads  to  the  si)ontaneous  forjnation  of  concepts  and  judg- 
ments, etc. 

4,  Coitti'dstrd  ideas  reproduce  one  another.  Examples: 
The  sight  of  great  luxury  and  waste  reminds  one  of  poverty 
and  misery ;  a  deed  of  distinguished  courage  recalls  an  ex- 
am])le  of  cowardice;  great  goodness  of  heart,  an  instance 
of  hard-heartedness ;  the  downfall  of  Prussia  in  1806,  its 
uprising  in  1813  ;  Germany's  political  unity  since  1870-1871, 
its  i)revious  distracted  condition ;  the  cradle,  the  grave,  etc.^ 

Tiiis  was  an  important  beginning  in  the  illumination  of 
sueli  an  obscure  held  as  that  of  the  movement  of  ideas,  and 
redounds  to  the  honor  of  the  great  Stagirite.  This  perform- 
ance is  all  the  more  remarkable  because  in  all  sciences  it  is 
the  first  steps  that  are  the  most  difficult;  but  still  more 
Ijecause  of  the  fact  that  psychological  investigation  during 
the  succeeding  two  thousand  years  did  not  make  any  essen- 
tial ]»rogress  in  this  regard. 

Those  four  laws  of  recollection  are,  as  without  doubt  their 

>  Wlio<'V<>r  wislic's  to  get  any  real  good  out  of  these  four  laws  for  the 
aAHociatioii  of  iih-as  must  not  omit  to  ohseive  his  own  thoughts  as  they 
occur  to  liiin  off  and  on,  and  see  under  which  rule  eacli  separate  case 
)H-l<inKH.  Ill  the  stiirly  of  psychology,  that  which  is  learned  should  he  ap- 
plied on  un<l  on  to  tiie  phenomena  of  one's  own  mind,  since  nothing  can 
take  the  placf  of  s«'lf-<»hsfTvation.  For  exceedingly  interesting  sugges- 
tioiin  Heo  Gallon,  Jlunntn  Faculty,  p.  182-207. 


DESCARTES    SIMinJFIKI)   THE    LAWS.  43 

discoverer  also  kiunv,  oiil}'  si/mjifomatlr,  not  rausal.  They 
say  that  tlie  ideas  rciu-oduee  each  other  in  these  four  ways, 
but  they  cannot  say  trhf/  tlu'y  must  do  it;  wherefore,  also, 
it  remains  unexplained  why  there  are  just  four  ways,  no 
more  and  no  less.  But  aside  from  tliis  chief  omission,  of 
which  we  shall  sjjcak  later  on,  the  Arist(itelian  theory  of 
memory  is  also  symptomatically  incomjjlete,  although  not 
absolutely  wrong.  Since  Descartes  (died  lOrK)),  this  incom- 
pleteness has  been  remedied.  And  this  has  been  the  only 
scientific  addition  to  the  doctrine  of  memory  until  the 
present  century.  Herbart  (died  1841)  gave  a  new  impetus 
to  psychology  in  every  department,  and  has  justly  been 
called  the  father  of  modern  psychology.  It  is  this  recent 
work,  more  particularly  in  the  physiological  field,  that  has 
contributed  most  toward  a  solution  of  the  cause  of  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas.  The  addition  made  by  Descartes  was  this. 
lie  recognized  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  first  and  second, 
and  on  the  other  hand,  the  third  and  fourth,  laws  (as  stated 
above)  have  so  much  in  common,  that  probably  each  pair 
forms  a  single  law. 

In  the  first  pair  the  deciding  characteristic  is  the  time; 
more  exactly,  the  circumstance  that  the  two  ideas  in  ques- 
tion have  been  in  consciousness  together,  either  at  the  same 
time  or  immediately  succeeding  each  other.  There  is  no 
reference  to  the  content  of  the  ideas.  They  ma}'  be  derived 
from  different  senses,  or  from  the  same;  and  in  the  latter 
case  they  may  be  like  or  unlike,  and  it  makes  no  difference. 
If,  now,  both  laws  re(piire  a  ])revious  co-existence  of  the 
ideas  in  consciousness,  while  they  differ  only  as  to  whether 
the  ideas  are  completely  simultaneous,  or  whether  one  idea 
has  already  become  partly  obscured  when  the  other  enters 
consciousness,  —  or,  in  other  words,  whether  the  two  ideas 


44  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

have  lK>en  togetluT  in  cousciousness  a  longer  or  a  shorter 
timo,  —  it  is  clear  that  in  both  cases  the  reason  of  repro- 
(Uu'tion  must  be  sought  in  the  common  characteristic  of 
luiving  been  together  in  consciousness.  Accordingly,  these 
two  laws  are  to  be  understood  only  as  one,  which  may  be 
culled  the  law  of  slmiiltdneiti/.  That  which  had  previously 
misled  into  thinking  that  there  were  two  laws  proves  to  be 
merely  a  difference  in  the  effect  of  one  and  the  same  cause, 

namely,  the  being  in  consciousness  at  the  same  time, — 

and  in  the  main  only  a  difference  of  degree,  since  the  com- 
pletely simultaneous  ideas  are  more  strongly  united  than 
the  half  simultaneous. 

The  other  jiair  (."..  and  4.  laws  p.  42)  differ  from  the  first 
pair  in  two  ways.  First  of  all,  the  matter  of  time  does 
not  come  into  consideration  here  at  all,  since  the  ideas 
need  never  have  been  together  in  consciousness.  And  in 
tlie  second  case,  that  which  before  was  not  considered  — 
namely,  the  content  of  the  ideas  —  is  here  the  distinguish- 
ing characteristic  ;  for  the  expressions  "  similar  "  and  '<  con- 
tra-st^^-d  "  refer  to  the  content  of  the  ideas.  Keeping  this 
in  mind,  one  cannot  help  wondering  why  in  the  one  case 
the  similarity,  in  the  other  case  the  dissimilarity,  of  mean- 
ing should  cause  reproduction.  It  was  plain  that  there 
must  be  some  mistake  It  was  soon  recognized  that  in 
tlie  hitter  case  the  earlier  psychologists  had  allowed  them- 
.selves  to  be  deceived  by  outward  appearance.  A  contrast 
between  two  objects  presupposes  their  similarity  in  other 
respects.  For  between  two  entirely  dissimilar  or  disparate 
ideas  there  can  be  no  contrast,  because,  as  we  say,  they  can- 
not Ixj  com] tared.  Thus,  for  example,  such  ideas  as  have 
tlu'ir  origin  in  different  senses,  as  square  and  sweet,  red 
and    shrill,   eU-. ;   likewise,   round   and   yellow    (form   and 


LATER  VIEWS  OF  MEMORY.  45 

color),  although  they  come  from  the  same  sense.  Since, 
then,  in  the  tliird  law  it  is  plainly  only  the  likeness  that 
causes  the  reproduction,  it  might  easily  be  guessed  that 
also  in  the  case  of  contrasted  ideas  it  was  their  like  char- 
acteristics that  made  one  reproduce  the  other,  and- that 
oidy  after  tliis  liad  so  far  taken  place  the  contrasted  char- 
acteristics attracted  attention.  This  was  proved  to  Ije  true 
by  the  fact  that  ideas  completely  unlike  never  recall  one 
anotlier,  unless  they  have  been  in  consciousness  simultane- 
ously, in  which  case  the  law  of  simultaneity  alone  holds. 
From  which  it  follows  that  the  3.  and  4.  laws  are  likewise 
to  be  regarded  as  one,  which  may  be  called  the  law  of  simi- 
larity. That  which  had  previously  misled  into  supposing 
tluit  there  were  two  laws,  —  namely,  the  consciousness  of 
contrast,  —  proves  to  be  merely  a  difference  in  the  effect 
of  one  and  the  same  cause,  and  really  only  an  after-effect  of 
tlie  reproduction  that  has  already  taken  place  by  reason 
of  similarity. 

Thus  a  deeper  examination  has  shown  that  the  funda- 
mental laws  for  the  manifold  forms  of  reproduction  are 
considerably  simpler  than  was  formerly  believed.  There 
are  not  four  laws  of  memory,  but  only  two ;  that  of 
siinultaneiti/,  and  that  of  slmUarltij.  In  the  first  a  sub- 
jective factor  decides, — namely,  the  previous  presence  of 
the  ideas  together  in  consciousness ;  in  the  second,  an 
objective  factor,  —  namely,  their  similar  content. 

These  two  laws,  then,  simple  as  they  seem,  are  only  symp- 
tomatic, and  do  not  yet  express  tlie  cause  of  reproduction. 
Modern  psychology,  physiological  and  experimental,  has 
been  fruitful  in  suggestions  of  solutions  for  this  question. 
When  we  recall  to  niind  an  act  we  have  done  or  a  sensa- 
tion we  have  experienced,  the  similarity  between  this  and 


46  TiiorniTT  and  memory. 

the  original  doing  or  feeling  is  so  great  as  to  leave  but  little 
aoul»t  that  the  same  parts  of  the  nervous  system  are  con- 
cerned in  the  mental  reproduction  as  in  the  previous  physi- 
cal piwluetion.  We  know  that  every  action  leaves  the 
parts  of  the  body  with  a  disposition  to  the  same  action 
again,  thus  making  the  second  performance  more  easy. 
This  fact  lies  at  the  foundation  of  habit,  and  it  would 
seem  the  same  fact  is  the  basis  of  memory. 

Thus,  then,  we  may  conclude  that  the  senses  are  not 
only  necessary  to  receive  impressions  from  the  outside 
world,  but  are  also  necessary  for  their  vivid  reproduction 
in  memory  ;  the  muscles  of  the  body  are  not  only  concerned 
in  the  movement  of  parts  of  our  organism,  but  they  also 
play  a  part  in  the  remembrance  of  these  actions  afterward. 
The  memory,  therefore,  has  no  seat  in  any  particular  part 
of  the  nervous  system,  but  is  everywhere.  There  are  as 
many  species  of  memory  as  there  are  species  of  represen- 
tiition.     ^[ental  work  is  also  nerve  and  muscle  work. 

This  being  so,  we  can  easily  appreciate  the  fact  that  the 
nervous  discharge,  when  once  started  on  a  previously 
tnivelled  tract,  continues  till  it  has  roused  all  those  cells 
to  action  wliich  took  part  in  the  first  process.  Or,  to  put 
it  more  plainly,  if  one  portion  of  a  previous  mental  state 
returns  to  consciousness,  the  entire  state,  with  all  its  ac- 
companiments, will  naturally  be  recalled,  provided  only 
the  nervous  energy  is  sufficient.  As  Professor  Lazarus 
of  lierlin  expresses  it,  "Every  state  of  consciousness  tends 
U)  rejiroduce  itself  completely."  That  this  law  has  its 
kifiis  in  the  anatomical  structure  of  the  brain  and  nervous 
system,  we  can  hardly  doubt. 

This  is  evidently  also  only  another  statement  of  the 
foregoing  law  of  simultaneity.     For  whatever  ideas,  feel- 


ASSOCIATION    I5Y   SIMILARITY.  47 

ings,  or  volitions  may  be  in  llie  luiiul  at  any  one  time  fuse 
together  into  one  state ;  there  is  strictly  only  one  complex 
idea  in  the  mind  at  any  one  time.  The  very  fact  that  two 
or  more  ideas,  etc.,  are  in  the  same  moment  in  the  same 
consciousness,  unites  all  of  these  into  one  state.  They  are 
not  separate  ideas,  feelings,  etc.,  until  they  have  been 
thought  of  lit  sejyarate  times  ;  i.e.,  in  separate  conscious- 
nesses. We  have,  therefore,  in  this  one  statement  the  cause 
both  of  our  mental  associations  ayid  of  our  viental  abstrac- 
tions. 

We  have  next  to  explain  the  cause  of  associations  by 
similarity.  For  the  sake  of  clearness,  I  shall  make 
use  of  a  very  simple  concrete  illustration.  In  the 
ma,rgin  is  a  very  meagre  outline,  say  of  a  vase.  Ask 
a  shoemaker  what  it  represents,  and  he  will  prob- 
ably, if  pressed  to  say  something,  declare  it  is  a  shoe- 
sole.  If  you  ask  the  same  question  of  a  biologist,  he  will 
probably  say  it  represents  a  cell  of  a  yeast  plant,  with  a 
daughter  cell  budding  off  from  it.  Ask  now  a  little  girl, 
and  she  will  say  it  is  the  head  and  body  of  a  doll.  A 
boatman  Avill  say  it  is  the  outline  of  some  island  he  knows. 
An  Indian  recognizes  it  as  a  representation  of  a  canoe 
paddle  ;  a  cliejiiist  sees  in  it  a  laboratory  fask  :  a  geo- 
meter sees  two  eUipses ;  a  German  is  reminded  of  nine- 
pins ;  while  a  gymnast  sees  a  suggestion  of  an  Indian  club. 
This  might  be  continued  indefinitely,  but  enough  has  been 
shown  to  illustrate  the  working  of  the  law  of  similarity. 

That  which  remained  constant  in  all  of  these  associa- 
tions is  the  rougli  outline  on  the  paper  ;  but  in  each  case 
it  called  up  in  mind  a  different  complement  of  accessory 
ideas,  thus  completing  for  each  of  these  observers  a  differ- 
ent  previous    mental    state.     It   is    evident   that  in  thus 


48  THOUGHT   AND   IVIEMORY. 

redintegrating  previoxis  states  of  consciousness  the  same 
process  was  taking  place  as  Avas  before  described  as  asso- 
ciation by  simultaneity. 

Let  us  take  one  step  farther.  The  same  person  looking 
at  the  alxjve  figure  would  no  doubt  be  reminded  of  differ- 
ent objects  (successively,  just  as  we  have  supposed  different 
[RM-sons  to  be).  In  other  words,  one  of  these  objects  would 
suggest  the  other  throuyh  the  medium  of  the  outline,  which 
is  coininon  to  both.  Now,  this  illustrates  very  clearly,  I 
take  it,  what  occurs  in  the  case  of  every  instance  of  asso- 
ciation by  similarity.  Conscioiisness  concentrates  on  cer- 
tain elements,  —  namely,  on  those  through  which  the  asso- 
ciation is  made,  and  which  are  therefore  common  to  both 
ideas ;  tliereupon  ])y  the  law  of  simultaneity  the  other 
parts  of  that  second  previous  mental  state  are  recalled. 
It  is  in  this  way  that  the  mind  passes  from  one  complex 
idea  to  another  by  simply  retaining  those  elements  common 
to  both,  and  then  (1)  drojjpinff  out  of  consciousness  the  other 
elements  of  the  first  idea,  and  (2)  redintegrating  the  second. 

Tlie  process  may  be  represented  diagrammatically  as  in 
the  tigure.     The  flow  of  consciousness  is  represented  from 


left  to  right.  The  complex  idea,  containing  elements  rep- 
resented by  V,  a,  and  y,  is  now  in  mind.  The  attention  is 
then  concentrated  on  the  one  or  more  elements  represented 
by  a,  which  therefore  simply  persist  in  consciousness  after 
X  and  y  have  dropped  out.  The  elements  a  have,  however, 
alreatly  formed  an  integral  part  of  a  previous  state  of  con- 


RELATION    OF   TflK   TWO   LAWS.  49 

sciousness  in  wliich  they  wcro  associated  Avith  w  and  ,•:;. 
They  therefore  now  reproduce  iv  and  n  by  the  law  of  sim- 
ultaneity and  the  second  complete  idea  results  in  conscious- 
ness. 

Thus  we  see  the  process  of  recollection  by  similarity  re- 
duces to  redintegration  by  simultaneity,  and  the  latter  is 
therefore  stamped  as  the  original  law  of  association.  The 
only  way  in  which  two  ideas  can  be  immediately  associated 
is  by  their  forming  parts  of  the  same  mental  state  at  some 
time.  On  the  other  hand,  since  two  similar  ideas  are 
associated  throufjh  their  common  elements,  we  might  call 
such  association  mediate,  in  contrast  to  the  immediate 
association  of  two  ideas  by  simultaneity.  This  use  of 
terms,  as  well  as  the  entire  preceding  explanation  of  asso- 
ciation, is  of  course  very  far  from  being  Herbartian. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  two  laws  of  memory  in  their 
very  inmost  nature  and  causal  connection  before  us.  Not- 
withstanding, however,  their  identity  in  origin,  the  two  ways 
are,  psychologically,  essentially  different  in  their  influence 
on  the  development  of  the  mental  life.  They  are  distinct 
ways  of  reproduction,  and  without  the  recognition  of  this 
fact  the  higher  activities  of  thought  are  inexplicable.  One 
individual  never  goes  beyond  outer  connection ;  his  memory 
for  facts  appears  marvellous ;  we  wonder  <•  how  one  small 
head  can  carry  all  he  knows " ;  his  stories  are  filled  with 
minutest  unimportant  details,  apparently  having  no  connec- 
tion but  that  they  once  happened  in  that  order.  Another 
person  does  not  seem  to  know  half  so  much,  but  brings 
every  fact  into  its  logical  connection.  When  he  tells  a  story, 
only  such  details  as  have  relation  to  the  main  issue  are 
brouglit  in ;  his  memory  makes  no  great  show  of  power, 
but  always  seems  to  be  readier  in  an  emergency  than  the 


60  THOUGHT   AND  MEMORY. 

other  iiKin's.  r>iit  the  greatest  difference  of  all  is,  the 
latter  uiulcrstmn/s  things  better  than  the  former.  "To 
the  i)easaiit  the  falling  apple  redintegrates  only  spatial 
assoeiations  of  its  pleasant  taste ;  to  Sir  Isaac  Newton  its 
resemblance  to  all  falling  bodies  suggested  the  law  of 
gravit^ition." 

The  (lift'eronce  in  mental  economy  is  shown  by  the  rela- 
tive availability  of  a  fact  remembered  by  association  with 
another  fact  in  time  or  space;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  of 
a  fact  remembered  by  its  relation  of  similarity  with  others. 
For  future  use  the  former  is  frequently  as  good  as  worth- 
less. It  is  bound  up  with  other  ideas  with  which  it  may 
never  again  need  to  be  in  connection.  Except  in  those 
cases  where  the  same  processes  or  events  are  repeated  over 
and  over  again,  siich  memory  has  practically  no  use.  It 
serves  us,  to  be  sure,  in  remembering  that  the  sun  rose  in 
the  east  and  set  in  the  west,  yesterday,  day  before,  and  so 
on.  It  must  even  be  admitted  that  it  forms  the  basis  of 
all  memory,  as  we  have  shown  above ;  and  it  has  truly 
immense  importance  for  automatic  action  and  all  the 
mechanism  of  the  mind.  But  it  cannot  be  too  emphatically 
reiterated  that  this  sort  of  memory  alone  never  can  amount 
to  anything.  All  mental  power  of  thought,  invention,  im- 
agination, and  character  itself  depends  on  the  workings  of 
the  other  law  (of  similarity).  The  connection  of  similarity 
is  internal,  and  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  the  ideas. 
With  the  formation  of  every  new  link  of  similarity  the 
capacity  of  the  mind  is  increased  instead  of  becoming 
taxo«l.  T'ut  its  greatest  point  of  superiority  is  in  the  avail- 
ahUitij  for  (ill  future  use  of  ideas  so  associated.  Wherever 
needed,  there  is  just  where  they  put  in  an  appearance. 
They  spontaneously  group  themselves  in  order,  and  prepare 


DISSOCIATION.  51 

the  way  for  all  the  higher  activities  of  thinking.  As  we 
have  before  seen,  this  proeess  of  spontaneous  grouping 
leads  to  conception,  judgment,  and  reasoning.  The  birth 
of  all  new  ideas,  plans,  inventions,  discoveries  of  nature's 
laws,  etc.,  are  alone  made  possible  by  the  association  of 
ideas  by  similarity.  All  science,  both  of  investigation  and 
of  formulation,  consists  of  applications  of  it. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  in  the  process  of  recollection, 
as  just  described,  the  first  step  consists  in  dissociation ; 
i.e.,  in  separating  certain  elements  from  the  rest  of  the 
first  complex  idea,  which  then  drops  out  of  consciousness. 
The  power  to  do  this  requires  practice,  and  is  of  the 
same  nature  as  abstraction.  This  breaking  up  of  the 
ideas  into  their  elements,  however,  must  take  place  in 
order  to  make  the  ideas  mobile,  and  to  dissolve  their 
connection  in  time  and  place,  and  introduce  them  into  new 
combinations  with  other  ideas  like  themselves.  Eeadiness 
of  thought  depends  on  this  ability ;  and  both  steps,  disso- 
ciation and  redintegration,  need  practice.  In  early  child- 
hood the  facts  of  the  external  world  pour  in  through  the 
senses,  leaving  no  time  to  sort  out  and  classify.  The  asso- 
ciation fibres  that  are  probably  necessary  for  the  latter 
process  do  not  get  their  medullary  sheath  and  begin  to 
function  for  a  considerable  time  after  birth.  The  founda- 
tion of  all  future  greatness  is,  however,  being  laid  in  this 
great  store  of  concrete  material  received  through  the  senses 
and  retained  by  sheer  force  of  natural  memory.  Happy 
the  child  whose  mind  has  been  furnished  thus  abundantly. 
This  is  the  raw  material  of  school  instruction  that  must  be 
su})plemented  where  deficient,  and  worked  over  into  the 
higher  products  of  thought.  The  method  of  school-work 
should  therefore  form  the  transition  from  the  one  form  to 


52  TlIOUCllT   AND   MEMOKY. 

the  Other ;  from  nu'inory  by  simultaneity  to  memory  by 
similarity,  from  childish  wouder  to  maturer  thought  and 
uuderstiUidiug. 

The  (luostion  of  resolvin.^  the  two  laMS  of  memory  into  one  prin- 
rii.l.'  has  m-oupied  nearly  all  the  psychologists  of  note.  Durpfelcl, 
differing  from  the  above  views,  follows  llerbart  in  his  metaphysics 
of  the  statics  ami  dynamics  of  ideas,  and  hence  sees  in  the  law  of 
similarity  the  ground  for  the  removal  of  the  check  from  all  the 
similar  ideas  which  tlierefore  rise  in  consciousness  of  themselves  (1). 
UeiRnition  is  tlie  assistance  by  which  ideas  which  are  not  thus  freed 
from  check  can  be  dragged  into  consciousness  (2).  This  explana- 
tion of  the  two  laws  is  concurred  in  by  nearly  all  the  Herbartian 
writers.  The  recent  translation  of  lifer's  Introduction  to  the  Peda- 
goijy  of  Ihrhart  contains  the  shortest  unvarnished  statement  of 
these  views  in  English  (particularly  pp.  12-14).  See  Herbart's  PsJj- 
chiilo'j!/,  pp.  11-10;  Lindner's  Psi/rholoyy,  p.  81  ff.  ^and  two  articles 
by  (J.  F.  Stout  in  "  Mind'"  on  "  The  Herbartian  Psychology''''  (Nos. 
51  and  52).  For  a  good  short  account  with  criticism,  see  the  chap- 
ters on  Herbartian  Psychology  in  Ribot's  German  Psychology  of 
To-day,  pp.  21-G7. 

Sjwncor  seeks  on  another  basis  to  reduce  slnuiltaneity  to  simi- 
larity. To  him  the  essential  fact  in  association  is  fusion  of  similars 
in  recognition.  Coexistent  ideas  are  similar  in  their  time  relation 
and  hence  associate.     Principles  of  Psychology,  i.  p.  207  ff. 

f)n  the  other  hand,  Lazarus  in  Germany,  and  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton an<l  otht-rs  in  England,  and  Dewey,  James,  Ladd,  and  Baldwin 
in  tiiis  country,  agree  in  the  explanation  given  in  the  text,  reducing 
all  association  to  the  principle  of  coexistence  in  consciousness. 
See  Dewey,  Ptn/chology,  pp.  00-117.  James,  Psychology,  i.  p.  578  ff., 
is  ver>'  clear  and  n-adalde.  He  adds  that  our  general  retentiveness 
is  unchangcalile  l)y  any  amount  of  training  (i.  p.  603  If.).  On  i. 
]>.  V.U  lie  gives  an  interesting  "history  of  opinion  concerning  asso- 
<  ;  ition."  For  a  similar  Ijrief  summary  of  opinions,  see  Bain,  Mental 
Scienre,  Appendix,  pp.  fll,  02;  and  Sully,  Human  Mind,  ii.,  Appen- 
dix, pp.  3;50-.'542.  Ladd  ( Psychology,  descriptive  and  explanatory, 
p.  27'>)  says,  "the  influence  of  contiguity  in  consciousness  is  the 
«,./,  disinvi  I  .),!..  i.'.ychological  principle  of  association."     Baldwin 


BIBLIOGllAl'IIY.  53 

(Ilnndhonk  of  Psycholor/i/,  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  201)  fonnulates 
the  priiiKuy  law  as  follows:  "Every  association  of  mental  states 
is  an  integration,  due  to  the  previous  correlation  of  those  states  in 
apperception."  But  one  has  to  read  the  context  to  see  what  all 
of  this  means.  Kay  {Memory,  What  it  is  and  how  to  improce  it, 
p.  278)  agrees  in  recognizing  contiguity  as  the  one  principle  of  all 
association,  hut  fails  completely  when  he  comes  to  explain  it. 

John  Stuart  :Mill  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  reduction  of  the  two 
ways  of  association  to  one  principle  must  be  necessarily  unsuccess- 
ful (James  Mill's  Analysis  of  the  Ilnnian  Mind,  p.  Ill,  note  3.5  by 
J.  S.  ilill).  IluCfdiiig  (Outlines  of  Psychology,  Yi.  1,58)  recognizes 
this  as  the  fact,  but  identifies  the  association  between  the  parts  and 
the  whole  as  the  typical  form  of  all  association,  which  he  calls  the 
law  of  totality.  Sully  (Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  2G7  ff.)  describes 
the  phenomena  in  very  much  the  same  way,  although  he  does  not 
undertake  to  formulate  any  general  law. 

For  an  admirable  historical  account  of  the  psychology  of  memory, 
see  Dr.  Wm.  H.  Burnham's  articles  in  the  American  Journal  of 
Psychology,  vol.  ii.  A  very  complete  bibliography  of  memory  will 
be  found  at  the  close  of  these  in  vol.  ii.  pp.  014-G22. 

For  ilissociation  of  ideas,  see  Dewey,  Psychology,  pp.  117-129. 

For  the  physiological  basis  of  memory,  see  Spencer,  Psychology,  i. 
p.  270;  and  author's  preface  to  Kay's  Memory  and  pp.  29-4(3  and  92 
ff. ;  James,  Psychology,  i.  p.  G43  ff.  is  clear  and  readable  as  usual. 
Perhaps  the  most  accessible  and  clearest  explanation  of  recent 
theory  of  physical  basis  for  the  association  of  ideas  is  contained  in 
Ziehen's  Introduction  to  Physiological  Psychology,  chapter  ix. 

See  also  Bain,  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  p.  338,  for  liis 
famous  doctrine  that  "  the  renewed  feeling  occupies  the  very  same 
parts,  and  in  the  very  same  manner,  as  the  original  feeling." 

B.  Ok  Thought. 
The  term  law  is  applied  to  thought  in  two  senses:  we 
speak  on  tlie  one  hand  of  psychological,  and  on  the  other 
hand  of  logical,  laws  of  thought.  In  the  first  case  the  term 
law  is  used  in  the  same  sense  as  in  all  the  natural  sciencesj 
namely,  to  describe  the  actual,  uniform,  and  invariable  pro- 


54  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

cesses  of  nature.  Sucli  laws  allow  of  no  exception.  On 
the  other  hanil,  the  laws  of  logic,  like  those  of  grammar, 
aesthetics,  ethics,  music,  poetry,  etc.,  are  rules  laid  down  by 
Art  to  be  followed  in  order  to  secure  a  right  result.  The 
laws  of  Science  7iiust  be  followed  if  there  is  to  be  any 
result  at  all.  The  rules  of  Art  may  be  and  often  are  dis- 
regarded, and  this  results  only  in  mistakes.  Since  our 
investigation  is  a  psychological  one,  we  have  to  do  only 
with  the  psychological  laws. 

In  order  to  simplify  our  problem,  we  must  try  to  reduce 
the  fourfold  activity  of  tliouglit  under  one  point  of  view. 
In  the  second  cliapter  above,  the  four  forms  of  thought 
were  reviewed :  comparison,  conception,  judgment,  and 
reason.  It  is  usual  to  mention  only  the  last  three.  The 
reason  for  this  we  shall  see  presently. 

I  should  like  to  ask  such  of  my  readers  as  have  been  to 
normal  schools  or  have  already  privately  studied  a  com- 
pendium of  psychology,  just  to  try  whether  they  can  them- 
selves reduce  those  four  operations  of  thought  under  one 
head.  This  problem,  belonging  as  it  does  to  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  which  is  the  plainest  and  best-worked  field 
in  psychology,  would  indeed  be  very  Avell  adapted  to  show 
1h)w  much,  or  rather  how  little,  good  can  come  from  com- 
pendiums.  1  shall  attempt,  however,  first  to  make  the 
problem  plainer  by  a  few  separate  questions.  In  what 
ndation,  genetic  or  logical,  do  these  processes  of  thought 
stJind  to  one  another?  Is  one  iireliminary  to  another;  that 
is,  does  one  prepare  the  way  for  another  ?  And  if  some- 
thing like  this  is  found  to  be  true  of  some,  is  it  further 
true  of  all  ''  Do  these  four  processes  form  a  single  genetic 
series,  one  arising  out  of  another  ?  In  a  word,  when 
riglitly    understood,    are   there    really   four   thought    pro- 


GENETIC   SEQUENCE   OF   THOUGHT-PROCESSES.       55 

cesses,  or  three,  or  two,  or  only  one?  Even  witli  tliese 
suggestions  the  reiuU'r  will  probably  not  be  able  to  answer, 
especially  if  he  has  studied  his  logic  diligently.  Tlie  books 
on  psychology,  and  especially  the  handbooks,  leave  their 
readers  entirely  too  much  in  the  lurch  in  this  regard. 
They  do  not  even  present  this  problem,  nor  so  much  as 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  is  such  a  ijroblon.  Ihit 
worse  still,  they  usually  treat  of  three  thought-processes  iu 
the  order  in  which  they  are  treated  in  logic.  Xow,  logic  is 
right  in  its  treatment ;  for,  since  it  has  to  do  merely  with 
the  forms  of  thought,  not,  however,  with  their  origin,  it  pro- 
ceeds very  correctly  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  and 
treats  accordingly  first  of  the  concept,  then  of  the  judg- 
ment, and  then  of  the  syllogism.  If  the  text-books  in 
psychology  choose  the  same  order,  it  should  be  only  as  a 
preliminary  treatment  of  each  of  these  thought-processes 
by  themselves.  But  if  now  they  contain  no  further  dis- 
cussion of  the  genetic  connection  between  the  different 
thought  functions,  so  as  to  correct  the  false  order  previ- 
ously used,  then  not  only  is  the  chief  topic  in  the  theory  of 
know^ledge  left  obscure,  but  if  the  reader  tries  now  to  work 
this  problem  out  for  himself,  he  will  be  misled  by  the  i)re- 
vious  confusion  of  treatment.  My  own  presentation  in 
the  second  chapter  above  nevertheless  follows  the  order 
dictated  by  logic,  but  the  reason  for  so  doing  was  simply 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  reader  the  contrast  between 
that  want  of  order  and  the  genetic  sequence  which  I  shall 
now  present. 

For  the  sake  of  brevity  I  shall  avoid  the  proper  induc- 
tive form  of  presentation,  and  state  at  once  the  correct 
order  of  the  thought-processes,  leaving  the  proofs  to  fol- 
low in  connection  with  examples. 


56  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

In  the  first  place,  reasoning  or  inference  drops  out  of  tlie 
list  of  processes,  on  logical  grounds,  because,  as  Ave  saw 
before,  reasoning  is  only  a  peculiar  kind  of  judgment : 
it  is  the  derivation  of  a  new  judgment  from  two  or  more 
other  judgments,  and  the  conclusion  is  therefore  sometimes 
called  a  derivetl  judgment.  Therefore,  leaving  reasoning 
out  of  the  list,  we  have  still  three  specifically  different  pro- 
cesses of  thought. 

These  three  stand  in  a  genetic  relation  to  one  another ; 
i.e.,  they  arise  one  out  of  anotlier,  but  not  in  the  confused 
sequence  in  Avhich  logic  treats  them.  There  is  really  but 
a  shi'jle  thoiKjht-jn'occss,  Avhich  from  its  purpose  may  be 
caUed  the  formation  of  concepts ;  but  it  runs  through 
several  acts,  just  as  in  a  flower  the  bud,  the  blossom,  and 
the  ripe  fruit  follow  each  other.  The  three  acts  in  the 
thought-process  are  conqjarison,  judgment,  and  conception. 

Comparison  is,  for  the  present,  to  be  counted  as  a  sep- 
arate act  preliminary  to  judgment,  in  order  to  avoid  any 
obscurity,  or  uncertainty  as  to  its  place  in  the  thought- 
process.  But,  in  point  of  fact,  comparison  and  judgment 
really  form  but  one  mental  act,  or,  in  other  words,  they  are 
only  two  diiferent  expressions  for  one  and  the  same  pro- 
cess, which  in  each  case  is  regarded  and  named  from  a  dif- 
ferent standpoint.  The  word  comparison  regards  the 
begiiming  of  the  process  ;  the  word  judgment,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  reference  to  its  end,  denoting,  as  it  does,  the 
result  of  the  comparison.  Or,  in  other  words,  comparison 
represents  the  process  from  its  objective  side,  pointing  to 
the  two  or  more  objects  in  consciousness  whose  like  or  un- 
like characteristics  are  to  be  sought;  judgment,  on  the 
contrary,  shows  the  process  from  its  subjective  side,  refer- 
ring to  the  peculiar  form  of  idea  produced.     Now,  in  order 


THE   TFIOUnilT-PIlOCKSS.  57 

to  have  a  single  expression  for  this  one  mental  process, 
we  call  it,  from  its  result,  by  the  name  of  judgment.  In 
this  psychological  sense,  to  judge  is,  therefore,  nothing 
more  than  to  call  up  clearly  in  consciousness  a  distinct 
mental  representation  or  idea  of  the  object  to  be  judged, 
together  with  those  characteristics,  wherein  it  is  like  or 
unlike  another  object.  If  the  'act  of  judgment  is  com- 
pleted, the  formation  of  the  concept  follows  of  itself.  But 
this  latter  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  verbal  expression 
for  the  concept.  Nor  can  the  reader  be  too  careful  in  dis- 
tinguishing the  above  use  of  the  word  "judgment"  in  the 
psychological  sense  from  the  usual  definition  of  judgment 
as  given  in  logic.  Accordingly,  we  may  say  in  conclu- 
sion :  — 

There  is  oiil//  a  single  tlunit/Jit-process,  hut  it  takes  place 
in  two  successive  acts,  namehj,  judgmext  and  coxceptiox. 

In  this  statement  we  have  the  myriad  forms  of  thought 
reduced  to  their  greatest  simplicity.  Even  popular  usage 
in  speech  has  long  since  expressed  the  fact  that  there  is 
properly  only  one  thought-process,  and  that  it  consists  of 
the  two  acts,  judgment  and  conception  ;  and  further,  that 
with  the  completion  of  judgment  the  conception  was  ready 
of  itself,  and  that,  conversely,  no  concept  was  possible  with- 
out previous  judgment.  Each  of  the  two  expressions  is 
used  promiscuously  in  jtopular  language  for  the  whole  pro- 
cess. For,  when  one  wants  to  express  the  fact  that  another 
does  not  understand  a  certain  matter,  one  may  say  either 
''he  has  formed  no  jutlf/iiicvf  in  regard  to  it,"  or  "he  has 
no  concejjtion  of  the  matter,"  and  they  both  mean  the 
same. 

However  welcome  the  foregoing  general  view  of  the 
process   of  thought  may  have  been   to   the    reader,    such 


58  THOUGHT   AND   aiEMORY. 

knowledge  must  still  roiaaiu  subject  to  all  of  those  faults 
that  are  inseparable  from  instruction  by  abstract  ideas 
wliioli  do  not  rest  on  a  concrete  basis  of  careful  observa- 
tion. It  affords,  at  best,  very  incomplete  satisfaction  to 
have  a  broad,  open  field  of  view  and  yet  not  be  able  to  see 
clearly  and  distinctly  anything  in  it.  There  is,  besides, 
much  more  that  requires  explanation,  particularly  in  the 
relation  between  the  two  parts  of  the  thought-process. 
With  the  help  of  the  concrete  examples  let  us  now  attempt 
this  further  work. 

For  the  correct  understanding  of  the  following  examples, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  two  directions  of  thought  be  first 
properly  understood.  In  comparison  or  judgment  we  may, 
of  course,  look  for  either  similarities  or  dissimilarities  in 
the  object  compared.  Just  according  as  we  look  for  the 
one  or  the  other,  will  the  result  be  a  different  kind  of  con- 
cept. For  instance,  if  the  characteristics  common  to  a 
right-angled,  an  acute-angled,  and  an  obtuse-angled  triangle 
are  combined,  the  concept  "  triangle "  is  formed,  which  in 
respect  to  the  three  ideas  above  (so  far  as  these  are  them- 
selves concepts),  is  called  a  superordinate  or  generic  con- 
cept. If,  however,  this  concept  were  already  formed,  and 
in  a  new  comparison  of  those  three  figures  the  dissimilar 
characteristics  are  seized  upon  (which  process  we  call  dis- 
tinguishing them),  there  result  finally  the  three  differing 
i(le;is :  right-angled,  acute-angled,  and  obtuse-angled  tri- 
angle. These,  in  respect  to  the  concept  "triangle,"  are 
called  sul)ordinate  or  species  concepts.  This  shows  us  that 
thouglit  can  move  in  two  different  directions ;  in  one  way 
it  f)rocoeds  to  ever  wider,  more  general,  and  higher  con- 
cepts ;  in  tlie  other  way,  it  reaches  ever  narrower,  more 
special,  and  lower  concepts.     In  the  one  case,  broad  views 


FIRST  EXAMPLE.  69 

open  up  to  us ;  in  the  other,  we  iind  exercise  for  our  dis- 
crimination. It  is  well  when  one  head  can  combine  both 
abilities  —  far-sight  and  acuteness. 

The  following  examples  are  mostly  those  of  involuntary 
or  spontaneous  conception,  because  when  concepts  are  in- 
tentionally formed  the  process  is  of  itself  somewhat  more 
transparent.  The  cpiestion  therefore  arises,  what  is  it  that 
determines  whether  the  spontaneous  process  shall  take  the 
one  or  the  other  direction.  When  the  process  is  voluntary, 
the  will  determines  by  choosing  the  one  or  the  other  ;  but 
if  it  is  spontaneous,  the  determination  must  come  from 
some  other  source.  This  source  is  in  the  objects  them- 
selves. For,  if  the  objects  to  be  compared  show  more 
similar  characteristics  and  seem  so  much  alike  that  the 
difference  appears  unimportant,  and  therefore  not  worth 
considering,  thought  will  proceed  to  the  superordinate  con- 
cept. If,  on  the  contrary,  the  dissimilar  characteristics 
exceed,  or  if  one  in  particular  succeeds  in  attracting  special 
attention,  then,  although  the  likeness  will  be  noticed,  still 
the  process  Avill  lead  to  the  subordinate  concepts.  Thus 
■we  see  that  nature  has,  even  in  the  spontaneous  process, 
already  provided  for  both  directions  of  thought. 

First  Example  (in  the  direction  of  superordinate  con- 
cepts). The  reader  has  only  to  call  to  mind  what  was  said 
above  in  the  second  chapter  on  the  origin  of  the  concept 
"mountain"  in  early  childhood.  If  tlie  child  has  already 
once  seen  such  an  elevation,  and  then  afterwards  sees  an- 
other, the  concejtt  '•'  mountain  "  is  in  its  inception  forth- 
with present.  Although  a  general  idea  has  thus  worked 
itself  out  of  the  two  concrete  ideas,  the  child  has  not  been 
conscious  of  this  inner  process,  and  yet  if,  when  he  saw 
the  first  elevation,  he  was  told  that  it  was  a  mountain,  he 


60  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

would  at  the  sight  of  the  second  undoubtedly  exclaim: 
'•  That  is  a  mountain,  too."  "We  may  well  be  surprised  at 
the  fact  that  here  the  judgment  already  contains  the  word 
(mountain)  expressing  the  concept.  This  certainly  looks 
as  if  the  judgment  did  ]iot  take  place  before  conception,  but 
rather  as  if  judgment  and  concept  were  hoxn  si multaneoxisly. 
liut,  if  this  is  so,  how  could  we  claim  before  that  judgment 
was  a  preliminary  process  to  conception  ?  And  if  it  is  not 
so,  our  concrete  example  seems  to  have  brought  us  only 
further  into  the  fog  of  imcertainty.  But  the  reader  will 
probably  conclude,  and  rightly  too,  that  the  example  was 
nevt-rtheless  purposely  chosen.  The  purpose  Avas  to  call 
attention  to  an  important  peculiarity  in  the  spontaneous 
formation  of  superordinate  concepts,  a  peculiarity  which 
is  usually  not  even  alluded  to  in  the  text-books.  This 
example  by  itself,  however,  will  not  give  us  any  full  ex- 
planation. "\\'e  must  therefore  first  take  an  example  from 
the  other  direction  of  thought,  in  which  judgment  and 
concept  appear  strictly  separate.  After  we  have  rightly 
comprehended  tlie  relation  in  the  latter  case,  we  shall  be 
able  to  clear  up  the  doubtful  points  in  the  lirst  example, 
and  find  out  the  important  peculiarity  Avhich  it  teaches  in 
regai-d  to  tlie  formation  of  superordinate  concepts. 

Second  Exumple  (in  the  direction  of  subordinate  con- 
cepts). Supitose  a  child  has  repeatedly  seen  yellow  wood- 
sorrel  (oxalis  stricta).  Of  course  there  are  different  kinds 
of  wood-sorrel,  but  we  will  suppose  that  he  has  not  yet 
noticed  their  differences.  Since,  however,  he  has  seen 
various  specimens  of  yellow  wood-sorrel,  his  mind  has 
fonned  from  these  concrete  ideas  (percepts)  likewise  the 
abstra<!t  idea  (concept)  "wood-sorrel."  If  after  this  he 
comes  across  a  specimen  of  violet  wood-sorrel,  he  will  notice 


SECOND   EXAMPLE.  61 

of  course  that  it  is  similar  to  tlie  wood-sorrel  he  has  pre- 
viously seen,  but  at  the  same  time  his  attention  will  be 
attracted  by  the  strongly  different  characteristic  of  color. 
The  comparison  and  distinction  is  forthwith  completed, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  mental  })i'0cess  of  judgment  is 
ready  to  give  expression  to  itself  in  the  words,  "this  wood- 
sorrel  is  violet."  —  What  do  we  find  here  as  the  result  of 
the  comparison  ?  At  all  events  a  judgment.  l>ut  is  there 
not  also  a  new  concept  —  the  species  concept  "  violet  wood- 
sorrel  "  ?  That  there  is  no  such  concept  in  the  judgment 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  new  idea  appearing  in  the 
predicate  is  nothing  more  than  a  characteristic  (violet). 
But,  it  may  be  asked,  does  not  the  species  concept  "  violet 
wood-sorrel  "  come  into  existence  along  with  this  new 
characteristic  ?  For  the  present  it  does  not ;  for  the  single 
specimen  of  this  species  that  the  child  has  seen  can  only 
give  rise  to  the  concrete  idea  or  perception  "  violet  wood- 
sorrel."  In  order  for  an  abstract  idea  to  be  produced  (in 
this  case,  the  spontaneous  species  concept  "  violet  wood- 
sorrel  "),  it  woiild  1)0  necessary  that  several  specimens  of 
this  species  should  first  be  seen.^ 

The  relation  between  the  act  of  judgment  and  the  for- 
mation of  the  concept  will  now  probably  be  somewhat 
clearer  to  the  reader.  The  judgment  indicates  as  the  re- 
sult of  comparison  nothing  new  more  than  a  new  charac- 
teristic, but  not  yet  the  species  concept,  to  which  this 
characteristic  belongs.  It  prepares  the  way,  to  be  sure, 
for  this  concept,  since  it  furnishes  the  new  material  (the 

1  Of  course  it  is  not  necessary  that  several  different  specimens  should 
be  presented  to  the  senses,  but  only  that  several  different  percepts  or 
mental  i)rosontations,  whether  obtained  from  one  or  from  more  than  one 
object,  should  have  taken  part  in  the  formation  of  the  concept 


62  THOUGHT   AND   MEMOKY. 

characteristic)  for  it ;  but  the  judgment  as  such  knows 
nothing  of  the  concept  itself.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that 
here,  in  the  formation  of  subordinate  concepts,  the  judg- 
ment certainly  comes  previously  to  the  concept  —  not 
simultaneously,  as  seemed  to  be  the  case  in  superordinate 
concepts. 

It  is,  furthermore,  important  to  notice  that,  as  was  just 
pointed  out,  the  judgment  prepares  the  way  for  the  species 
i-oncept ;  for,  just  as  soon  as  the  newly  noticed  difference 
"  violet "  has  been  distinctly  apprehended,  or,  in  other  words, 
as  soon  as  this  new  characteristic  appears  in  consciousness 
in  the  form  peculiar  to  the  judgment,  the  concept  wood- 
sorrel  which  was  already  present  becomes  unsettled.  AVhy  ? 
It  previously  contained  the  characteristic  "  yellow,"  since 
this  characteristic  had  occurred  in  all  the  specimens  pre- 
viously seen,  and  was  therefore  counted  in  with  the  common 
characteristics.  But  now,  after  a  violet  wood-sorrel  has 
come  to  view,  it  is  seen  that  this  characteristic  "  yellow  " 
does  not  belong  to  the  common  characteristics  of  this 
genus.  What  result  has  this  on  the  old  concept  ?  First  of 
all,  that  the  concept  "  wood-sorrel  "  loses  the  characteristic 
(yellow)  that  did  not  belong  to  it,  and  becomes  in  so  far 
purified  and  more  complete.  And  secondly,  that  beside 
this  earlier  concept  (wood-sorrel)  on  the  one  hand,  the  ready 
formed  subordinate  concept  "  yellow  wood-sorrel  "  arises  ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  way  is  prepared  for  a  second 
subordinate  concept  "violet  wood-sorrel,"  co-ordinate  with 
the  other.' 


'  The  way  is  prepared  for  the  second  concept  but  it  is  not  yet  formed. 
This  must  he  distinctly  noticed  ;  for  tlift  judgment  as  such  never  helps  in 
the  formation  r»f  concepts  at  all  in  any  other  way,  since  it  does  nothing 
eUc  than  (urnisli  characteristics.    This  is  just  as  true  of  the  formation  of 


RELATION   OF   JUDGMENT    TO   CONCEPTION.  63 

The  second  example  has  therefore  shown  us,  lirst  tliat 
the  judgiaent  always  comes  before  the  concept,  and  cannot 
come  otherwise  ;  secondly,  that  the  act  of  judgment,  when 
it  relates  to  a  dissimilar  characteristic,  has  the  effect  of 
clarifying  the  old  concept  and  splitting  it  into  two  sub- 
concepts,  thus  making  it  a  genus  concept. 

We  can  now  return  to  our  first  example  and  clear  up  the 
doubts  that  surrounded  it.  Why  was  it  that  in  this  first 
example  judgment  and  conception  appeared  simultaneous  ? 
If  in  comparison,  as  we  know,  the  mind  is  concerned  only 
with  like  or  unlike  cliaracteristics,  and  if  the  mental  act  of 


higher  as  of  lower  concepts.  In  the  present  case,  in  the  judgment, 
"  this  wood-sorrel  is  violet,"  there  is  another  circunistance  that  will 
serve  to  show  very  plainly  how  strictly  separate  the  act  of  judgment 
is  from  the  act  of  conception.  For  here  the  cliaracteristic  "violet" 
appears  as  a  point  of  dissimilarity  in  contrast  to  "  yellow;  '"  but  a  con- 
cept, on  the  other  hand,  is  always  concerned  with  common  or  like  char- 
acteristics only.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  judgment  alone  could 
never  give  rise  to  the  concept  "violet  wood-sorrel,"  hut  that,  as  before 
said,  several  specimens  of  violet  wood-sorrel  must  first  he  seen.  Only 
after  these  have  been  com]>arcd  can  the  characteristic  "violet"  be  recog- 
nized as  common.  Tiie  new  judgment,  "all  these  wood-sorrels  are  vio- 
let," will  now  lead  to  the  sub-concept  "violet  wood-sorrel."  The  earlier 
judgment  in  which  "  violet  "  was  an  unlike  characteristic,  has,  there- 
fore, strictly  speaking,  not  directly  prepared  the  way  for  this  sub-concept, 
but  only  indirectly,  ami  therefore  not  so  much  prejiared  the  way  for  it  as 
merely  served  as  an  incentive  to  its  formation.  The  other  sub-concept 
(yellow  wood-sorrel)  did  not  need  any  new  judgment,  since  it  was  already 
contained  in  the  old  concept  "  wood-sorrel."  This  old  concept  experi- 
enced a  change  in  its  content,  in  losing  one  of  its  characteristics;  its  pre- 
vious content,  on  the  coutrai-y,  then  became  the  S])ecies  concept.  This 
illustrates  veiy  nicely  that  mutual  influence  between  new  and  old  ideas, 
which  is  so  characteristic  of  all  apperception. 

One  thing  more  should  be  noticed  here.  Since  a  concept,  whether 
higher  or  lower,  is  in  comparison  with  the  ideas  which  it  embraces  in  its 
content,  in  the  relation  of  superiority  to  these,  it  follows,  therefore,  that- 
in  the  act  of  conception  as  such  the  movement  of  thought  is  always  up- 
ward. The  two  movements  of  thought  spoken  of  in  the  text  are  there- 
fore found  in  juilgmeut  (comparisou)  ouly. 


64  THOUGHT    AND   MEMORY. 

judgment  is  nothing  more  tlian  a  mental  representation  of 
the  result  of  comparison,  then  it  follows  that  the  predicate 
of  a  mental  judgment  must  relate  to  characteristics  only, 
whether  like  or  unlike.  If,  on  the  contrary,  conception 
consists  of  seizing  together  in  the  grasp  of  a  single  idea 
the  similar  charac^teristics,  then  it  must  be  plain  that  judg- 
ment and  conception  are  two  entirely  distinct  acts.  If,  then, 
in  our  lirst  example  this  distinction  did  not  clearly  appear, 
it  was  owing  to  one  or  both  of  the  following  causes  — ■ 
either  to  a  peculiarity  in  the  spontaneous  formation  of 
genus  concepts,  or  to  the  interference  of  language. 

In  order  to  have  a  concrete  instance  in  mind,  let  us  re- 
turn to  the  example  (mountain)  given  above.  Here  the 
characteristics  which  the  objects  compared  with  one  an- 
other had  in  common,  are  several  in  number,  as  is  also  the 
case  in  most  instances  of  such  concepts.  A  child  will 
never  be  able  at  the  first  sight  to  notice  distinctly  all  of 
these  characteristics  separately  ;  even  an  adult  would  not 
succeed  in  a  single  rapid  glance.  Now,  just  as  the  child  has 
formed  only  a  general  perception  of  each  of  the  two  objects, 
so  also  of  the  characteristics  in  which  they  are  alike.  He 
perhaps  has  the  general  impression  that  the  two  objects 
are  similar,  i.e.,  have  much  in  common,  but  he  cannot  give 
an  account  of  the  characteristics  which  compose  this  simi- 
larity. Suppose,  however,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  a 
child  really  had  apprehended  distinctly  all  the  common 
characteristics,  or  at  least  some  of  them;  still,  he  would 
scarcely  have  at  command  the  necessary  expressions  to 
denote  each  of  these  characteristics  precisely.  But  even 
sujjposing  he  had,  the  child  would  have  no  incentive  to 
express  these  common  characteristics  in  a  series  of  separate 
judgments.     What  concerns  him  is  simply  to  make  known 


children's  use  of  words.  65 

the  generitl  iinprrssion  lliat  the  two  objects  are  similar. 
For  this  purpose  the  easiest  means  tliat  offers  is  the  name 
of  the  elevation  first  seen  —  the  word  "  mountain,"  whicli 
when  first  heard  liad  for  the  child  the  meaning  of  a  proper 
name. 

This  shows  us  clearly  whence  it  comes  that  the  expressed 
judgment,  "that  (thing)  is  a  mountain,"  already  contains 
the  concept  word.  The  expression,  mountain,  which  the 
child  uses  in  the  predicate  is,  for  him,  not  a  concept  word, 
but  a  mere  name,  the  name  of  the  elevation  first  seen. 
He  means  to  denote  by  it  the  characteristics  he  has  noticed 
(in  this  case  those  that  were  common  to  both).  Since, 
however,  only  the  total  impression  was  noticed,  or  in  case 
any  one  of  the  characteristics  was  distinctly  noticed,  the 
particular  expression  for  it  was  wanting,  he  therefore 
chooses  the  name  of  the  object  previously  seen,  as  much 
as  to  say  :  tlie  characteristics  which  he  has  now  in  mind 
here,  are  just  the  same  as  he  had  before  seen  there  :  or,  in 
other  words,  since  the  two  objects  have  so  much  in  com- 
mon (judgment),  they  deserve  the  same  name  (concept). 
If  the  meaning  of  the  child's  expression  is  so  understood, 
we  see  plainly  the  relation  between  the  act  of  judgment 
and  the  formation  of  the  concept,  although  in  the  actually 
spoken  judgment  both  acts  were  mingled.  The  child's 
manner  of  expression  accords  with  his  incomplete  appre- 
hension and*his  poverty  of  language.  For,  because  the 
mental  act  of  judgment  is  not  correctly  completed,  and 
because,  moreover,  the  correct  expression  is  wanting,  while 
the  idea  is,  nevertheless,  struggling  for  utterance ;  the  gen- 
uine judgment  form  which  ought  to  give  the  separate 
characteristics  is,  as  it  were,  skipped,  and  that  forin  is 
chosen  which  the  judgment  has  when  it  conies  after  the 


66  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

concept  has  been  foiineil,  and  when  it  therefore  is  intended 
to  name,  not  the  separate  characteristics,  but  the  concept 
itself.  This  is  probabl}-  the  correct  view  with  reference 
to  nearly  all  those  charming  instances  of  childish  ''  exten- 
sion of  meaning"  in  common  words,  which  are  frequently 
given  as  proof  of  the  child's  power  of  abstraction  and  con- 
ception. One  little  girl,  born  in  the  South,  saw  snow  for 
tlie  first  time  on  a  visit  I^orth,  and  said  it  was  "raining 
soapsuds."  Another  called  the  crackling  of  the  kitchen 
fire,  ''  barking."  A  little  boy,  not  yet  old  enough  to  pro- 
nounce distinctly,  called  dipping  bread  into  gravy  giving 

it  a  bath  (<'ba'").     Baby  J used  the  word  ''bo"  to 

mean  anything  that  pleased  him.  Darwin's  little  boy,  at 
twelve  months,  invented  the  word  '•'  mum,"  which  he  used 
for  food  of  all  kinds.  There  is  no  proper  abstraction  in 
any  of  these  cases.  A  child  of  one  or  two  years  old  uses 
words  by  analogy,  as  was  explained  above,  but  does  not 
h;ive  general  concepts  with  any  definite  content. 

Adults,  moreover,  do  not  do  a  particle  better  than  the 
child  in  the  spontaneous  formation  of  genus  concepts. 
When  they  pass  a  judgment  merely  on  the  basis  of  a  hasty 
comparison,  without,  therefore,  distinctly  apprehending 
the  se]jarate  common  characteristics,  they  understand  very 
well  how  to  cover  up  this  deficiency.  They  pass  by  the 
genuine  form  of  judgment  and  employ,  instead,  the  expres- 
sion which  contains  the  ready  formed  concept,  and  perhaps, 
besides,  use  a  very  (jcneral  expression  for  this  concept. 
And  tliis  phrase  must  pass  current  for  a  genuine  judgment, 
and  the  general  expression  must  serve  as  an  adequate  con- 
cept. Sometimes  such  a  word  serves  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  uttered  —  just  as  light  money  passes  for 
full  value  until  its  deficiency  is  recognized. 


TO  THINK   IS  TO   FOKM   CONCEPTS.  67 

Thus  wo  liave  shown  that  likewise,  in  the  case  of  super- 
ordinato  concepts,  there  results  fr<jin  the  comparison  first 
of  all  a  judgment,  no  matter  whether  expressed  or  not. 
But  the  judgment  never  concerns  itself  with  anything  but 
the  separate  characteristics  ;  for  the  mental  act  of  judg- 
ment is  nothing  but  the  focusing  of  consciousness  on  a 
single  like  or  unlike  characteristic.  To  sum  up  :  not  until 
the  judgments  are  made,  that  is,  until  the  neeessary  like 
or  unlike  characteristics  are  seized  upon,  thus  bringing  to- 
gether the  material  for  the  concept  in  question,  —  not  until 
this  is  done,  can  the  concept,  whether  superordinate  or  sub- 
ordinate, be  formed.  For  conception  is  nothing  but  the 
taking  together  {fon,  together,  atjiio,  I  take)  of  the  com- 
mon or  essential  characteristics  in  the  grasp  of  one  idea. 
In  just  so  far  as  the  preceding  judgments  have  been  incom- 
plete, will  also  the  succeeding  concept  be  incomplete.  A 
concept  deserves  to  be  called  scientifically  precise,  only 
when  it  is  the  result  of  correct  and  exJuu/stice  judgments. 

The  manifold  forms  of  thinking  have  thus  been  so  far 
simplified  that  we  see  they  consist  entirely  of  judging  and 
forjuing  concepts,  —  or  of  the  two  successive  acts  :  appre- 
hension of  the  separate  characteristics  of  several  objects, 
and  comprehension  of  their  like  or  essential  characteristics 
in  the  grasp  of  a  general  idea.  There  is,  moreover,  noth- 
ing to  prevent  carrying  this  simplification  farther  and 
denoting  only  the  final  act,  and  saying,  accordingly,  to 
think  is  to  form  concepts.  But  one  must  then  keep  in 
mind  that  this  concluding  act  is  preceded  by  the  prepara- 
tory act  of  judgment. 

A  further  hindrance  to  the  clear  understanding  of  the 
genetic  relation  between  judgment  and  conception  lies  in 
the  use  of  langua.ge.     Since  the  text-books  make  no  men- 


68  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

tion  of  this  difficulty  and  no  attempt  to  remove  it,  we  shall 
try  to  supply  tlie  omission. 

Language  is  in  this  respect  by  no  means  a  true  mirror 
of  the  mental  processes.  Thus  the  concept,  being  a  single 
idea,  would  require,  as  a  corresponding  expression  for  itself, 
a  single  word  or  a  Avord  with  one  or  more  qualifiers  (e.g., 
right-angled  triangle,  bitter  tasting,  beautiful  and  correct 
writing,  'Hhe  little  village  of  Grand-Pre,  distant,  secluded, 
still,"  as  subject,  "  lay  in  the  fruitful  valley,  in  the  Acadian 
land,  on  the  shores  of  the  Basin  of  Minas,"  as  predicate, 
etc.).  But  in  order  to  express  any  mental  act,  language 
never  uses  a  single  word  or  an  isolated  phrase  ■ —  unless  it 
be  an  abbreviation,  in  which  the  omission  is  supplied  men- 
tally —  but  always  employs  a  sentence,  which  is  the  form 
of  expression  for  a  judgment.  And  since  concepts  always 
occur  as  parts  of  a  sentence,  any  one  who  does  not  thor- 
oughly understand  the  origin  of  judgments  and  concepts 
would  be  led  to  believe  that  concepts  Avere  developed  before 
judgments.  The  reason  why  language  obscures  the  correct 
sequence  of  these  acts  is  not  difficult  to  see.  One  has  only 
to  remember  that  the  speaker  puts  his  thoughts  in  words 
not  for  /lis  oini  sake,  but  in  order  to  communicate  them  to 
ot Iters.  TluLs,  if  one  is  thinking  to  one's  self  and  wishes  to 
denote  in  words  a  newly  conceived  idea,  a  shigle  ivord  will 
suffice,  or  an  isolated  phrase  ;  but,  if  one  wants  another 
clearly  to  understand  a  newly  conceived  idea,  such  an 
isolated  expression  will  not  be  sufficient,  but  the  preceding 
act  of  judgment  must  be  indicated.  Now,  this  is  done  by 
f«»rmulating  a  complete  sentence,  in  which  the  objects 
judged  appear  as  subject  and  the  resulting  concept  as 
jjredieate.  For  example,  suppose  the  new  concept  is  "  par- 
allelogram."    If  it  has  been  gained  from  the  study  of  the 


JUDGMHNTS   AS    KXPIiESSED    IN   LANGUAGE.         09 

square  and  rectangle,  it  has  been  preceded  by  the  two  judg- 
ments :  "  in  the  square  the  opposite  sides  are  parallel," 
and  "  in  the  rectangle  the  opposite  sides  are  likewise 
parallel."  Hereupon  the  superordinate  concept  results 
which  we  briefly  call  '''parallelogram."  Now  if  this  act  of 
conception  is  to  be  made  known  to  others,  it  takes  place 
through  the  sentence,  "  Squares  and  rectangles  are  parallel- 
ograms." The  same  is  true  if  the  concept  is  not  entirely 
new,  but,  although  formed  before,  is  not  yet  clarified  and 
completed.  Thus,  in  the  case  before  us,  if,  in  regular  school 
work,  the  new  concept  ''  parallelogram  "  is  to  be  tested  and 
at  the  same  time  made  complete  —  by  application  first  to 
the  rhombus,  we  will  say  —  there  will  result  first  of  all 
again  a  genuine  judgment :  "  in  the  rhombus  the  opposite 
sides  are  likewise  parallel."  Hereupon  the  clarified  con- 
cept appears  in  the  sentence  :  "  the  rhombus  is  likewise  a 
parallelogram."  If,  after  the  test  has  been  further  made 
with  the  rhomboid,  the  completed  concept  is  now  to  be 
expressed  in  its  full  extent,  the  sentence  would  be :  "  the 
square,  the  rectangle,  the  rhombus,  and  the  rhomboid  are 
parallelograms." 

In  this  way  language  clothes  all  thoughts  in  the  sentence 
or  judgment  form ;  but,  if  one  looks  closer  to  see  what  sort 
of  a  mental  act  is  thereby  represented,  one  will  find  that 
there  are  two  sorts  of  judgments  as  expressed  in  language. 
One  kind  expresses  an  actual  mental  act  of  judgment  pre- 
paratory to  the  particular  concept ;  the  other  kind  properly 
makes  known  only  a  newly  gained  or  newly  completed  con- 
cept, and  such  are  therefore  possible  only  after  the  concept 
has  been  formed.  In  the  first  case  the  language  is  adapted 
like  a  well-fitting  garment  expressly  made  to  order ;  in  the* 
latter  case,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  only  a  borrowed  suit  for 


70  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

an  emergency.  Thus,  aUhougli  the  fact  that  language  uses 
sentom-es  exi-lusively,  may  easily  mislead  the  beginner  in 
psychology  into  believing  that  the  judgment  forms  the 
conclusion  of  the  thought  process,  a  closer  examination  has 
shown  us  that  the  contrary  view  is  confirmed,  viz.,  that 
conception  is  the  end  and  goal  of  thinking.  For  further 
elucidation  let  the  attention  be  called  to  a  couple  of  ex- 
amj)les  which  show  that  the  act  of  conception  towards 
which  the  judgment  is  aiming  is  very  frequently  not  ex- 
pressed at  all,  but  instead  only  the  preceding  judgment. 
This  is  more  particularly  the  case  when  the  concept  is  in 
the  main  already  formed  and  the  new  judgment  only  adds 
a  further  explanation.  Thus,  for  example,  the  geometrical 
proposition,  '■'  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  together  equal  to 
two  right  angles,"  is  a  genuine  judgment.  The  act  of  con- 
ception, to  which  it  tends,  consists  in  the  completion  of  the 
concept  triangle  by  a  new  and  accessory  characteristic. 
The  Pythagorean  proposition  is  likewise  a  judgment  in 
which  the  concept  "  right  triangle "  receives  a  new  and 
accessory  characteristic.  In  both  cases  it  is  the  act  of 
judj^'ment  to  which  we  give  expression,  not  the  act  of  con- 
ception. The  preceding  discussion,  which  has,  it  is  hoped, 
tended  very  much  to  simplify  our  conception  of  thiidtiug, 
has  likewise  simplified  our  search  for  the  psychological 
laws  of  thought.  AVe  have  only  to  concern  ourselves  with 
judgment  as  the  preliminary  act,  and  with  conception  as  the 
final  and  chief  act.  The  psychological  law  is  here  to  be 
understood  as  meaning  the  cause  or  incentive  which  leads 
the  mind  spontaneously  (involuntarily)  on  the  road  to 
judgment  and  further  on  to  conception.  We  must  there- 
fore watch  and  observe  unintentional  or  spontaneous  think- 
ing, since  intentional  or  scientific  thought  is]  influenced  by 


THE    LAW    OF   CONCKJ'TION.  71 

the  will.  We  will  begin  with  couception,  since  we  can 
from  this  higher  puiiit  of  view  look  back  better  over  the 
preliminary  act. 

We  must,  then,  briefly  recur  to  the  process  of  conception 
as  before  described  in  the  second  chapter.  When  a  con- 
cept is  to  be  formed,  two  or  more  ideas,  having  something 
in  common,  must  be  present  side  by  side  in  consciousness. 
There  are  three  possible  cases :  in  the  first,  two  objects 
may  be  immediately  present  to  the  senses,  e.g.,  if  the 
teacher  dniws  two  geometrical  figures  on  the  board,  or 
distributes  two  different  kinds  of  plants  to  the  class. 
Secondly,  one  idea  may  be  a  sense  perception  and  the 
other  a  reproduced  idea,  e.g.,  if  tlie  mountain  one  is  look- 
ing at  recalls  the  image  of  one  previously  seen.  Thirdly, 
both  may  be  reproduced  ideas,  as  is  mostly  the  case,  for 
instance,  in  silent  meditation.  The  concepts  in  these  cases 
are  so-called  class  concepts,  because  they  include  in  their 
extent  a  number  of  objects.  The  individual  concept  differs 
from  these  in  referring  only  to  a  single  individual  (person, 
thing,  etc.).  But  in  its  origin  it  does  not  differ,  since  the 
individual  must  have  been  seen  several  times  and  in  differ- 
ent forms,  e.g.,  a  person  in  different  clothes,  or  at  different 
ages,  in  different  mood,  activity,  etc.  Here,  onl}-  the  second 
and  third  cases  above  mentioned  can  occur  —  the  last,  when, 
for  instance,  an  historian  meditates  on  the  essential  charac- 
teristics of  an  historical  character,  whose  biography  he  has 
read. 

The  process  of  conception  always  consists  simply  in 
those  characteristics  which  the  two  objects  have  in  common 
becoming  clearer  in  consciousness,  and  the  dissimilar  char- 
acteristics consequently  being  crowded  back,  i.e.,  becoming 
indistinct.     The  former  make  up  the  content  of  the  con- 


12  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

cept.  It  is  possible  that  the  like  characteristics  at  first 
have  not  been  all  distinctly  marked,  but  only  in  the  form 
of  a  general  impression  or  feeling,  as  people  usually,  but 
very  improperly,  say.  Nevertheless,  even  in  such  case,  the 
concept  is  already  embryonic.  The  cause  of  the  act  of  con- 
ception is,  accordingly,  the  fact  that  the  common  character- 
istics become  clearer  in  consciousness,  since  each  pair  of 
characteristics  corresponding  to  the  two  ideas  compared 
unite  into  one  and  are  thus  strengthened.  This  is  then 
the  psychological  law  of  conception  which  we  have  been 
seeking.* 

The  next  question  is  whether  this  is  the  only  law,  or 
whether  there  is  another  in  conjunction  with  it.  There  is, 
indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  a  second  law  in  all  those  cases 
where  one  or  both  ideas  are  reproduced  in  memory.  For 
in  these  cases  the  meeting  of  two  ideas  in  consciousness  is 
mutle  possible  only  when  an  idea,  momentarily  in  con- 
sciousness, recalls  to  mind  an  earlier  similar  idea.  Thus 
we  see  that  here  the  memory  is  actively  engaged  in  the 
service  of  conception,  and  we  may  therefore  say,  that  in  all 
those  cases  where  the  ideas  compared  are  not  sense  percep- 
tions, the  law  of  reproduction  by  similarity  assists  as  a  pre- 
paratory factor  of  thought.  The  first  case  above,  in  which 
this  assistance  is  not  rendered,  since  the  objects  are  pre- 
sented to  the  senses,  occurs  comparatively  seldom,  —  and 
for  the  most  part  only  in  regular  school  instruction,  in 
wliich  case  the  process  is  intentional,  whereas  we  are  here 
speaking  of  spontaneous  conception.     The  other  cases  em- 

'  Coiirepts,  therefore,  bear  a  striking  analogy  to  composite  portraits. 
The  term  "abstract  idea"  is  frequently  not  so  appropriate  a.s  "cumular- 
llvo  l«1r'i\."  Compare  Oalton,  Inqvirics  into  Human  Faculty,  p.  83. 
Rn,<,»  ......f,...^  tlie  term  ""eiieric  idea." 


CAUSE   OF   SPONTANEOUS   JUDGMENTS.  73 

brace  not  only  ]>y  far  the  greater  part  of  llie  processes  of 
thought,  but  arc  further  of  special  importance,  inasmuch 
as  through  them  the  store  of  ideas  already  collected  is  con- 
tinually being  applied  to  the  production  of  new  thoughts ; 
without  them  the  older  supply  of  ideas  would  remain  as 
dead  capital  for  the  mind. 

In  order  now  to  discover  the  natural  cause  that  leads  the 
mind  to  form  judgments,  we  shall  have  to  exclude  from 
our  consideration  all  cases  of  voluntary  thought,  since  here 
the  will  too  much  overshadows  the  other  natural  cause  for 
us  to  observe.  And  so  far  as  involuntary  or  spontaneous 
thinking  is  concerned,  it  will  again  occur  to  the  reader  that 
here  the  act  of  judgment  is  skipped,  as  it  were,  i.e.,  does 
not  show  plainly,  thus  resulting  in  concepts  which  are 
likewise  incomplete.  Hence  it  would  appear  that  the  very 
process  which  we  wish  to  observe  is  so  obscured  that  our 
investigation  seems  to  be  brought  again  to  a  standstill. 
But  Ave  should  recollect  that  those  judgments  which  lead 
immediately  to  conception,  relate  exclusively  to  the  like 
characteristics.  Even  if  this  half  of  the  field  is  cut  off 
from  our  view,  there  still  remains  for  observation  all  the 
other  half,  consisting  of  those  judgments  which  relate 
to  tinlike  characteristics.  These  were  already  referred 
to  above  as  giving  the  downward  direction  to  thought, 
towards  subordinate  concepts. 

One  point  is  already  clear  to  start  with.  Keeping  in 
mind  that  a  judgment  is  nothing  but  a  peculiar  kind  of 
mental  presentation,  and,  further,  that  the  usual  mental 
presentation  can  take  place  without  leading  to  outward 
expression  in  language,  we  notice  that  there  are  two  parts 
to  be  distinguished  in  the  act  of  judgment.  In  the  first 
place  the  apprehension  of  the  characteristics  in  question, 


74  THOUGHT  AKD  MEMORY. 

whereby  the  ordinary  form  of  mental  presentation  results ; 
and,  secondly,  a  certain  additional  factor  that  changes  the 
ordinary  mental  presentation  into  the  judgmental  form.  It 
is  this  second  factor,  then,  that  is  properly  the  cause  of  the 
act  of  judgment,  and  is  therefore  the  element  that  we  are 
seeking.  The  following  examples  will  show  us  wherein  it 
consists. 

First  example:  A  child  sees  a  white  sheep,  and  at  the 
same  time,  alongside  of  it,  a  piece  of  black  coal. 

Second  example:  The  child  sees  a  white  sheep,  and  at 
the  same  time,  alongside  of  it,  a  black  one  (supposing  he 
lias  not  seen  sheep  before  at  all). 

'I'lie  examples  are  evidently  so  chosen  that  the  very  same 
two  unlike  characteristics  (white  and  black)  occur  in  both 
cases.  The  question  is  now  :  What  sort  of  a  mental  state 
will  these  unlike  characteristics  call  forth  in  each  case  ? 
"Will  they  give  rise  to  a  judgment  or  not  ? 

In  the  first  example,  what  arise  first  in  the  mind  of  a' 
cliild  are  the  total  perceptions  of  the  two  objects.  There 
is  certainly  no  doubt  that  the  color  characteristic  Avill  not 
be  wanting  in  either  one  of  the  perceptions,  since  color,  as 
is  Avell  known,  l^elongs  to  the  characteristics  that  seldom 
escape  attention.  We  will,  therefore,  assume  that  the 
color  characteristic  has  been  apprehended  along  with  the 
rest  in  each  object,  resulting  in  at  least  an  ordinary  idea. 
Will  now  this  ordinary  idea  produce  a  judgment  ?  At  first 
view  one  might  think  that  since  these  characteristics  are  in 
contrast,  and  their  difference  is  so  great  tliat  it  could  not 
be  greater,  they  would  strike  the  child  as  something  notice- 
able, and  so  lead  to  the  formation  of  a  judgment.  Never- 
tlicless,  1  claim  that  the  act  of  judgment  will  not  follow, — 
wliicli  is  as  mucli  as  to  say,  that,  in  spite  of  the  contrast, 


A   child's    SrONTANEOUS   -JUDGMENTS.  75 

tlie  uttention  is  not  siillicioutly  aroused,  and  tlic,  apprehen- 
sion has  not  been  sufficifnlly  lively,  to  make  tJie  ml  ad  feel 
the  need  of  (j'triiKj  rent  to  itself  hi  a  jiuhjment.  Of  course 
it  would  not  l)e  absolutely  impossible  in  the  case  of  an 
adult,  although  even  here  probably  no  judgment  would 
arise ;  but  in  the  case  of  a  child  in  whose  mind  those  two 
ideas  meet  for  the  first  time,  it  is  practically  impossible. 
The  two  objects,  sheep  and  coal,  are  so  different  in  kind 
that  they  have  nothing  in  common  in  respect  to  most  of 
their  characteristics ;  they  are,  therefore,  aside  from  the 
single  characteristic  of  color,  incapable  of  comparison  (dis- 
parate). Although  there  are  two  oljjects,  they  do  not  make 
a  ^^a/r.  The  two  ideas  lie  side  by  side  in  the  mind,  but, 
since  their  main  elements  have  no  relation  to  each  other, 
they  remain  thorough  strangers.  They  do  not  rouse  each 
other,  they  produce  no  movement  of  thought,  but  remain 
indifferent,  as  if  they  did  not  concern  each  other  at  all. 
To  be  sure,  the  two  unlike  color  ideas,  being  capable  of 
comparison,  could  in  themselves  serve  as  a  stimulus  to 
each  other,  and  particularly  so  since  they  are  in  contrast ; 
but,  compared  with  the  excess  of  indifferent  elements,  this 
single  stimulus  is  too  weak  to  cause  any  result.  If,  then,  in 
such  a  case,  where  the  contrast  is  so  great,  no  judgment  re- 
sults, there  is  still  less  cause  when  the  difference  is  smaller. 
Turning  now  to  the  second  example,  we  find  as  before 
first  of  all  the  two  total  perceptions.  But  the  rest  of 
the  mental  process  will  be  essentially  different  when  com- 
pared with  the  first  example.  The  two  objects  are  so  very 
much  alike  that  they  have  all  characteristics  in  common 
with  the  single  exception  of  color.  Accordingly,  the  two 
total  perceptions  do  not  remain  as  strangers,  indifferent  to 
each  other,  in  stolid  repose,  but  engage  at  once  in  inter- 


76  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

course  as  near  relatives.  Hereupon  the  law  of  conception 
begins  to  operate,  and  the  similar  elements  coalesce  in 
pairs.  This  movement  of  the  like  characteristics  communi- 
cates itself  to  those  that  are  unlike ;  they  also  approach 
each  other,  as  it  were,  and  feel  the  stimulus  of  rivalry  to 
comjxire  their  content.  In  so  far  it  looks  as  if  the  atten- 
tion would  be  almost  forcibly  directed  to  the  difference  of 
those  characteristics,  and,  therefore,  that  a  judgment  would 
now  really  result,  and  yet  it  is  highly  probable  that  such 
will  not  be  the  case.  For  the  very  same  favorable  circum- 
stani-e  that  brought  the  two  unlike  characteristics  together 
and  stimulated  comparison,  viz.,  the  commencement  of  con- 
ception, contains  likewise  a  hindrance  to  comparison  and 
therefore  to  judgment  also;  for,  while  according  to  the 
law  of  conception  the  common  characteristics  are  coa- 
lescing, and  therefore  strengthening,  the  effect  on  the 
unlike  characteristics  is,  as  we  know,  to  crowd  them  back 
in  the  same  measure,  to  make  them  obscure,  and  therefore 
withdraw  them  from  the  atte?ition.  The  advantage  afforded 
the  act  of  judgment  by  the  process  of  conception  thus 
seems  to  be  lost.  This  case  Avhich  at  the  beginning  seemed 
to  be  so  favorable  will,  therefore,  as  a  rule,  not  lead  to  any 
conscious  comparison  of  the  unlike  characteristics  and 
tlierefore  to  no  formal  judgment.  If  one  changes  the 
example  before  us  so  that  instead  of  two  present  percep- 
tions only  one  is  of  this  kind,  and  the  other  a  past  per- 
ception, and  therefore  now  a  reproduced  idea,  it  is  easy  to 
see  that,  so  far  as  the  act  of  judgment  is  concerned,  the 
change  is  not  essential.  We  shall,  therefore,  not  consider 
this  ca-se  any  farther,  but  shall  proceed  to  a  new  example, 
in  which,  on  the  contrary,  the  act  of  judgment  appears  in 
full  for.-.'. 


DISAPPOINTED   EXPECTATION.  77 

Third  example :  Suppose  the  cliikl  lias  seen  a  white 
sheep  not  only  once  but  repeatedly,  so  that  the  spontaneous 
concept  "sheep"  is  already  formed  —  so  far  as  is  possible 
from  such  observations.  AVhat  will  take  place  now  in  his 
mind  when  he  one  day  happens  to  see  a  black  sheep  ? 
Compared  with  the  forej^'oing  example  we  shall  notice 
two  points  of  difference,  both  of  which  are  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  mind  possesses  an  already  formed  concept, 
whi(di  is  now  recalled  in  consciousness.  Althout,di  again  an 
act  of  conception  takes  i)lace,  still  it  is  only  the  application 
of  an  already  furmed  concept  and  therefore  proceeds  easily 
and  quickly,  thus  not  occupying  the  attention  so  strongly 
as  at  first.  While,  therefore,  on  the  one  hand,  the  incen- 
tive to  comparison  of  the  unlike  characteristics  remains  in 
full  force,  the  accompanying  hindrance,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  weakened.  This  is  the  first  advantageous  change.  The 
second  point  of  advantage  is  as  follows.  Since  all  the 
sheep  yet  seen  were  white,  and  this  characteristic  was  firmly 
impressed  by  the  repetition,  and  even  received  into  the  con- 
cept as  part  of  its  content,  the  mind  expects  to  find  the 
characteristic  "  white,"  again,  in  case  such  an  animal  comes 
again  to  view.  If  now  a  black  sheep  appears,  this  expec- 
tation is  disappointed.  TJiis  feeling  of  disappointed  ex- 
2Jectatio7i  directs  the  attention  with  all  its  force  to  the 
unlike  characteristic,  draws  the  idea  forward  again  more 
strongly  into  consciousness,  and  then  gives  vent  to  the 
judgment,  "  This  sheep  is  black." 

To  sum  up  the  results  of  our  discussion  thus  far,  we  see 
that  in  the  first  example  the  apprehension  of  the  unlike 
characteristics  was  not  yet  of  itself  sufficient  to  call  forth 
a  judgment,  even  when  the  difference  amounted  to  contrast. 
What  is  further  necessary  is  a  stimulus  to  comparison  ;  for 


78  THOrcHT    AXD   MEMORY. 

foinparison  is  the  cliaraeteristic  act  which  begins  the 
thoui,'h(-i)rocCbS,  or  the  decisive  point  of  transition  from  an 
ordinary  idea  into  a  tliought.^  Only  similar  ideas  afford 
material  and  opportunity  for  comparison ;  therefore,  in  the 
first  example,  since  the  objects  were  too  disparate,  no  com- 
parison was  i)ossible.  The  act  of  comparison  begins  uni- 
formly with  the  like  characteristics ;  because  the  impulse 
to  comparison  has  its  origin  in  the  law  of  conception, 
wliereby  the  similar  elements  coalesce,  and  this  impulse 
begins  to  operate  at  once,  as  soon  as  the  two  ideas  come 
together.  The  comparison  of  the  unlike  characteristics,  on 
the  contrary,  does  not  begin  iintil  the  process  of  conception 
lias  been  concluded,  because  the  latter  process  obscures  the 


1  A  now  light  is  here  shed  on  the  important  idea  of  comparison.  It 
will  be  rc'Mieinbi'red  that  at  the  beginning  of  tliis  section  comparison  was 
expressly  counted  as  one  of  the  acts  of  tliought.  Comparison  is  really  the 
act  out  of  which  all  the  other  acts  of  thought  grow,  just  as  the  bud 
develops  into  the  flower  and  fruit.  First  of  all,  judgment  —  on  the  one 
hand,  of  like,  on  the  other  hand,  of  unlike  characteristics;  hereupon  fol- 
lows conception  —  on  the  one  hand  (on  the  basis  of  the  like  characteris- 
tics), rising  to  higher  concepts,  on  the  tlie  otlior  hand  (on  the  basis  of  the 
unlike  charartcristics),  descending  to  subordinate  concepts.  In  the  form 
of  a  table  these  chief  points  iu  the  thought-i)rocess  may  be  represented 
as  follows :  — 

Superordlnate  Concepts 

/ 

Conception  rising  to 
like  characteristics 


Compafison  gives  rise  to  J 


-< 


unlike  characteristics 

\ 

Distinction  of  Concepts 
descending  to\ 

Subordinate  Concepts. 


'IIIK    PKKVIOUS    EXPECTATION.  rJ 

difforoiifcs  ami  withdraws  tlic  atlciiiioii  I'ldin  them.  As 
au  offset  to  this  hhulraiu'e  a  new  incentive  to  comparison 
is  found  in  tlie  above  mentioned  feeling  of  disappointed 
expectation.  lUit  this  feeling  is  not  itself  the  primal  cause 
of  judgments  in  case  of  unlike  characteristics ;  for  this 
feeling  is  a  derived  condition  and  points  to  a  still  earlier 
cause.  There  must  evidently  have  lieen  a  j^f&vioiis  expecta- 
tion based  on  an  eai'lier  act  of  conception.  This  concept, 
on  the  one  hand,  when  it  appears  as  a  reproduced  idea  in  a 
new  application,  and  the  unexpected  new  perception,  on 
the  other  hand,  give  rise  to  the  feeling  of  disappointment. 
The  primary  cause  of  judgments  in  the  case  of  unlike 
characteristics  is,  accordingly,  to  be  found  in  the  law  of 
conception  whereby  like  characteristics  coalesce.  It  must, 
moreover,  not  be  overlooked  that  the  other  factor  of  con- 
ception, the  law  of  rei^roduction  by  similarity,  is  also  at 
work  here. 

A  few  pages  back  (p.  73)  we  passed  by  the  judgments 
formed  in  the  case  of  like  characteristics,  because  there 
the  act  of  judgment  was  not  easily  recognized.  iS"ow  it  is 
not  to  be  supposed  that  the  act  of  judgment  is  really 
skipped,  although  this  form  of  expression  was  before  used. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  judgment  does  really  take  place,  but 
surreptitiously ;  because  a  concept  can  only  be  present  when 
it  has  some  content,  and  this  latter  can  only  consist  of 
those  characteristics  which  are  recognized  as  common,  even 
though  they  are  not  distinguished  separately  and  precisely. 

The  primary  cause  of  judgment  in  the  case  of  unlike  as 
Avell  as  in  the  case  of  like  characteristics,  is  therefore  one 
and  the  same,  namely,  the  law  of  conception.  The  only 
difference  is,  that  in  the  case  of  like  characteristics  this 
law  serves  as  the  only  and   immediate  stimulus  to  judg- 


80  THOUGHT   AND  MEMORY. 

meut,  whereas,  in  the  case  of  unlike  characteristics,  it  first 
gives  rise  to  that  feeling  of  disappointed  expectation,  and 
thus  operates  through  this  intermediate  factor. 


There  are  three  recognized  forms  of  judgments,  —  affirm- 
ative, negative,  and  double,  i.e.,  affirmative  and  negative. 
It  will  certainly  not  be  uninteresting  to  the  reader,  if,  in 
conclusion,  we  speak  briefly  of  the  psychological  basis  of 
this  threefold  form,  even  though  this  does  not  properly 
belong  to  our  siibjeet. 

Negative  judgments  relate  to  characteristics  that  are 
missed,  i.e.,  to  such  as  are  wanting,  whereas  previous  ex- 
perience has  taught  one  to  expect  them.  If,  for  example, 
at  a  season  of  the  year  when  trees  are  usually  covered  with 
foliage,  one  comes  across  a  tree  without  leaves,  this  natu- 
rally attracts  attention  and  leads  to  the  judgment,  ''  this 
tree  is  not  covered  with  foliage."  Or,  if  one  meets  a  man 
who  has  lost  both  his  arms,  one  says,  "  this  man  has  no 
arms."  The  negative  judgment  thus  points  out  a  vacancy 
or  omission.  Both  of  the  other  forms  relate  to  characteris- 
tics that  are  not  expected.  Two  cases  are  possible.  The 
new  characteristic  may  either  supply  an  omission  in  one's 
previous  knowledge,  and  therefore  be  compatible  with  it, 
or  it  may  take  the  place  of  an  expected  characteristic,  and 
in  this  case  be  incompatible  with  one's  expectations.  As 
an  example  of  the  first  case,  suppose  a  person  does  not 
know  how  many  styles  there  are  in  the  apple  blossom, 
although  he  is  otherwise  well  acquainted  with  this  blossom. 
If  his  attention  is  called  to  it  and  he  finds  that  there 
are  five,  this  characteristic  simply  completes  his  previous 
knowledge,  and  does  not  conflict  with  any  other  character- 


istic.  Tliere  results,  accordingly,  the  simple  affirmative 
judgment,  "  the  apple  blossom  has  five  styles."  As  an 
example  of  the  second  case,  let  us  suppose  a  child  as  yet 
has  seen  only  white  sheep,  but  now  comes  across  a  black 
one.  The  new  mark  of  color  conflicts  with  the  old.  liut 
to  express  this  resulting  state  of  mind,  a  simple  affirmative 
statement  is  not  enough;  for  both  the  new  characteristic 
and  likewise  its  incouipcitihUlti/  Avith  the  old  must  find 
vent.  Hence  arises  the  form,  ''this  sheep  is  not  white, 
but  black."  Thus  the  affirmative  judgment  relates  to  an 
unexpected,  but  compatible  characteristic  ;  the  double  judg- 
ment, on  the  contrary,  to  an  unexpected,  but  incompatible 
characteristic. 

Our  investigation  into  the  laws  of  thought  is  finished, 
and  we  have  found  that  the  two  principal  acts  which  suc- 
ceed each  other  in  the  thought-process,  namely,  judgment 
and  conception,  however  different  from  each  other  they 
may  be,  still  are  based  on  one  and  the  same  fundamental 
law  :  the  coalescence  of  the  similar  elements  contained  in 
the  two  ideas.  Only  in  the  case  of  judgments  of  unlike 
characteristics,  there  is  a  secondary  and  additional  cause  : 
the  feeling  of  disappointed  expectation.  How  simple  the 
causes  appear  in  this  field  of  thought,  where  at  first  the 
processes  seemed  so  varied  and  complex ! 


The  laws  of  thought,  as  well  as  the  laws  of  memory, 
have  thus  passed  in  review  before  ns.  Let  us  now  briefly 
compare  the  two  results,  in  order  to  make  definite  the  rela- 
tion between  these  two  mental  activities. 

In  the  case  of  thought  we  have  here  to  do  only  with  its 


82  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

primary  or  I'hief  liu'tor,  and  therefore  with  but  a  single 
law  ;   which  is  as  follows  :  — 

ThoiKjId  (li'peiids  on  the  coalescence  of  the  similar  ele- 
vxents  of  ideas  ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  the  similarity  of 
ideas  that  determines  thought. 

l^he  menionj  is  controlled  by  two  laws,  either  — 

1.    /)//  the  SIMILARITY  of  ideas,  or 

L'.     /.'//  their  SIMLLTAXKITY. 

If  now  we  compare  thought  and  memory  with  respect  to 
tlu^se  factors  that  underlie  their  processes,  we  see  that  both 
mental  activities  have  one  factor,  namely,  the  similarity  of 
ideas,  in  common.  In  the  one  case  this  common  factor 
causes  a  production  of  new  material  through  the  process  of 
abstraction  and  conception  ;  in  the  other  case,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  results  in  a  reproduction  of  tlie  old.  We  may 
formulate  this  fact  briefly  as  follows :  — 

Tin;  LAW  OF  THOUGHT  IS  LIKEWISE  ONE  OF  THE  TWO 
LAWS    OF    MEMORY. 

It  will,  undoubtedly,  have  occurred  to  the  reader  already, 
that  this  psychological  trutli  must  be  of  most  immense  im- 
])ortance  in  the  work  of  teaching  and  education.  This  will 
show  itself  still  more  exactly  if  we  examine  the  relation 
between  thought  and  memory  to  see  in  how  far  these  two 
mental  activities  re-enforce  and  serve  each  other. 

In  what  way  does  memory  act  as  the  servant  of  thought  ? 

This  question  has  already  been  answered  in  the  second 
chapter.  The  memory  is,  together  with  the  activity  of 
j>('r<-eption,  the  furnisher  of  the  material  of  thought.  But 
in  tliis  service  it  makes_  a  very  great  difference  whether 
the  material  is  furnished  according  to  the  one  or  the  other 


IMAGINATION.  83 

law  of  ineniory.  By  tho  first  law  of  memory  similar  ideas 
are  sup})lieil,  and  therefore  a  material  wliieh  immediately, 
without  further  selection,  may  be  turned  to  account  in 
thought.  IJy  the  second  law,  in  so  far  as  it  alone  controls, 
the  memory  furnishes,  on  the  contrary,  only  material  that 
is  not  immediately  usable  in  thought.  How  important  this 
difference  is  in  the  work  of  teaching  will  be  more  fully  dis- 
cussed in  the  following  chapter. 

Keversing  the  question,  we  may  now  ask.  How  does 
thought  re-enforce  memory  ? 

The  narrow  worslii[)i)ers  of  memory  may  well  wonder  at 
this  question,  particularly  since  many  of  them  think  that 
the  early  training  of  thought  is  a  hindrance  to  memory. 
We  shall  have  to  leave  them  in  their  wonderment  for  the 
present ;  but  since,  as  Plato  says,  wonder  is  the  mother  of 
philosophy,  this  astonishment  may  have  the  good  result 
of  teaching  one  to  think  more  favorably  of  thought  —  even 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  narrow  partisan  of  memory. 
The  foregoing  question  is  answered  by  the  important  fact 
above  established.  If  the  law  of  thought  is  also  one  of  the 
two  laws  of  memory,  it  follows  that  the  icork  of  thlnhing 
viust  at  the  same  thne  accomplish  a  considerable  part  of  the 
work  of  memory.  This  volunteer  service  of  thought  to 
memory  may  be  of  twofold  character.  On  the  one  hand, 
wherever  thought  takes  place,  its  help  to  the  memory 
is  spontaneous  and  unsolicited ;  on  the  other  hand,  in  in- 
struction it  may  be  employed  intentionally  as  a  means  of 
memory.  This  point  will  likewise  receive  further  consid- 
eration in  the  following  chapter. 

At  the  close  of  some  of  the  foregoing  sections  we  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  to  clear  up  our 


84  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

ideas  of  certain  psychological  plienomena,  which,  though 
not  belonging  strictly  to  our  theme,  stand  in  close  relation 
to  it.  In  this  way  have  been  treated  the  sensations,  the 
rise  of  perceptions  out  of  sensations,  and  of  complex  ideas 
out  of  simple  ones.  The  present  seems  to  be  the  pro^jer 
place  for  some  remarks  on  the  phantasy,  or  imagination. 
For,  since  the  imagination  has  something  in  common  with 
memory  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  thought  on  the  other 
hand,  opportunity  is  here  afforded  to  define  more  sharply 
the  meaning  of  memory  and  of  thought  in  this  respect. 

We  first  may  ask  wherein  tlie  peculiarity  of  imagination 
consists.  New  sense  ideas  are  not  furnished  by  the  imagi- 
nation, but  only  by  the  senses;  nor  does  it  furnish  new 
abstract  ideas,  for  this  is  the  Avork  of  the  understanding 
alone.  Tlie  imagination,  therefore,  operates  with  the  store 
of  ideas  already  at  hand,  and  is,  hence,  nothing  but  a  pecul- 
iar kind  of  reproduction  of  ideas.  In  ordinary  recollection, 
the  ideas  come  back  into  consciousness  in  just  the  form  in 
which  they  were  originally  apprehended ;  in  the  case  of 
imagination,  on  the  contrary,  the  ideas  are  rearranged, 
wherefore  we  may  speak  of  the  activity  of  imagination  as 
a  modified  reproduction.  But  now,  since  the  simple  or 
elementary  ideas  are  in  their  nature  unchangeable,  it  fol- 
lows tliat  this  modification  and  rearrangement  can  relate 
only  to  tlie  composition  and  sequence  of  the  complex  ideas. 
Tliis  modification  of  a  complex  idea  may  take  place  in 
three  ways.  This  is  as  true  of  the  intentional  as  of  the 
iniintentional  use  of  the  imagination ;  but,  us  the  reader 
knows,  we  always  have  uppermost  in  mind  the  involuntary 
and  spontaneous  processes. 

The  first  modification  consists  in  leaving  out  single  ele- 
ments  in   the   reproduced  group  of  ideas,  —  as  when,  for 


IDEALIZATION    AND    ITS    OPPOSITE.  85 

instance,  anyone  tries  to  recall  the  face  of  an  absent  ac- 
quaintance, but  finds  that  he  does  not  succeed  completely, 
because  single  features  have  dropped  out  of  his  memory. 
This  is  plainly  only  an  instance  of  inexact,  unfaithful  rec- 
ollection. Kevertlioless,  it  may  happen  that  a  complex 
idea  so  changed  will  thus  receive  a  character  noticeably 
different  from  the  original,  and  therefore  produce  a  dif- 
ferent effect.  For,  if  in  such  a  case  the  lost  elements 
happen  not  to  be  beautiful,  the  remainder  will  appear  more 
beautiful,  and  therefore  this  modification  will  be  in  its 
effect  what  we  call  idealization.  Take  an  example  from 
every-day  experience.  If  one  imagines  one's  self  in  a  situa- 
tion long  since  passed,  for  instance  in  one's  childhood,  that 
period,  with  its  events,  conditions,  and  persons,  as  a  rule, 
will  appear  to  him  in  a  more  beautiful  light  than  it  did  at 
the  time  when  he  actually  lived  through  it.  The  ideas  of 
the  manifold  disagreeable  inconveniences,  which  were  not 
wanting  in  tluit  early  time,  are  now  partly  forgotten ; 
moreover,  the  feelings  connected  Avith  those  ideas  which 
are  not  forgotten,  have  weakened  more  or  less ;  since  a 
pain,  after  it  is  overcome,  no  longer  hurts  as  it  did  when 
it  was  actually  felt.  Kow,  this  must  naturally  result  in 
the  remaining  features  of  this  picture  assuming  a  more 
friendly  character.  Thus  the  recollection  has  been  invol- 
untarily and  unwittingly  idealized.  On  the  contrar}-,  dis- 
trust, envy,  hate,  in  short,  all  sorts  of  ill-nature  may  so 
work  upon  the  recollection  that,  in  the  picture  left  in  mem- 
ory of  tlie  events,  conditions,  and  persons  in  question,  the 
gentler  and  kindlier  features  disappear,  thus  resulting  in  a 
disfigurement  of  memory,  the  exact  opposite  of  idealiza^ 
tion.  AVhat  we  have  been  considering  in  all  these  cases  is, 
as  the  reader  sees,  in  its  genesis  and  its  nature,  nothing 


86  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

more  than  an  Inexact  rccoUcetion;  but  still,  in  order  to  indi- 
cate that  tliis  cliange  has  given  a  noticeably  different  char- 
acter to  the  ideas,  such  modifying  reproduction  is  said  to 
be  imaginative.  The  justification  for  this  particular  name 
is  more  plainly  to  be  seen,  when  one  remembers  that  this 
modification  may  also  take  place  purposely.  This  first 
mode  of  the  modifying  reproduction,  in  Avhich  the  change 
consists  in  the  omission  of  certain  elements,  is  called  the 
select  'mg  imagin  at  ion} 

Secondly,  the  work  of  imagination  may  consist  in  adding 
new  elements  to  the  complex  idea,  thus  reversing  the  fore- 
going mode.  It  is  an  instance  of  intentional  imagination 
of  this  kind,  when,  for  instance,  an  artist,  in  order  to  rep- 
resent an  angel,  imagines  wings  on  the  human  form.  But, 
even  in  daily  experience,  we  find  it  occurs  unintentionally 
likewise.  Thus,  for  instance,  when  anyone  hears  or  reads 
an  account  of  an  event  and  wants  to  get  a  very  clear  pic- 
ture of  the  occurrence,  he  will  picture  it  to  himself,  with 
all  details.  For,  since  language  uses  only  general  terms, 
the  hearer  must  make  these  more  or  less  concrete  by  filling 
out  the  further  characteristics,  —  thus,  for  example,  he 
must  think  of  the  persons  mentioned  as  of  a  definite 
stature  and  size,  in  a  particular  dress,  circumstances,  etc. 
Because  the  reproduced  idea  is  here  further  filled  out  and 
therel)y  more  exactly  determined,  this  second  kind  is  called 
the  determining  imagination. 

1  This  process  of  abstraction  in  tlie  field  of  phantasy  must  not  be  con- 
fused with  tliat  which  takes  place  in  the  process  of  thinking.  In  the 
first  case,  tlie  abstraction  takes  place  on  a  single  complex  idea;  in  the 
seconr]  case,  on  the  contrary,  after  a  comparison  of  at  least  two.  If,  in 
the  former,  tl>e  given  complex  idea  was  concrete,  the  result  of  abstrac- 
tion remains  likewise  a  concrete  idea;  in  the  latter,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  result  is  always  an  abstract  idea  or  concept. 


FltEEI)0:sr    OF    TIIK    IMArjINATIOX.  87 

Only  seldom  will  this  second  kind  of  modified  reproduc- 
tion occur  iiloiir;  both  modes  are  usually  united,  particu- 
larly when  the  imagination  has  much  play  —  for  example, 
involuntarily  in  dreams,  or  voluntarily  in  art  productions. 
This  is,  then,  the  third  kind,  and  is  called  the  combininfj 
imagination. 

The  phantasy  is  usually  thought  of  as  completely  free 
and  unbound  by  law.  If  this  is  not  a  comjjlete  error,  one 
must  at  least  define  the  word  freedom  and  explain  in  how 
far  the  phantasy  is  unbound,  that  is,  in  what  respect  it  is 
free,  and  furthermore  in  what  respects  it  never  can  be  free. 
The  involuntary  imagination  is  free  in  no  respect,  but  is 
bound  just  as  much  by  natural  laws  as  are  the  processes  of 
physical  nature.  First,  it  is  bound  by  the  store  of  ideas 
already  at  hand,  as  a  general  preliminary  condition ;  for  a 
man  blind  from  birth  cannot  imagine  color,  nor  a  deaf  man 
imagine  sound.  Secondly,  being  a  reproduction,  it  is  bound 
by  the  two  laws  of  reproduction  of  ideas  (simultaneity  and 
similarity)  ;  for  there  is  no  third  way  in  which  one  idea 
can  recall  another  into  consciousness.  Thirdly,  it  depends 
on  how  the  older  ideas  were  gained,  on  the  relation  in 
which  they  stand  to  one  another,  and  in  general  on  their 
ease  of  reproduction ;  for  whatever  here  is  well  or  badly 
done  or  left  undone  is  sure  to  show  itself  in  the  reproduc- 
tion, either  as  retentiveness  or  forgetfulness.  These  are 
the  rules  by  which  the  phantasy  is  bound.  The  apparent 
lawlessness  of  its  productions  is  only  seemingly  so.  How- 
ever singular,  for  example,  the  images  of  a  dream  may  look, 
and  however  singularly  they  may  succeed  each  other,  they 
have,  nevertheless,  come  into  consciousness  exactly  as 
under  the  circumstances  they  had  to  come. 

The    voluntary  imagination  is    likewise   bound    by    the 


bS  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

above  named  tliree  kinds  of  conditions.  But,  since  the  will 
comes  in  as  a  new  factor  here,  the  imagination  receives 
thereby  a  freer  scope  in  two  respects.  In  tlie  first  place 
the  will,  according  to  its  purpose,  may  direct  the  mind 
from  step  to  step  in  a  definite  direction,  or  to  a  particular 
point,  —  all  the  time,  however,  dependent  on  those  three 
conditions  as  to  what  ideas  come  into  consciousness. 
Secondly,  the  will  may  now  select  and  retain,  according 
to  its  purpose,  certain  ones  of  those  ideas  which  were  actu- 
ally called  up.  There  is  no  freedom  for  the  imagination 
in  any  other  sense.  An  important  rule  for  the  cultivation 
of  the  imagination  follows  from  what  has  just  been  said. 
We  must  above  all  direct  our  attention  to  that  on  which 
the  imagination  as  a  species  of  reproduction  natural]  3*  de- 
pends. In  other  words,  the  (/reciter  the  j^ower  of  introduc- 
tion of  the  ideas  the  better.  But  the  same  advice  applies 
to  the  cultivation  of  the  intelligence  in  general,  as  we  shall 
see  in  the  following  chapter. 

In  its  genesis,  therefore,  the  imagination  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  memory,  since  each  is  a  species  of  repro- 
duction. On  the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be  confounded 
with  the  understanding,  although  both  produce  new  ideas. 

The  imagination  has  still  many  other  interesting  aspects. 
It  is  of  great  importance  not  only  in  artistic  creation,  but 
no  less  in  the  discoveries  and  inventions  of  science,  and, 
besides,  in  many  practical  walks  in  life,  for  example,  for 
the  soldier,  the  judge,  the  teacher,  etc.  From  all  of  which 
it  follows  that  in  the  school  its  cultivation  must  not  be 
neglected.  But  to  discuss  all  of  this  would  require  a  sepa- 
rate monograph. 


CHAITFJ;    TV. 

APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY. 

It  remains  to  apply  in  pedagogical  practice  the  entire 
results  of  our  foregoing  psychological  investigation. 

Since  this  practical  consideration  appears  in  a  psycholo- 
gical monograph  only  as  a  sort  of  appendix,  it  will  natu- 
rally have  to  be  restricted  in  many  ways.  In  the  first 
place,  it  will  be  restricted  to  the  intellect  only  ;  for  if  the 
feelings  and  the  character  were  likewise  to  be  considered; 
this  would  have  had  to  be  preceded  by  a  psychological  in- 
vestimtion  into  the  activities  of  feeling  and  will.  Beside 
this  limitation  of  aim,  there,  is  then,  a  second  in  respect  of 
the  two  meanfi  to  be  employed,  thought  and  memory  ;  for 
their  conjunction  here  means,  that  the  one  as  well  as  the 
other  activity  is  to  be  discussed  only  in  so  far  as  is  neces- 
sary to  make  plain  how  they  can  and  should  work  tofjether 
in  the  building  up  of  knowledge.  Inside  of  this  narrow 
field  we  must,  moreover,  be  satisfied  with  but  a  few  in- 
structive examples  from  one  or  another  of  the  subjects  of 
study. 

To  commit  to  memory  means  to  make  the  ideas  in  ques- 
tion capable  of  reproduction  and,  as  far  as  possible,  of 
faithful,  rapid,  and  many-sided  reproduction.  It  is  to  be 
noticed  here  that  the  purpose  of  committing  to- memory  is 
not  stated  to  be  the  retention  of  ideas,  but  rather  the  pover 
of  reproiJurinti  them  ;  for  whether  they  are  retained  or 
not  will  show  itself  in  whether  they  can  bo  reproduced  or 
not.     Ideas  incapable  of  reproduction  have  no  more  mean 

89 


90  THOUGHT   AND   MEMOKY. 

ing  than  dead  capital  or  possessions  in  tlie  moon ;  and,  as 
long  us  they  remain  incapable  of  reproduction,  so  long  are 
they  — together  with  the  pains  spent  in  learning  and  com- 
mitting to  memory  — lost  to  the  mind.^ 

If.  now,  thought  results  in  a  production  of  new  ideas,  and 
memory  embraces  the  whole  of  the  previously  acquired 
ideas,  thought  and  memory  in  their  service  to  knowledge 
bear  the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  do  earning  and 
saving  in  daily  life  to  the  acquirement  of  a  competency. 

In  school  instruction,  therefore,  both  activities  necessa- 
rily belong  together,  —  as  necessarily  as  in  domestic  life 
industry  and  economy,  or,  as  in  walking,  one  leg  and  the 
other,  or,  as  in  politics,  the  progressive  and  conservative 
parties.  And  if  they  helontj  together,  they  must  also  hold 
together,  as  faithfully  and  inviolably  as  in  the  home  and 
family  man  and  wife  do. 

First  of  all,  we  must  find  the  places  where  the  memory 
must  render  assistance  to  thought  and  to  the  learning  of 
new  ideas  in  general.  For  this  purpose  we  must  recall  to 
mind  the  different  stages  or  steps  in  the  acquirement  of 
new  ideas. 

All  knowledge  in  any  subject  must  begin  with  the  appre- 
hension of  concrete  material,  or,  as  we  usually  say,  with 
ohscn'dtitm  (I.). 

With  the  perceptions  so  acquired  as  a  basis,  the  second 
step  in  learning  follows,  namely,  the  production  of  abstract 
ideas  or  conception,  in  short,  tlioufjht  (II.). 

'  If  the  reader  thinks  tliis  is  too  strong  language^  lie  may  console 
liiinself  with  tho  story  of  the  cabin-boy,  who  came  to  the  cajjtaiu  one  day 
and  said  pitoously  :  "  Sir,  is  a  thing  lost  when  you  know  where  it  is  ?  " 
"  You  crazy  fellow,"  cried  tlie  captain,  "  why,  how  can  it  then  be  lost?" 
"  I  am  glad  to  liearyou  say  that,"  replied  the  boy;  "  I  have  just  dropped 
your  silver  mug  into  the  sea,  while  rinsing  it." 


STEPS    IN    ACQUIUlXd    KNOWLEDGK.  91 

But  in  scliijol  instruction  ihis  cannot  be  regarded  as  the 
completion  ul  the  act  of  learning.  In  several  different 
ways  one  is  led  to  conclude  that  there  must  be  a  third  part 
to  the  process.  In  the  first  place,  the  newly  produced 
concept  is,  as  a  rule,  still  incomplete  —  in  its  extent  as  well 
as  in  its  content.  In  its  extent,"  because  it  has  resulted 
from  but  a  few,  perhaps  only  two,  observed  examples,  and 
therefore  embraces  but  very  few  concrete  ideas  ;  in  its  con- 
tent, because  the  characteristics  of  which  it  consists  are 
seldom  so  sharply  and  distinctly  apprehended  as  they 
ought  to  be.  In  the  second  place  a  concept  developed  from 
but  few  examples  increases  only  the  ability  to  knoxv,  not 
the  ability  to  do  ;  that  is  to  say,  since  this  thought-process 
has  taken  i)lace  but  once,  it  has  not  yet  acquired  readiness 
and  skill  in  practice.  And  thirdly,  outside  of  those  ideas 
from  whii'h  the  concept  was  accpiired.  there  may  be  still 
others  in  the  mind  belonging  to  this  concept.  If,  now,  the 
process  of  conception  stops  short  with  those  fevv'  exam})les, 
then  all  the  rest  of  the  related  perceptions  have  lost  the 
advantage  of  their  association  ;  they  renuiin  as  nothing 
more  than  raw  nuxterial  of  intelligence,  not  yet  having  been 
changed  into  higher  pr.oducts  of  knowledge  to  become  in- 
struments of  thought,  or  organs  of  apperception,  as  our 
friends  the  Herbartians  would  say.  This  shows  us  that 
intelligence  resulting  only  from  the  above  named  two 
activities  (observation  and  thought  as  a  single  act  luire- 
peated),  would  be  faulty  in  nuiu}"  ways,  and  therefore 
something  must  be  done  to  supply  this  lack.  This  third 
and  concluding  part  of  the  process  consists  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  ac(piired  concept  (III.). 

In  school  instruction  this  third  step  will  usiuilly  consist 
in  presenting  to  the  pupil  a  number  of  new  concrete  exam- 


92  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

l)les  one  al'tor  the  otlier,  for  liiin  to  see  ^vliether  they  like- 
wise beloiiiT  i:iuUm-  tlie  new  concept.  What  takes  place  in 
tlie  mind  of  the  pupil  in  this  case  is,  in  the  main,  evidently 
notliini,'  else  than  the  repeated  production  of  the  same  con- 
cept. We  are.  nevertheless,  justified  in  giving  this  mental 
process  a  special  name.  For,  in  the  first  place,  new  material 
is  now  used  in  the  process.  And  secondly,  the  pupil  must 
now  proceed  with  the  work  of  thhil-lnij  hulependently  of 
the  tenrlii'i' ;  besides,  the  task  may  be  still  further  increased 
by  re(piiring  the  pupil  himself  to  hunt  for  new  examples. 
Thirdly,  thought  proceeded  the  first  time  from  the  percepts 
to  the  concepts ;  now  the  concept  is  ready  to  be  applied  to 
new  j)erceptions.  Therefore  the  difference  between  the 
first  act  of  conception  and  this  act  of  application  is  usually 
denoted  by  saying  that  in  the  former,  the  movement  of 
thought  is  from  the  part icula)-  to  the  general  ;  in  the  latter, 
on  the  contrary,  from  tlie  (jcnerdl  to  tlie  imrticidor.  A 
well-known  instance  of  such  application  is  furnished  by 
tlie  examples  in  arithmetic,  which  are  to  be  worked  by  the 
jiui)il  independently. 

All  true  intelligence  —  that  is,  all  information,  that  has 
at  the  same  time  become  organized  knowledge,  and  there- 
fore able  to  develop  power  —  requires  the  united  action  of 
those  three  i)roductive  activities  of  learning :  observing, 
thhihing,  and  oj'plging.  If  anything  is  left  undone  in  one 
of  these  respects,  the  loss  cannot  Ije  made  good  again. 
What  is  thus  true  on  the  whole  and  in  all  branches  of  knowl- 
edge, is  also  true  of  every  single  topic,  every  "  method- 
unit,''  i.e.,  every  portion  of  concrete  material  from  which 
one  general  notion  or  concept  is  to  be  developed.  Every 
sudi  topic  must  be  Avorked  over  in  this  threefold  manner 
—  by  observation,  by  thought,  by  application. 


MEMORY    IN    APPERCEPTION.  93 

These  are  the  threi'  chief  acts  or  formal  steps  in  the  pro- 
cess of  acquiring  knowledge,^ 

We  have  now  to  inquire  wliat  part  the  nu-niory  sliould 
play  in  connection  with  tliese  three  acts.  It  was  alieady 
shown  that  tlie  h-arniiig  of  new  ideas  and  their  conmiitnient 
to  memory  sliould  go  hand  in  hand.  It  follows  from  this 
that,  in  a  lesson,  every  productive  operation  of  the  mind 
should  be  folhnved  by  committing  the  result  to  memory. 
Thus  the  results  of  observation  (I.)  must  be  at  once  im- 
pressed on  the  memory  ;  the  result  of  the  thouglit-})roc('ss 
(II.)  must  l)e  immediately  committed  to  memory.  Only  in 
the  third  step  may  special  attention  to  mem9ry  be  omitted, 
because  in  the  process  of  application  the  act  of  thought  is 
repeated  on  and  on,  and.  therefore  of  itself  accomplishes 
the  work  of  memory.  The  place,  therefore,  of  the  omitted 
memory -drill  may  be  taken,  if  one  wishes,  by  final  repro- 
duction of  the  whole  lesson  as  a  test  —  either  orally  or  in 
writing,  and  in  the  latter  case  perhaps  in  the  form  of  an 
independent  essay. 

The  question  may  now  be  asked,  Wh}-,  then,  must  the 


1  In  tlio  secoml  of  tlicso  steps  we  may,  as  before  sliown,  distiiiguish 
two  acts,  judgment  and  conception.  Furthermore,  tlie  first  stei)  re(iaires 
a  preliminary  act,  to  connect  the  new  knowledge  with  the  related  old, 
thus  resulting  in  two  suh-acts  here  likewise,  the  introductory  preparation 
and  the  presentation  of  the  new  matter.  Hence,  if  we  count  these  four 
sub-acts  in  place  of  those  two  chief  ones,  we  shall  have  five  fornnil 
steps.  Cont.  Rein,  Outlines  of  Pedagogics,  trans,  by  Van  JJew,  p.  Ho. 
It  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  reader  has  the  good  sense  to  see  the  limi- 
tations and  countless  modifications  of  these  steps  in  practical  school 
woi-k.  They  are  but  a  resumd  or  generalization  of  exercises  used  and 
recommended  by  all  good  teachei-s  for  centuries,  and  are  in  no  way 
intended  to  restrict  or  fetter  the  fn^cst  activity  of  the  j)upi].  To  di.scuiis 
all  of  these  points  would,  however,  require  too  much  of  a  digression 
here.  It  is  hoiied  that  a  special  monograph  on  tliis  subject  will  soon  bo 
published,  treating  of  the  psychology  of  the  recitation. 


94  THOUGHT    AND   MEMORY. 

operations  of  learnin;^'  and  coiuniitling  to  memory  go 
strictly  parallel  with  each  other  ?  —  or,  iu  other  words,  Why 
may  not  the  intentional  commitment  to  memory  be  post- 
poned until  all  three  acts  of  learning  are  ended  ?  The  an- 
swer is  very  simple.  If  the  concrete  perceptions  are  not 
impressed  on  the  mind  and  made  easy  of  recall,  the  thoiujht- 
pron-ss  will  take  place  indifferently,  or  perhaps  not  at  all ; 
and  if  the  resulting  thouglit  product  is  not  likewise  stamped 
on  the  memory,  it  will  he  hindered  in  its  ajjprication  to 
other  examples.  Another  reason  still  deserves  considera- 
tion. Everything  should  be  impressed  on  the  memory  as 
soon  as  possible  after  it  is  first  learned  ;  for  the  longer  one 
waits  the  more  one  loses  of  what  was  learned.^  Dr.  Mager 
used  to  say,  '^IJlioi  the  repetition  is  necessanj,  it  comes  too 
late.'* 

Another  point  in  regard  to  how  far  the  observation 
material  should  be  comndtted  to  memory  needs  some 
explanation.  Since,  in  any  single  lesson,  in  historj^,  for 
instance,  this  material  is  not  thoroughly  worked  over  in  all 
its  parts,  but  only  some  few  ethical  thoughts  are  developed 
from  it,  perhaps  even  only  a  single  one,  the  question  arises, 
Why,  tlien,  must  the  memory  nevertheless  be  burdened  with 
all  this  concrete  material  in  its  details  ?  In  answer  it  may 
be  said,  that  whatever  of  the  observation  material  was  not 
used  on  this  occasion  may  be  made  use  of  later  in  another 
lesson  —  either  as  an  example  for  comparison  in  the  case 
of  the  formation  of  concepts,  or  as  an  example  for  applica- 
tion. If  the  work  is  properly  planned,  this  will  undoubt- 
edly actually  be  done  with  a  considerable  part  of  the 
concrete  material  remaining  over.     For,  later  on,  where  are 


PP 


1  Compare  Ehhingliaus's  experiments  showing  curve  of  forgetting, 
.  ri'>-120  of  this  book. 


WAYS    AND   MKANS    OF    COMMITTING   TO   MEMOItY.      05 

tlie  cxaini)l('s  for  comparison  and  application  to  l)e  oljtained, 
if  not  in  the  main  from  the  concrete  material  of  the  pre- 
vious lessons  ?  These  concrete  ideas  must,  therefore,  ever 
be  ready  at  hand  and  as  easy  of  access  as  possible.  What- 
ever is  left  over  after  the  school  years  are  past  may  still  he 
turned  to  account  in  later  life.  Facts  of  observation  are,  to 
be  sure,  only  raw  material,  but,  in  case  they  are  retained  in 
memory,  they  may  be  continually  turned  to  account  in  ever 
new  uses  —  just  like  a  tree  that  bears  fruit  unceasingly, 
needing  only  somebody  to  pick  it  off.  To  allow  the  obser- 
vation material  to  be  forgotten  would  be  like  cutting  down 
a  fruit  tree  after  it  has  borne  one  crop. 

Having  thus  determined  whereabouts  in  each  lesson  the 
memory  is  specially  to  be  exercised,  it  still  remains  to  indi- 
cate the  sort  of  exercise. 

This  is  the  point  that  makes  our  subject  of  such  great 
practical  importance  in  teaching,  because  the  old  psychol- 
ogy has  nourished  didactical  errors  in  this  regard,  which  are 
not  only  among  the  very  worst  that  there  are  in  the  whole 
field  of  teaching,  but,  besides,  they  have  made  themselves 
particularly  dangerous  by  being  surrounded  with  a  sort  of 
sacred  halo.  The  foregoing  psychological  investigation 
will  put  us  into  a  position  to  recognize  the  right  method 
of  committing  to  memory,  and  to  see  the  mistakes  on  the 
right  and  on  the  left  in  the  proper  light. 

We  turn  noAV  to  the  icat/s  cmd  means  of  committing  to 
memory.  To  avoid  going  astray,  we  must  keep  iirmly  in 
mind  the  above  definition  of  memory.  To  commit  to  mem- 
ory is,  namely,  to  make  the  acquired  ideas  as  capable  as 
possible  of  reproduction,  and  not  only  that  they  may  be 
faithfully  and  miickly  reproduced,  but  also  that  they  may 
be  reached  from  many  sides,  i.e.,  through  many  different 


96  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

ideas.  In  this  dofiuition  three  points  are  to  be  noticed. 
First,  that  which  is  here  assigned  as  the  purpose  of  com- 
mitting to  memory,  namely,  the  power  to  recall  the  ideas. 
Hence,  everything  that  has  any  influence  at  all  in  making 
the  ideas  capable  of  recall  will  come  under  the  head  of 
ways  and  means  of  committing  to  memory.  Secondly,  it 
is  to  be  noticed  that  not  only  a  one-sided,  but  a  many- 
sided  })()\ver  of  recall  is  demanded.  Hence  it  follows,  that 
if  one  means  of  committing  to  memory  results  in  a  more- 
suh'd  power  of  recollection,  it  deserves  higher  estimation 
than  another  which  secures  only  one-sided  reproduction. 
Thirdly,  mention  is  here  made  only  of  the  purpose  of  com- 
mitting to  memory,  and  nothing  is  said  about  any  particu- 
lar method,  or  about  the  kind  of  ideas  remembered.  For, 
since  there  are  different  ways  of  committing  to  memory, 
the  definition  can  contain  only  what  is  common  to  them 
all.  and  that  is  merely  their  purpose.  Hence,  if  any  one 
included  in  his  meaning  of  memory  a  particular  means  of 
committing  to  memory,  e.g.,  by  repetition,  all  the  other 
means  would  remain  unused ;  and  if  particular  kinds  of 
ideas  were  included,  all  other  kinds  would  be  omitted  from 
the  benefits  of  memory.  The  above  definition  will,  there- 
fore, serve  as  a  sure  guide,  and  prove  its  value  even  at  the 
very  beginning  of  our  survey. 

Keeping  in  mind,  then,  that  the  reproduction  of  an  idea 
is  the  purpose  of  committing  it  to  memory,  we  must  at 
once  recur  to  the  two  main  forms  of  memory,  to  which  all 
others  are  subordinate.  Corresponding  to  the  two  laws  of 
inemor}-  ^similarity  and  simultaneity),  are  the  two  entirely 
different  ways  of  committing  to  memory:  the  one  asso- 
ciates the  ideas  by  their  content,  and  the  other  associates 
the  ideas  by  the  accidental  factor  of  contiguity  in  time. 


K()|;MS  of  memoklzing.  97 

As  early  us  Kiiiit,  tlies(>  two  fumlaiuciilal  kinds  were  dis- 
tinguished, the  first  as  the  judicious^  or  tkuikiiKj  mcinonj, 
and  the  second  as  the  viechanlcal  memonj. 

The  fact  that  these  are  the  two  essential  forms,  means 
that  every  activity  of  memory,  whether  intentional  or  unin- 
tentional, takes  one  or  other  of  these  two  ways,  and  associ- 
ates the  ideas  in  question  either  thinkingly  or  mechanically. 
If,  therefore,  repetition  is  made  use  of  intentionally,  it  is 
not  limited  to  either  particular  method  of  association,  for 
it  can  take  place  in  one  way  as  well  as  in  the  other. 
Hence  it  follows  that  repetition  is  likewise  of  two  kinds, 
either  thoughtful  or  mechanical.  If  we  add,  further,  that 
the  commitment  to  memory  may  also  take  place  invclun- 
tarily  or  spontaneously,  and  that  here,  likewise,  either  a 
thoughtful  or  else  a  mechanical  association  is  formed,  we 
shall  have  before  us  in  full  the  fundamental  forms  as  well 
as  the  secondary  forms  of  the  memory.-  Thus  we  see  the 
distinction  between  the  two  methods  of  association  extends 
through  the  entire  field  of  memory.  It  will,  therefore,  be 
advisable  to  examine  this  difference  somewhat  more  closely 
before  we  take  up  the  other  differences  between  intentional 
and  unintentional  remembering. 

AVhat  is  the  relative  value  of  the  two  methods  of  asso- 


'^Yxnxw  judicium,  meaning  judgment,  deliberation,  intuition.  Hence 
this  sort  of  memory  is  also  called  the  "deliberative,"  the  "reflective," 
tlio  "  rational,"  or  the  "  logical  "  memory. 

Fundamental  Forms.  Secondary  Forms. 

Thoughtful  •  r  Intentional, 

(by  law  of  similarity),        j       ^^.  Spont.aneous. 


2  Commitment 
to  memory 
may  be  either 


or  >[cchanical  f  Intentional, 

(by  law  of  simultaneity),  j      ^^  Spontaneous. 


98  TllorOIlT   AND   MEMORY. 

elation  with  rospot't  to  the  strengtli  of  the  association,  or 
of  the  power  to  recall  the  idea  into  consciousness  ?  First 
ami  foremost,  we  must  inquire  this  relative  value  at  the 
time  of  the  first  association,  and  without  regard  to  any 
latiT  repetition.  The  following  may  serve  as  concrete  ex- 
amples of  the  two  cases.  Of  mechanical  association:  An 
object  and  its  name,  or  a  fact  in  history  and  its  date,  or  a 
foreign  word  and  one  in  the  mother  tongue,  or  several 
sounds  composing  a  melody,  or  several  words  forming  a 
sentence,  etc.  Xow,  on  the  contrary,  in  case  the  associa- 
tion is  through  thought,  the  similarity  or  relation  of  the 
ideas  must  have  been  recognized  before,  and  hence  it  must 
liave  been  preceded  by  an  act  of  thought,  although,  per- 
Imps,  only  a  spontaneous  process  of  conception.  Suppose, 
for  example,  associated  in  this  way,  the  square  and  the 
rectangle  through  the  concept  parallelogram,  or  the  pine 
and  the  spruce  through  the  concept  conifer,  or  the  ascent 
of  a  balloon  and  the  fall  of  any  other  body  through  the  con- 
cept gravity,  or  two  historical  events  through  the  fact  that 
one  is  recognized  as  the  necessary  consequence  of  the 
other,  etc. 

Let  us  now  compare  the  results  in  the  two  cases.  The 
value  of  the  association  may  be  measured  in  three  respects : 
by  the  Infensiti/ol  its  strength,  by  the  exteyit  of  its  influence, 
and  whether  the  power  of  recall  is  one-sided  or  many-sided. 
How  much  strength  there  is,  or  rather  let  us  say,  how  little 
strength  there  is  in  mechanical  association,  when  the  ideas 
meet  in  consciousness  but  once,  the  reader  may  attempt  to 
estimate  approxim;iteIy  for  himself.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  case  of  association  by  thought,  when  two  similar  ideas 
are  present  in  the  mind,  if  one  comes  into  consciousness,  it 
may  reproduce  the  other  without  any  previous  act  of  con- 


SUI'KKIOKITV    OK   .Mi:Mr)i;V    i;v    SI  M  I  LA  1:IT\-.  'J'J 

ception  having  taken  place  (see  page  44).  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  these  ideas,  even  before  the  particular  act  of 
thought  which  unites  them,  are  by  their  very  existence  as 
closely  bound  together  as  the  mechanically  associated  ideas. 
Whatever  strength  the  act  of  thought  adds  is,  therefore, 
entirely  in  excess.  This  superiority  in  strength  is  owing 
to  the  recognition  of  the  likeness  in  the  two  ideas,  which  is 
then  expressed  in  the  resulting  concej^t.  The  concept  is  a 
band,  as  it  were,  or  clamp  to  hold  the  ideas  firmly  together. 
I  say  a  band  '•  as  it  were,"  for  that  which  here  binds  to- 
gether is  not  something  external,  something  outside  of  the 
ideas,  as  was  the  case  in  mechanical  association,  but  ol)jec- 
tively  it  is  nothing  but  the  similar  content  of  the  ideas, 
and  therefore  belongs  to  their  very  nature  ;  subjectively, 
it  is  nothing  but  the  recognition,  the  becoming  conscious 
of  this  content.  Hence  it  follows  that  this  association  by 
thought  lasts  just  so  long  as  the  concept  lasts,  and  the  con- 
cept lasts  so  long  as  the  ideas  as  such  exist  at  all,  that  is, 
so  long  as  their  content  is  not  lost.  In  a  word,  in  case  the 
concrete  ideas  are  clearly  apprehended  and  their  similarity 
distinctly  recognized,  the  association  is  so  strong  that  it 
cannot  be  any  stronger,  and  hence  no  repetition  would  be 
necessary  to  strengthen  it;  for,  if  one  did  undertake  to 
repeat,  this  would  only  be  for  tlie  j^urpose  of  making  the 
contents  of  the  concrete  ideas  wherein  the  concept  is  in- 
cluded, plainer  and  thereby  stronger.  The  strengthening 
of  the  association  results  then  of  itself.  Association  by 
thought,  therefore,  possesses  already  in  its  very  natuie  as 
much  strength  intensively  as  the  mechanical  association 
can  reach  even  after  in  a  in/  rejjefitions.  But  still  further. 
In  the  act  of  thought  the  concrete  ideas  together  witli  the 
concept  have  been  siniultaiieousli/  in  consciousness.     Hence 


100  THOUGHT  AND  MEMOKY. 

it  follows  that  they  have  likewise  been  associated  mechan- 
ically, and  therefore  in  this  point  are  once  more  as  strong 
as  ideas  associated  by  simultaneity  alone.  In  comparison 
with  the  exceeding  strength  which  the  thoughtful  associa- 
tion already  possesses  in  itself,  this  small  addition  of  a  sin- 
gle mechanical  association,  need  hardly  be  counted ;  we 
have  mentioned  it  only  in  order  to  show  clearly  and  with 
comi)leteness  the  great  difference  between  the  two  associa- 
tions. The  excess,  as  one  sees,  on  the  side  of  thoughtful 
association  is  truly  enormous. 

Turning  our  attention  now  to  the  extent  of  the  associa- 
tion with  respect  to  other  ideas,  we  see  that  in  mechanical 
association  without  repetition  the  power  of  reproduction,  as 
a  rule,  does  not  extend  beyond  a  sequence  of  three  or  four 
ideas  ;  to  gain  command  of  a  greater  number  requires  sev- 
eral repetitions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  thought  association 
embraces,  to  begin  with,  as  many  concrete  ideas  together 
with  their  concept,  as  have  been  compared  in  thought;  it 
may  have  been  two,  three,  four,  or  more.  But  the  repro- 
ductive power  extends  still  further.  For,  after  the  concept 
lias  once  arisen,  its  light  and  power  extend  to  all  the  other 
related  ideas  present  in  the  mind ;  they  also  become,  ac- 
cording to  the  degree  of  their  relationship,  more  ready  of 
reproduction,  and  belong  accordingly  to  the  sphere  of 
recollection  in  the  centre  of  which  the  concept  lies.  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  this  is  the  case  from  the  fact,  for  example, 
that  the  pupils,  after  the  concept  has  been  formed,  are  able 
to  hunt  new  examples  for  themselves.  The  power  of  the 
concept  will  affect  even  those  related  ideas  which  do  not 
come  into  the  mind  till  later ;  as  soon  as  these  are  born, 
they  likewise  belong  at  once  to  this  sphere  of  reproduction, 
and  therefore  share  its  stren.orth.     In  this  case  thou'dit  has 


MAN V-SI DEDN lii^l  W,  l^^^^f^(^\] (  \QX}1 

performed  the  work  of  memory  in  advance,  as  it  were.  It 
is  i)kiin  to  see  that  the  thinking  memory  has  a  far  gi-eater 
extent  of  influence  than  the  meclianical. 

Lastly  we  inquire  into  the  direction  in  which  the  power 
of  recollection  is  exerted,  whether  it  is,  namely,  one-sided 
or  vianij-sided.  In  the  mechanical  association  there  are 
always  only  two  members  in  each  case  so  strongly  united, 
that  they  can  mutually  reproduce  each  other,  and  even 
with  these  few  the  reproduction  backAvard  is  not  as  easy  as 
forward.  If  the  series  extends  beyond  two  or  three  mem- 
bers, then  only  a  one-sided  reproduction  is  possible,  namel}', 
forward.  In  the  sphere  of  ideas  associated  by  thought, 
however  extended  it  may  be,  the  connections  of  memory 
are,  on  the  contrary,  many-sided,  or  rather  all-sided.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  the  whole  of  the  concrete  ideas  belonging 
together  can  reproduce  one  another  mutually  ;  and,  secondly, 
these  ideas  and  their  concept  are  likewise  mutually  asso- 
ciated.' In  a  word,  in  this  region  the  roads  for  the  com- 
merce of  ideas  are  laid  out  from  the  centre  to  all  points  in 
the  boundary,  and  again,  all  the  points  in  the  boundary  are 
connected  with  each  other,  —  in  brief,  every  idea  can  reach 
any  other  idea.  Suppose  we  represent  these  connections 
between  the  ideas  by  connecting  lines  in  a  diagram.  In 
the  first  figure  on  the  following  page,  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  f,  symbo- 
lize six  ideas  associated  mechanically  in  a  series.  In  the 
second  figure  are  six  ideas  similarly  symbolized,  but  asso- 
ciated by  the  many-sidedness  of  thought.  They  are  held  in 
the  grip  t)f  the  concept  x,  and  by  the  similarity  of  their 
content  any  one  is  capable  of  reproducing  any  other  one. 
The  relative  number  of  connecting  paths  in  the  two  figures 

1  A  concrete  idea  can,  moreover,  call  up  its  concept  more  easily  than 
vice  versa ;  the  reason  for  this  the  reader  may  hunt  for  himself. 


102  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

will  serve  as  a  basis  of  comparing  the  availability  of  ideas 
associated  by  the  two  methods. 


The  result  of  the  foregoing  comparison  may  be  briefly 
sunnued  up  as  follows  :  the  power  of  the  thinking  mem- 
ory is  — 

1.  Intensively  much  stronger  than  the  mechanical 
memory, 

2.  Extensively  greater,  and 

3.  In  direction  all-sided,  whereas  the  mechanical  memory 
reproduces  in  series  only,  and  is,  in  case  there  are  more  than 
two  or  three  members  in  the  series,  only  one-sided.^ 

We  return  now  to  the  distinction  between  intentional 
and  involuntary,  or  spontaneous  memorizing  (p.  97). 

In  the  very  process  of  learning  new  ideas  they  are  spon- 
taneously impressed  on  the  memory.  This  takes  place,  as 
we  shall  see,  in  all  the  three  steps  in  learning  new  ideas. 

1  Further  on  we  shall  note  still  other  weak  points  in  the  mechanical 
memory,  such,  namely,  as  show  themselves  wlion  the  memory  seeks  help 
by  rfpf'tition.  The  influence  of  the  emotions  may,  to  be  sure,  upset  any 
sucli  calculations  as  that  in  the  text;  and  yet  I  think  the  feelings  too  will 
usually  be  found  strongest  in  association  with  thought  rather  than  with 
mechanical  reproduction.  The  ]>r('S(^nt  monograph,  however,  concerns 
itstdf  with  tlie  int(dlect  only,  and  therefore  may  make  the  facts  appear 
simpliT  than  they  really  are. 


OUSKIIVATIO.N    OF    TIIK    CONCRETE.  103 

(I.)  OhscriHitloii  has  f(jr  its  pur]io.s('  the  apprehension  of 
concrete  ideas.  Now,  in  so  fur  as  these  ideas  succeed  each 
other  in  series,  each  two,  and  therefore  also  the  whole 
series,  become  united  by  mechanical  association.  ]>ut  also 
so  far  as  there  are  ideas  in  the  series  that  are  related  with 
one  another,  or  with  earlier  ideas,  in  so  far  do  we  find  also 
the  precoii(liti()u  for  the  association  by  thought.  The 
working  of  mechanical  memory  is  here  plain  to  see;  the 
other  kind  is,  on  the  contrary,  hidden,  because  it  appears 
only  in  the  form  of  the  precondition.  Thus  the  activity 
of  observation  performs  in  and  with  its  own  proper  task  of 
acquiring  new  perceptions,  likewise  a  portion  of  the  work 
of  memory  in  both  its  forms.  Now,  one  might  think  that, 
although  this  was  right  in  theory,  yet  this  first  beginning 
could  probably  have  but  little  importance,  since  the  me- 
chanical association  takes  place  only  once,  and  therefore  is 
very  weak,  and  the  association  by  thought  occurs  only  in 
the  form  of  the  precondition.  But  that  would  be  a  great 
mistake  —  just  as  great  as  if  one  thought  that  education 
could  not  and  should  not  begin  until  the  pupil  is  already 
quite  grown  up.  What  is  true  of  education  in  general,  is 
also  true  of  memory  :  it  is  just  this  first  committing  to 
memory  in  and  with  the  work  of  observation  that  is  of 
predominant  importance.  To  understand  this,  it  is  only 
necessary  for  one  to  consider  why  observation  is  of  so  great 
consequence  for  the  succeeding  work  of  (II.)  thought  and 
(III.)  application.  For  the  success  of  these  two  processes 
of  thought-elaboration  depends  essentially  on  the  Avay  in 
which  the  concrete  ideas  were  originally  formed :  whether 
they  were  vivid,  strong,  and  distinct,  or,  on  the  contrary,- 
faint,  weak,  and  obscure.  And  tliis  again  depends  on 
whether  they  were  apprehended  with   interest,  and  hence 


ItU  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

also  witli  attention,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  indifferently, 
and  therefore  inattentively.  To  enumerate  all  that  goes 
to  arouse  a  lively  interest  in  the  work  of  observation,  and, 
with  its  help,  to  secure  further  a  vivid,  strong,  and  distinct 
apprehension,  would  exceed  the  lindts  of  this  book.  One 
point  only  will  I  call  attention  to,  and  that  is  the  great 
difference  it  makes,  whether,  for  example,  in  history,  the 
matter  is  presented  in  general  outlines,  as  in  a  compendium, 
and  hence  not  concretely,  or,  on  the  contrary,  is  given  with 
full  and  complete  detail,  and  hence  concretely  and  vividly. 
Just  in  proportion  as  the  concrete  ideas  are  originally 
strongly  and  distinctly  apprehended,  so  are  they  also 
strongly  and  distinctly  retained  and  firmly  associated. 
Hence  it  follows,  that  Avhatever  value  the  work  of  observa- 
tion has  for  tlie  succeeding  processes  of  thought,  exactly 
the  same  value  attaches  to  the  spontaneous  memorizing  of 
it  for  its  reproduction  in  these  later  processes.  A  discus- 
sion of  memory  which  underestimated  the  importance  of 
this  unintentional  memorizing  in  the  work  of  observation, 
would  therefore  betray  as  gross  ignorance  as  a  discussion 
of  the  process  of  learning  in  which  the  importance  of  the 
woi-k  of  observation  for  the  succeeding  elaboration  in 
thought  failed  to  be  recognized.  The  success  of  the  work 
of  observation  depends,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the 
choice  of  the  right  method  of  teaching. 

To  this  right  method  in  the  work  of  observation  belongs, 
liowcvcr,  one  other  point  which  was  only  incidentally  men- 
tioned al)0ve  in  speaking  of  the  formal  stejjs.  In  the  work 
of  observation,  namely,  the  presentation  of  new  matter 
must  Ite  ]jreceded  by  a-  preliminary  act,  the  so-called  2^'^'fiV- 
(ir'Hinti  dn-  introduction,  or  ''analysis"  as  Herbart  says),  in 
ordr-r  that  the  new  may  be  associated  with  the  old.     I  want 


SECOND    AND   THIIID    STAGES.  105 

to  point  out  tlie  connection  between  tliis  preliminary  act 
and  the  memorizing  of  the  new  ideas.  In  two  respects  it 
helps  to  strengthen  the  association.  First,  by  awakening 
a  more  lively  interest  for  the  new  matter.  The  prepara- 
tory step  seeks,  namely,  to  recall  to  mind  related  ideas 
from  the  child's  personal  experience  in  and  akrnt  his  home. 
Now,  since  the  child  has  more  interest  in  what  he  has  him- 
self experienced  than  in  what  he  otherwise  learns  at  school, 
the  new  ideas  associated  with  these  experiences  gain  like- 
wise a  more  lively  interest.  How  this  increase  of  interest 
helps  the  memory  was  already  shown  before.  The  second 
way  in  which  the  memory  is  strengthened  is  as  follows. - 
The  scenes  of  one's  childhood  and  early  experience,  on 
account  of  their  frequent  repetition  and  their  close  connec- 
tion with  the  feelings,  are  the  best  remembered.  Ideas 
connected  with  these  are  therefore  the  most  lasting  that 
the  mind  can  have.  Just  think,  for  example,  of  homesick- 
ness, or  call  to  mind  how,  in  advanced  age,  when  the  mem- 
ory begins  to  weaken,  youthful  reminiscences  still  remain 
vivid  as  ever.  If  the  new  ideas  are  associated  with  such 
strong  old  ideas,  the  former  will  thereby  gain  a  powerful 
support,  —  just  as  when  a  weak  young  sapling  is  tied  to  a 
stout  pole  firmly  planted.  It  is,  moreover,  not  to  be  over- 
looked that  this  association,  being  with  related  ideas,  takes 
place  through  thought,  and  is  on  this  account  also  already 
very  strong. 

In  how  far  the  (TI.)  tliouglit-jyrocess  in  and  with  every 
conception  at  the  same  time  performs  the  work  of  memory 
has  already  been  fully  exitlained  in  coniuK-tion  with  the 
comparison  of  the  thinking  and  the  mechanical  associa- 
tions. Hence,  the  more  thoroughly  the  concrete  matter  is 
elaborated  in  thought,  the  more  abundant  and  many-sided 


106  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

will  bo  the  assistance  it  will  gain  in  reprodnction.  Since 
the  association  by  thought  is  so  strong,  the  act  of  concep- 
tion has  but  slight  need  of  repetition.  The  need  occurs 
in  greater  degree  only  when  the  result  of  thought  is  ex- 
pressed in  a  rule,  maxim,  sentence,  proverb,  or  verse,  which 
is  therefore  to  be  learned  word  for  word  and  hence  must 
be  memorized  mechanically. 

In  the  work  of  (HI.)  application,  the  process  of  memoriz- 
ing is  apparent,  for  with  every  new  example  for  application 
the  process  of  conception  is  repeated.  What  would  other- 
wise have  to  take  place  by  intentional  repetition  in  order 
to  make  the  concept  distinct  and  ready  of  use,  takes  place 
of  itself  now  in  and  Avith  the  application  to  the  new  cases. 
Hence,  we  find  here  spontaneous  memorizing  in  the  form 
of  repetition,  but  not  of  the  mechanical  kind. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  process  of  learning  serves  of  itself 
to  irajjress  its  acquisitions  on  the  mind.  This  is  true  of 
all  its  three  main  steps,  in  the  first  of  which  the  service  is 
partly  by  the  law  of  similarity,  and  partly  by  the  law  of 
simultaneity,  but  in  the  last  two  stages  it  is  exclusively  by 
the  law  of  similarity  of  ideas.  Such  a  memorizing,  not 
undertaken  for  its  own  sake  nor  purposely,  bu.t  being 
carried  out  along  with  the  process  of  learning,  is  called 
immanent,  because  inherent  in  the  latter  process.  Since 
it,  therefore,  costs  neither  time  nor  pains,  it  is  plain  that  it 
has  a  much  higher  worth  than  voluntary  memorizing. 
Hence  we  may  say:  the  more  the  course  of  study  and 
the  method  of  teaching  are  so  planned  as  to  allow  of  the 
greatest  possilile  amount  of  immanent  memorizing,  the 
more  complete  will  they  be.  For,  the  more  an  uninten- 
tional memorizing  finds  place,  the  less  time  will  be  re- 
([uin-fl  ff)r  ail  intentional  one,  thus  leaving  more  time  free 


IMMANENT    MEMOIIIZING.  107 

to  leiini  new  tilings.  Thus  the  aiiiount  of  iinnumont  mem- 
orizing furnishes  an  excellent  means  of  testing  whether  the 
cori'ect  method  of  teaching  is  followed. 

Two  sulgects  in  tlie  course  of  study  are  particularly 
adapted  to  furnisli  such  opportunities  in  the  form  of  ex- 
amples for  practice.  These  two  are,  namely,  arithmetic 
and  language,  particularly  foreign  languages;  but  drawing 
may  well  be  counted  with  them  if  it  is  rightly  taught. 
Thus,  for  example,  in  the  instruction  in  foreign  languages 
the  double  translation  is  a  contimial  repetition  by  applica- 
tion of  what  was  thus  far  learned  from  grammar  and  lexi- 
con. The  same  is  true  of  the  exercises  for  application  in 
arithmetic  and  drawing.  Why  it  is  that  in  these  subjects 
this  kind  of  immanent  memorizing  has  so  much  room,  is 
not  difficult  to  find.  Leaving  out  of  account  whatever  is 
peculiarly  favorable  in  each  of  these  subjects,  and  also 
aside  from  the  fact  that  the  practical  purpose  of  all  of 
these  siibjects  is  a  ready  ability  to  do  or,  more  exactly,  to 
f'pplij  what  is  learned,  the  remaining  reason  is  that  here 
the  exercises  for  application  can  easily  be  arranged  as 
silent  or  busy  work,  namely,  so  that  the  teacher  does  not 
have  to  be  continually  at  hand  to  help.  A\'e  may  infer 
from  this  what  would  have  to  be  done  in  order  for  the 
other  subjects  of  instruction  likewise  to  gain  as  far  as 
possible  the  advantages  of  immanent  memorizing.  The 
exercises  for  application  would  have  to  be  as  extended  as 
practicable  and  as  far  as  possible  in  the  form  of  silent 
luisy-work.  ^foreover.  immanent  memorizing  may  be  fa- 
vored by  a  correct  arrangement  of  the  coiirse  of  study, 
namely,  by  the  correlative  association  of  the  various  sub- 
jects in  the  curriculum.^ 

1  A  good  example  of  this  is  funiislieil  in  M'ilbur  S.  Jackmuu's  dum- 
ber Work  in  Nature  Study. 


108  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

Intentional  or  voluntary  memorizing  makes  help  of 
repetition.  \Vliat  is  the  nature  of  this  means,  and  how 
does  it  help  in  making  the  ideas  easy  to  recall  ?  Has  it 
only  to  do  with  the  mechanical  memory  ?  And  what  is  its 
effect  ?  In  no  text-book  of  pedagogy  will  the  reader  prob- 
ably be  able  to  find  an  exact  discussion  of  these  questions, 
and  particularly  of  the  first  in  regard  to  the  exact  meaning 
of  repetition,  nor  will  the  psychologies  probably  contain 
any  reference  to  them  either.  Everywhere  such  a  discus- 
sion seems  to  be  regarded  as  superfluous.  Ah,  if  there 
were  only  innate  ideas!  But  it  is  often  just  the  sim- 
plest, most  elementary  relations  that  are  the  latest  to 
be  completely  apprehended,  because  every  one  mistakenly 
thinks  he  has  already  mastered  them.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  usual  ideas  in  regard  to  these  questions  are  in 
many  respects  obscure  and  faulty,  and  Voltaire's  expres- 
sion: Le  superflu — chose  si  necessaire  is  nowheres  more 
applicable  than  here.  We  shall,  therefore,  at  once  take  up 
this  apparently  superfluous  and  yet  so  necessary  task,  and 
seek  first  of  all  to  define  repetition;  the  rest  will  then 
follow  of  itself.^ 

Of  course  every  one  knows  what  the  word  "  repeat "  in 
general  means,  namely,  to  do  anything  over  again.     But 

1  How  very  lacking  many  of  the  text-l)Ooks  in  pedagogy,  even  those 
oflicially  recognized  as  such,  are  in  many  matters  needing  most  necessary 
ex])lanation,  is  all  the  more  apparent,  when  we  remember  in  contrast 
how  much  tliey  contain  that  is  superfluous.  It  is  usual,  for  example,  to 
enumerate  a  long  list  of  so-called  methods  of  teaching,  of  course  under 
some  strange  tongue-twisting  name  ("  acroamatic,"  etc.),  all  of  which  is 
hut  vain  and  useless  waste  of  words  and  pedantic  cling-clang,  whereas 
the  indispensably  necessary  chief  divisions  of  the  teaching  process,  the 
three  rrs]i.  five  formal  steps,  are  not  even  mentioned.  And  then,  as  a  re- 
sult, pedagogy  must  .submit  to  official  scorn  on  account  of  its  "  Elusiniau 
mysteries"! 


TWO   FORMS   OF   REPETITION.  109 

what  is  its  special  meaning  here,  in  the  field  of  psychologi- 
cal i)eilagogy  ?  Here  Ave  have  to  limit  tlie  meaning  by  tell- 
ing wliat  it  is  that  is  tlone  over  again.  Terhaps,  then,  some 
one  will  say  :  To  repeat  means  to  call  liaek  once  more  into 
conscionsness  acquired  ideas.  This  definition  is,  however, 
too  narrow ;  for  tliere  are  not  only  ideas  to  be  repeated,  but 
also  feelings,  acts  of  will,  etc.  But  even  in  the  field  of  in- 
tellect, that  definition  would  be  insutiicient,  because  it  is 
obsciire  in  one  point.  A  couple  of  examples  will  show 
what  I  mean.  Wlien  a  concept  is  to  be  repeated,  the 
teacher  may,  perhaps,  give  its  definition  again,  or,  it  may 
be,  only  the  name  of  the  concept.  This  will  evidently 
call  the  ideas  in  question  back  into  consciousness ;  but  is 
the  effect  the  same  as  if  the  ovlylnal  2^1'ocess  of  conception 
were  once  more  performed?  And  if  ideas  of  sense  are  to 
be  repeated,  is  it  the  same,  whether  they  are  simply  re- 
called into  consciousness  from  memory,  or  whether  they 
are  again  produced  by  ohseroation  ?  ^  There  are,  as  one 
sees,  two  forms  of  repetition,  the  one  stricter  and  more 
complete,  the  other  less  effective ;  one  carries  out  again 
the  original  act  of  production  of  the  ideas  in  question  and 
their  association,  the  other,  on  the  contrary,  brings  up  only 
the  more  or  less  faded  result  of  this  act.  Of  course  it  is 
neither  necessary  nor,  as  a  matter  of  time,  practicable  to 
undertake  repetition  exclusively,  or  even  mostly,  in  that 
stricter  form  ;  but  it  is  necessary  that  the  teacher  should 
know  tluxt  there  are  two  forms,  so  that  he  will  not  be 
applying  the   incomplete   form  where  of  right  the  better 

1  This  difference  shows  still  more  plainly  in  an  example  taken  from 
the  feelings.  Suppose  an  emotion  is  to  be  repeated ;  does  it  amount 
to  the  same  thing  whether  the  acual  emotion  is  again  called  forth,  or 
only  its  name,  and  hence  only  the  mental  idea  of  this  emotion? 


110  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

one  should  be  used.  When  repeating  for  the  first  time, 
particuh^rly  in  the  lower  and  middle  grades,  he  will  cer- 
tainly have  to  recur,  as  a  rule,  to  the  original  process. 
Thus,  for  example,  a  history  lesson  will  not  be  reviewed 
the  first  time  from  memory  only,  but  will  be  presented 
again  in  class,  or  read  in  the  text-book.  Repetition  in  the 
stricter  form  is,  consequently,  nothing  else  than  once  more 
going  through  the  given  operation  of  learning  (the  work  of 
observation,  or  that  of  thinking).  To  sum  iip  in  one  defi- 
nition, we  may  say :  To  repeat  means  (in  the  field  of  intel- 
lect) to  call  again  into  consciousness  the  ideas  in  question 
—  either  prod  net  ivehj  or  rep  roducti  veil/. 

The  relation  of  repetition  to  the  two  natural  forms  of 
memorizing,  the  thinking  and  the  mechanical,  may  be  eas- 
ily stated.  It  is  a  means  of  help,  offering  its  assistance 
wherever  needed,  to  the  thinking  association  as  Avell  as  to 
the  mechanical.  Wherever  its  service  is  accepted,  it  as- 
sumes the  same  character  as  the  particular  form  of  memo- 
rizing, ju.st  as  a  servant  wears  the  livery  of  his  master. 
In  the  one  case  the  repetition  is  called  thoughtful,  in  the 
other  mechanical,  although  in  itself  it  is  entirely  neutral  in 
this  respect.  Hence  when,  as  often  happens,  the  word 
repetition  is  limited  in  meaning  to  mechanical  memorizing, 
this  is  simply  an  error,  showing  that  the  relation  between 
repetition  and  memorizing  has  not  been  made  clear  in  such 
case.  llepetition  is  a  means,  memorizing  is  its  purpose, 
and  the  final  purpose  of  memorizing  is  the  reproduction  of 
the  ideas. 

So  far  as  the  effect  of  repetition  on  the  memory  is  con- 
cerned, the  following  is  to  be  noticed.  That  which  is 
strengthened  is,  in  the  first  place,  each  of  the  ideas  in 
themselves ;    and,   secondly,   their   connection,    no   matter 


TREATMENT    OF    IlEVIEWS.  Ill 

whctlun-  tliis  cnniicctioii  is  in  lliouglit  or  only  mechanical. 
In  the  case  of  mechanical  x-epetition  it  is,  liowever,  not  to 
be  overlooked  that  the  resulting  strengthening  of  the  ideas 
makes  them  more  capable,  likewise,  for  reproduction  in 
thought,  in  case  oppm-tunity  offers  later.  The  amount  of 
help  afforded  by  repetition  may  also  be  pretty  accurately 
expressed,  at  least  in  the  case  of  the  completer  form  of 
repetition.  If  the  mental  process  of  repetition  is  not  dif- 
ferent from  the  original  act  of  learning,  the  aid  to  memory 
is  essentially  just  as  great  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other, 
no  matter  whether  it  is  a  thinking  or  a  mechanical  associa- 
tion. I  say  ''  essentially  "  just  as  great ;  for  there  is,  to  be 
sure,  a  slight  weakening,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  stim- 
ulus of  novelty.  Of  course,  too,  this  weakening  Avill  increase 
with  every  successive  repetition.  How  much  is  to  be  de- 
ducted in  case  the  repetition  takes  place  in  the  shorter 
form  of  simply  recalling  the  result  of  the  previous  act,  the 
reader  may  estimate  for  himself.  This  question  deserves 
particular  attention  in  the  case  of  historical  subjects.  If 
the  stricter  form  of  review  has  already  accomplished  its 
purpose,  or  if,  from  any  cause,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
ideas  are,  for  the  present,  sufficiently  secure,  then  the  re- 
productive form  possesses  certain  advantages  over  the 
other.  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  self-activity  of  the  pupils 
will  be  called  into  play  more  strongly  noAv ;  secondly,  the 
change  of  form  affords  a  new  stimulus ;  and  finally,  in  case 
the  review  takes  place  by  questions,  there  may  be  even  a 
third  advantage,  of  which  we  shall  speak  later  on,  but 
which  the  reader  will  have  no  difficulty  in  already  guess- 
ing. It  all  depends,  as  one  sees,  on  using  the  two  forms 
of  repetition  each  in  its  right  place ;  and  in  deciding 
which  is  the  right  form,  one  must  consider  also  the  nature 
of  the  subject-matter  to  be  reviewed. 


112  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

In  regard  to  tlio  practical  treatment  of  reviews,  one 
point  deserves  special  mention  on  account  of  its  weight 
and  general  importance.  Nothing  prevents  making  an 
easy,  quick,  and  lasting  impression  on  the  memory  more 
than  to  offer  it  too  much  at  once.  Professor  Ebbinghaus 
found  he  could  remember  seven  nonsense  syllables  after  a 
single  reading.  It  took,  however,  sixteen  readings  to  re- 
member twelve  syllables,  thirty  readings  to  remember  six- 
teen, forty-four  readings  to  remember  twenty-four,  and 
fifty-five  readings  to  remember  thirty-six  syllables.  The 
psychological  reason  for  this  is  closely  connected  with  the 
so-called  limit  of  consciousness.  This  fact  leads  to  the 
familiar  rule,  if  a  series  of  ideas  to  be  committed  to  mem- 
ory is  too  long,  to  divide  them  into  smaller  portions  or 
groups  and  then  memorize  the  groups,  thus  building  up  the 
whole  series  gradually.  This  is  what  Ratich  expressed 
three  hundred  years  ago,  when  he  said  everything  must  be 
learned  "p/ece??/."  This  rule  of  practice  applies  to  both 
kinds  of  memorizing,  but  in  particular,  of  course,  to  the 
mechanical.  The  reason  for  this  is  easy  to  see.  For,  the 
mechanical  association  is  of  itself  very  weak  extensively ; 
and  besides,  its  full  force  extends  to  only  two  successive 
ideas  at  a  time,  so  that  the  connection  beyond  the  third  or 
fourth  member  of  the  series  can  only  be  very  small.  Ac- 
cordingly we  divide  a  story,  for  example,  into  smaller  sec- 
tions ;  a  list  of  names  to  be  learned  in  order,  into  small 
groups  (e.g.,  the  kings  of  England  we  divide  by  their  fami- 
lies into  Normans,  Plantagenets,  Yorkists,  Lancastrians, 
Tudors,  etc.)  ;  a  stanza  in  a  song  or  melody  is  memorized 
line  by  line,  etc. 

In  our  previous  comparison  of  the  strength  of  association 
by  similarity,  with  that  of  association  by  simultaneity,  we 


THOrflllTFUL   AND    MKCHAXfCAL   MEMORY.        113 

found  lluit,  tlie  former  possesses  important  advantages  over 
tlio  latter  :  its  strength  is  intensively  mueli  stronger,  ex- 
tensively greater,  and  besides,  many-sided.  The  compari- 
son, however,  took  no  account  of  the  help  to  be  gained  by 
repetition.  Now  that  we  have  discussed  this  means  of 
help  as  to  its  nature,  its  forms,  and  its  usefulness,  we  shall 
have  to  ask,  how  it  stands  with  the  relative  strength  of 
those  two  methods  of  association,  after  repetition  has  taken 
place. 

So  far  as  the  three  advantages  possessed  by  the  think- 
ing association  are  concerned,  it  is  evident  that  they  re- 
main as  before,  —  of  course,  provided,  that  repetition  takes 
place  in  equal  measure  in  both  cases.  How  would  it  be 
possible  for  the  mechanical  association  to  gain  anything  in 
its  favor  beyond  the  other,  since  the  additional  factor  on 
both  sides  is  one  and  the  same  ?  If  the  two  terms  of  a 
ratio  be  multiplied  by  the  same  number,  the  products  will, 
of  course,  be  in  the  same  ratio.  The  relative  situation  is, 
therefore,  as  clear  and  definite  as  an  example  in  arithmetic. 

One  of  the  three  advantages  possessed  by  the  thinking 
memory,  namely,  its  intensive  strength,  receives,  moreover, 
new  light  in  this  connection  that  deserves  mention.  In  the 
previous  comparison  the  fact  was  already  alluded  to,  that, 
in  every  case  of  association  in  thought,  there  was  likewise 
an  inherent  or  immanent  mechanical  association.  Before, 
we  did  not  care  to  take  account  of  this  comparatively  small 
additional  factor.  But  this  addition  is  multiplied  by  repe- 
tition until  it  now  deserves  to  be  counted  ;  for,  by  equal 
repetition  in  both  eases,  it  already  alone  amounts  to 
exactly  as  much  as  the  entire  strength  in  the  case  of  mer.e 
mechanical  association.  The  association  by  thought  equals 
its  rival  already,  therefore,  merely  by  its  immanent  median- 


114  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

ical  Strength,  so  that  all  its  own  peculiar  power  and  natural 
strength  are  altogether  in  excess.  This  comparison,  how- 
ever, "the  reader  must  remember,  relates  to  only  one  of  the 
three  advantages,  the  intensive  strength  of  the  association. 
Both  the  other  advantages  —  greater  extent  and  many- 
sidedness  —  remain  forever  denied  to  the  mechanical  mem- 
ory, even  after  the  most  diligent  repetition.^ 

From  this  comparison  several  practical  inferences  may 
be  drawn  in  regard  to  the  use  of  reviews.  The  tirst  is, 
that,  in  the  case  of  thoughtful  memorizing,  but  little  repeti- 
tion is  needed  to  secure  the  result  desired,  namely,  cer- 
tainty and  facility  in  reproduction.  The  second  is,  that,  in 
mechanical  memorizing  very  much  repetition  is  necessary, 
to  reach  the  same  result. 

This  diligent  repetition,  which  in  the  case  of  mechanical 
association  is  necessary  in  order  to  gain  any  result  at  all, 
has  furthermore  connected  with  it  several  noticeable  effects, 
—  such  as,  though  not  intended,  follow  of  themselves.  One 
is  of  an  advantageous  kind ;  the  rest  are  unwelcome  disad- 
vantages, but  which,  willingly  or  unwillingly,  must  be  taken 
in  the  bargain. 

The  advantageous  result  consists  in  the  acquirement  of  a 
high  degree  of  facility  in  reproduction  —  a  facility  which 
may  even  exceed  the  proverbial  monkey-like  or  parrot-like 


1  This  fact  will  also  explain  the  ori<!;in  of  the  mistaken  notion  above 
n-ferred  to.  of  snjiposing  th.at  repetition  must  necessarily  mean  mec/iamcaZ 
memorizing.  Since  in  mechanical  memorizing,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  repeti- 
tion is  the  more  necessary,  aiid  it  therefore  occurs  more  frequently  in  the 
ineclianiciil  form,  many  persons  have  allowed  this  appearance  to  deceive 
them  into  forgetting  that  repetition  must  and  does  take  place  in  the 
thoughtful  association  likewise.  Tliis  has  also  led  them  to  overlook 
the  fact  that  the  mechanical  factor  does  not  lie  in  the  repetition  as  such, 
but  in  the  iiHchaiiical  association. 


MECHANICAL    RKPETITION.  115 

rapidity,  and  wiiicli  is,  therefore,  riglitly  or  wronfrly,  called 
mavh'mi'-likc.  One  need  only  recall,  for  instance,  the 
quickness  with  which,  in  speaking  a  piece,  the  word-ideas 
succeed  one  another,  or  in  singing  a  melody  the  sound- 
ideas,  etc.,  in  wliich  cases,  however,  the  trains  of  ideas 
could  pass  much  faster  still,  if  the  bodily  organs  concerned 
in  their  production  could  keep  up  with  them.  It  would, 
however,  be  wrong  to  think  that  this  facility  is  favored 
by  tlie  nature  of  this  particular  manner  of  association,  so 
as  to  merit  the  name  mechanical.^  Because,  the  reason 
of  the  facility  lies  rather  in  the  act  of  repetition  alone, 
or  more  exactly  in  diligent  repetition.  Even  the  thinking 
association  may  reach  a  machine-like  facility,  if  desired, 
by  sufficient  repetition.  This  result  may  here  be  reached 
even  more  easily,  because  the  association  by  thought 
possesses  in  itself  a  far  greater  intensive  power  than  the 
mechanical,  and  hence  needs  a  much  smaller  measure  of 
repetition  to  produce  the  same  effect.  Ordinarily,  however, 
one  limits  the  association  by  thought  to  only  so  much  repe- 
tition as  is  necessary  to  gain  complete  certainty  in  repro- 
duction. Whether  this  is  well,  whether  one  should  not 
rather  aim  at  complete  dexterity  in  both  cases,  the  reader 
must  decide  for  himself.  Hence  we  see,  machine-like  facil- 
ity of  reproduction  is  not  a  peculiarity  of  the  mechanical 
memory,  but  is  only  accidentally  more  prominent  there, 
since  in  the  other  case  repetition  is  somewhat  neglected, 
whereas  in  the  former  we  dare  not  omit  it,  if  the  needful 
certainty  of  reproduction  is  to  be  reached. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  disadvantageous  effects  which 


1  The  expression  "mechanical  "  liere  means  only  that  the  a.ssociation 
is  determined  by  an  external,  accidental,  subjective  factor  (simultaneity), 
and  not  by  the  internal  meaning  of  the  ideas. 


116  THOUGHT   AND   MEMORY. 

the  mechanical  repetition,  when  it  is  diligently  practised, 
brings  with  it. 

1.  The  first  disadvantage  consists  of  a  considerable 
amount  of  tediousness,  resulting  from  two  sources.  The 
first  lies  in  the  act  of  repetition  as  such,  as  soon  as  the 
stimulus  of  novelty  is  lost.  That  which  in  its  origin 
seemed  to  begin  only  as  a  lack  of  enlivening  stimulus,  soon 
makes  itself  felt  as  a  positive  depression,  or  actual  tedium, 
on  account  of  the  continued  repetition  demanded  by  the 
mechanical  association.  In  so  far  as  tedium  results  from 
this  first  source,  it  must  affect  likewise  the  repetition  of 
logical  associations  as  well.  The  other  source  lies  in  the 
nature  of  the  mechanical  association,  determined  as  it  is 
by  an  external  and  accidental  quality  which  is,  therefore, 
devoid  of  interest.  With  this  second  source  of  tedium, 
logical  associations  have  fortunately  nothing  to  do.  Now, 
counting  the  effects  of  both  sources  together,  and  remem- 
bering that  the  result  is  not  merely  the  sum  but  approxi- 
mately the  product  of  these  factors,  it  will  be  clear  that 
mechanical  repetition  must  suffer  strongly  from  tediousness, 
and  all  the  more  so,  the  more  diligently  it  is  practised. 

2.  The  second  evil  is  not  of  a  general  nature,  but  occurs 
only  in  the  repetition  of  language  work,  and  here  only  in 
case  the  passage  is  to  be  memorized  word  for  word,  and  is 
of  considerable  length.  As  soon,  namely,  as  a  machine- 
like facility  is  reached  in  the  reproduction  of  the  words  the 
sei)arate  thoughts  in  this  complex  become  thereby  less 
viohile  for  further  use  in  thinking.  This  is  entirely  as  we 
should  expect.  For,  since  the  words  are  confined  to  a  defi- 
nite sequence,  and  the  thoughts  are  bound  to  the  language 
forms,  the  latter  likewise  share  in  the  confinement  of  the 
former.      Thus,  then,  the  w^hole  is,  in  the  end,   securely 


THOUGHTLESS    MECHANICAL    UEPETITHJN.  117 

memorized,  and  can  also  be  reproduced  easily  in  the  given 
sequence,  but  just  as  the  separate  sentences  stand  wedged 
in  in  this  series,  so  are  likewise  the  separate  thoughts.  If 
one  of  tlie  niithlle  members  of  the  series  is  wanted,  all  the 
preceding  nu'iubers  have  to  pass  in  review  first.  Tims,  a 
certain  friend  of  mine,  although  able  to  repeat  a  speech  or 
sermon  on  hearing  it  once,  is  nevertheless  unable  to  pick  out 
a  thought  in  the  middle  of  the  sermon,  without  beginning 
at  the  start  and  repeating  down  to  the  part  wanted.  The 
same  is  tnie  of  most  of  us,  when  Ave  have  committed  a 
poem  to  memory  and  wish  to  quote  a  particular  verse.  In 
the  case  of  a  short  sentence  expressing  only  a  single 
thouglit,  literal  memorizing  may  not  in  any  way  injure  the 
further  utilization  of  that  thought  in  any  other  connection; 
on  the  contrary,  its  definite  expression  in  language  and  the 
facility  in  the  use  of  such  expression  render  the  thought 
all  the  more  handy  and  serviceable.  The  fact  that,  in 
learning  long  selections  by  heart,  the  thought  becomes  stiff 
and  dull,  particularly  when  the  selection  is  of  an  abstract 
nature,  every  one  will  recognize  in  his  ow^n  experience. 
But  the  teacher  meets  it  only  too  often  in  the  class-room, 
and  especially  in  the  still  worse  form,  where  already  such 
a  selection  has  been  previoiisly  learned  by  heart  merely  as 
so  many  words,  leaving  the  thoughtful  understanding  of  it 
to  follow  later. 

3.  The  third  evil  occurs  likewise  in  the  case  of  verbal 
memorizing,  and,  although  not  a  necessary  evil,  is,  however 
frequent  ent)ugh  in  childhood.  For,  when  a  child  repeats 
such  pieces  by  heart,  he  thinks  only  of  the  words,  but  not 
at  all,  or  very  superficially,  of  their  meaning  —  indeed  he 
may  not  give  his  attention  to  the  words  even.  Thus  the 
most    ridiculous    blunders    may    occur,    for    example,    the 


118  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

craziest  (nonsensical  or  perverted)  words  may  be  mixed  in, 
or  the  speaker,  without  noticing  it,  may  switch  off  into 
another  piece  of  similar  sound.  A  mother  reports  she 
overheard  the  other  day,  her  little  girl  solemnly  and  ear- 
nestly conning  over  the  following  prayer,  which  she  was 
learning  to  recite  in  Sunday-school :  "  I  hardly  think  I 
ha\e  any  father,  I  hardly  think  I  have  any  father."  After 
considerable  inquiry  she  found  that  the  dear  little  soul  had 
mistaken  the  words  for  "I  heartily  thank  thee,  heavenly 
Father."  In  the  worst  cases  of  this  kind  the  process  has 
then  become  almost  as  mechanical  as  when  any  one  at  his 
work,  or  in  meditation,  hums  a  tune  to  himself,  without 
thinking  of  the  separate  sounds,  or  even  perhaps  being 
conscious  of  the  act.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  evil  result 
comes  about.  In  the  case  of  language  two  kinds  of  ideas 
must  be  apperceived,  the  word-ideas  and  the  ideas  of 
the  things.  That  which  is  memorized  is  first  of  all  only 
the  words.  AVhether  their  meaning  is  every  time  thought 
of  with  them  is  questionable.  When  the  learner  spends 
time  and  pains  on  a  word  or  a  single  sentence,  it  may  be 
that,  as  a  rule,  the  meaning  is  also  thought  of.  But  in  the 
way  in  which  children  are  accustomed  to  commit  to  mem- 
ory, the  words  usually  follow  quickly  on  one  another  ;  con- 
sciousness is  carried  along  by  main  force  with  the  train  of 
words.  It  is,  therefore,  only  too  easy  each  time  to  think 
of  the  contained  meaning  only  fleetingly  and  superficially. 
])Ut  whenever  this  takes  place  it  cannot  but  result  in  the 
formation  of  a  habit  of  irrational  and  thoughtless  repeti- 
tion. Is  it  any  wonder,  then,  that  this  habit  later  shows 
its  power  when  the  cliild  attempts  to  speak  the  piece  ? 
Hence,  even  when  the  teacher  is  present,  uidess  he  knows 
of  some  means  to  force  the  pupil  to  think  of  the  meaning 


PROPER    USE   OF    MECHANICAL    MEMORY.  110 

of  words,  this  evil  of  thoughtlessness  will  continue  to 
exist. 

So  much  for  the  present  about  mechanical  repetition. 
Further  on  we  shall  speak  of  the  means  to  overcome  these 
evils  (see  illustrations,  p}).  128ff.). 

Mechanical  association  is,  as  we  saw  before,  far  inferior 
in  reproductive  power  to  the  thinking  or  logical  associa- 
tion ;  and  mechanical  repetition,  as  we  have  just  seen,  re- 
sults in  many  evils  just  in  proportion  as  it  is  sedulously 
practised.  lUit  are  we,  on  this  account,  to  despise  the  aid 
thus  afforded  to  memory  ?  In  social  science  we  learn  that 
every  workman  is  worthy  of  his  hire,  and  that  every  work 
that  is  indispensable  in  its  place,  has  a  really  inestimable 
value,  however  mechanical  and  subaltern  it  may  be.  Cer- 
tainly the  common  soldier  cannot  perform  the  work  of  a 
field  marshal;  but  woe  to  the  field  marshal  that  has  no 
soldiers  behind  him !  These  reflections  may  likewise  be 
applied  to  the  estimation  of  the  mechanical  compared  with 
the  rational  memory.  For  the  common  purpose,  the  devel- 
opment of  the  mind,  the  mechanical  memory  may  in  its 
place  indeed  render  indispensable  service,  and  hence  de- 
serves corresponding  estimation.  When,  therefore,  fault 
is  found  with  the  mechanical  memory,  this  must  be  because 
it  has  not  been  put  in  the  rifjlit  j)/ace,  or  has  not  been  cor- 
rectly employed.  Thus  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  fault  if 
mechanical  repetition  produces  a  machine-like  facility  in 
reproduction;  on  the  contrary,  this  facility  is  a  virtue 
to  be  highly  prized ;  for  the  more  surely  and  easily  the 
lower  mental  activities  perform  their  work,  the  freer  will 
the  higher  ones  be,  and  the  more  can  they  accomplish  in- 
their  higher  tasks.  If,  however,  this  facility  has  been  pur- 
chased at  the  cost  of  too  much  pains  and  distress,  and  if 


120  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

tlie  further  use  of  these  ideas  in  thought  has  been  hindered 
thereby,  and  thoughtlessness  has  been  cultivated,  these  are 
sure  sigus  that  Pedagogy  has  not  learned  her  lesson  of 
Psychology  properly.  Hence,  if  mechanical  memorizing  is 
to  find  its  proper  use,  Ave  must  first  know  where  its  proper 
place  is,  i.e.,  where  its  service  is  indispensable;  and  sec- 
ondly, how  it  must  be  used  in  order  to  avoid  the  evils,  and 
render  the  best  possible  service  to  the  higher  activities. 

We  may  distinguish  three  cases  in  which  its  service  is 
indispensable.  The  first  consists  of  instances  where,  in 
the  interest  of  mental  development,  ideas  must  be  associ- 
ated that  are  not  capable  of  any  other  than  the  mechanical, 
or  external,  association.  This  is  plainly  the  chief  field  of 
operation  for  the  mechanical  memory.  Here  belong,  for 
example,  the  association  of  thing-idea  and  word-idea,  like- 
wise of  foreign  words  with  those  of  one's  mother  tongue ; 
whence  it  follows  that  the  learning  of  a  language,  impor- 
tant as  it  is  for  the  mental  development,  has  its  foundation 
in  mechanical  memorizing.  Here  belong  further  the  asso- 
ciation of  thing-idea  and  number-idea  (e.g.,  in  history,  in 
geography,  etc.) ;  furthermore,  the  association  of  sound- 
ideas  in  music,  likewise  of  the  sound-ideas  with  word-ideas 
in  singing;  and  finally,  although  it  is  usually  not  thought 
of,  the  association  of  the  simple  ideas  (the  parts  and  char- 
acteristics of  an  object)  into  a  complex  or  composite  idea. 
Thus  we  see  that  not  even  the  simple  perception  of  an 
object  can  take  place  without  the  aid  of  the  mechanical 
memory.*     Instances  of  the  second  kind  are  to  be  found 

1  A.s  before  mentioned,  both  laws  of  association  work  together  in  the 
pro<luctioii  of  ixTCL'ption,  since  the  repeated  observation  of  an  object 
RtrenRthens,  on  tlie  one  liand,  eaoli  simple  or  partial  idea  in  itsplf  (law  of 
Hiinilarity),  and  on  tlie  other  baud  their  association  into  a  complex  jiicture 
(law  of  simultaneity). 


RECAPITULATK^N.  llil 

Avlierevor  ideas  to  bo  committed  to  memory  in  a  delinite 
order  are  capable  but  partially  of  association  iu  thought, 
ami  in  part  must  be  associated  mechanically.  Here  be- 
longs, for  example,  the  word-for-word  memorizing  of  liter- 
ary selections.  The  mechanical  memory  must  in  such 
case,  at  all  events,  assist.  The  whole'  piece,  to  be  sure,  if 
one  wanted,  could  be  committed  to  memory  in  an  exclu- 
sively mechanical  manner ;  but  the  proper  way  is  to  com- 
bine both  methods  in  practice.  Examples  of  the  third 
kind  are  longer  lists  of  logically  associated  ideas ;  for  ex- 
ample, the  eight  branches  of  the  animal  kingdom,  or  the 
classes  under  each  of  these,  etc.  Here  we  might  devote 
our  efforts  entirely  to  rational  memorizing.  But,  in  so  far 
as  a  certain  facility  in  reproduction  is  desirable,  it  will  be 
better,  on  account  of  the  length  of  the  list,  to  call  in  the 
help  of  the  mechanical  repetition  in  conclusion. 

So  far  as  the  right  way  of  handling  mechanical  repeti- 
tion is  concerned,  it  must  suffice  to  eniphasize  a  few  of  the 
most  important  measures.  And  first  of  all  we  must  recur 
to  the  advice  above  referred  to,  which,  although  given  by 
Ratich  nearly  three  hundred  years  ago,  still  continues 
to  deserve  reiteration,  particularly  as  it  applies  equally  to 
the  understanding  of  the  new  as  well  as  to  the  memorizing 
of  it.  The  rule  is  to  learn  everything  "  piecely,"  i.e.,  in 
conveniently-sized  portions.  The  second  and  most  impor- 
tant rule  is,  wherever  the  metliod  of  rational  memory  can 
be  combined  with  the  mechanical,  always  to  use  it,  and  iu 
such  case,  in  accordance  Avith  its  higher  worth,  always  to 
give  it  the  precedence.  As  a  third  rule  for  the  cultivation 
of  the  judgment,  and  the  prevention  of  thoughtlessness", 
it  is  recommended  to  have  the  entire  lesson  reproduced  in 
conclusion,  and,  particidarly  in  tlie  case  of  memorized  se- 


122  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

lections,  always  to  insist  on  a  logical  analysis  by  topics. 
The  practical  carrying  out  of  these  rules  will  be  shown  in 
the  next  chapter  by  some  examples  taken  from  the  differ- 
ent subjects  of  the  curriculum. 

As  this  ends  the  general  discussion  ot  the  subject  of 
memorizing,  we  will  recapitulate  briefly  its  various  forms. 

Unintentional  or  immanent  memorizing  takes  place  of 
itself  in  every  lesson  in  and  with  the  act  of  acquisition  and 
in  ever)'  one  of  the  three  formal  steps  in  learning,  but  most 
extensively  in  the  applications  to  practice.  By  the  proper 
arrangement  of  the  course  to  favor  the  correlation  of 
studies,  this  sort  of  memorizing  may  be  considerably  in- 
creased. It  has  three  great  advantages  over  voluntary 
memorizing ;  first,  it  takes  no  extra  time ;  secondly,  it  is 
favored  by  the  stimulus  of  novelty  ;  and,  thirdly,  it  de- 
pends, for  the  most  part,  although  not  exclusively,  on 
rational  association  by  thought.  How  much  it  therefore 
deserves  to  be  increased  by  the  proper  interrelation  of 
studies,  is  obvious. 

Intentional  memorizing,  taking  place  by  the  help  of  repe- 
tition, divides,  according  to  the  two  natural  laws  of  associa- 
tion, into  rational  and  mechanical.  The  mechanical  method 
should  never  be  employed  alone  on  such  matters  or  on  such 
occasions  as  allow  of  thoughtful  repetition. 

"When  the  ideas  are  not  in  themselves  capable  of  rational 
association,  it  is  customary  in  certain  cases  to  belp  the 
mechanical  memory  by  inventing  an  artificial  rational  asso- 
ciation. This  means  Avas  already  known  and  practised  by 
the  ancient  Greeks.  An  example  will  show  how  such 
crutches  for  the  memory  are  manufactured.  Suppose,  in 
history,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Roman  emperor 
Theodosius,  divided  the  empire  between  his  two  sons,  Ho- 


MNEMONICS.  1'23 

noriiis  ami  Arcadius,  giving  to  llie  fonucr  tlio  wt-stcni,  aii<l 
to  the  latter  the  eastern  portion.  I  lure  it  is  eviib-nt  that 
the  pupils  can  easily  become  confused  when  trying  to  recol- 
lect wliich  was  emperor  in  the  east  and  wliich  in  the  west. 
To  avoid  tliis  an  artificial  association  is  attempted  in  one 
case  between  the  personal  and  geograi)hical  name.  In  case 
the  pupils  already  know  the  ancient  Clreck  prcjvince  of 
Arcadia,  this  association  may  take  place  between  the  sound 
of  the  name  Arcadius  and  that  of  the  province  Arcadia ; 
this  lay  in  the  eastern  portion  of  the  empire,  and  it  was 
this  portion  that  fell  to  Arcadius.  If  the  pupils  have  not 
heard  of  that  (h-eek  province,  the  artilicial  association  could 
be  made  as  follows  :  the  name  Arcadius  begins  with  the 
first  letter  of  the  alphabet ;  in  the  ea«t  the  sun  rises  first ; 
thus  the  one  'first'  recalls  the  other  'first.'  This  method 
of  association,  as  distinguished  from  the  genuinely  rational 
association,  is  called  mnemonic  (from  the  Greek  word  ixin'ifxrj, 
recollection).  It  was  named  by  Kant  the  ingenious  memory, 
i.e.,  cunningly  devised.  We  call  it  also  artificial  memory. 
Mnemonics  is,  in  certain  cases,  particularly  for  the  reten- 
tion of  dates  and  other  nximbers,  as  little  to  be  despised  as 
crutches  and  artificial  limbs  are  when  the  natural  limbs  are 
wanting.  In  its  application  to  nund)ers  this  art  has  in 
later  times  been  reduced  to  definite  rules,  which  are  easily 
learned,  and  in  such  vocations  as  require  many  numbers  to 
be  learned  it  will  no  doubt  pay  to  drill  one's  self  in  the  use 
of  these  rules.  But  it  is  quite  another  question  whether 
educative  instruction  should  make  use  of  a  system  of 
mnemonics  in  drilling  on  historical  dates  and  geographical 
numbers.  It  might  be  asked  in  rei)ly  whether  one  should 
systematically  accustom  sound  limbs  to  the  use  of  crutches  ? 
That  which  no  gymnastics  for  the  body  would  permit,  may 


124  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

not  be  allowed  -for  the  mind  either.  This  fact,  however, 
should  not  prevent  the  mechanical  memory  from  receiving 
artificial  aid  in  certain  individual  cases ;  for  example,  to 
prevent  confounding  similar  ideas  —  if  for  no  other  reason, 
to  call  the  pupils'  attention  to  the  fact  that  such  aid  is 
possible.  In  our  opinion  the  school  should  not  require  any- 
more numbers  to  be  learned  than  can  be  mastered  by  the 
natural  means  of  memory.  If,  therefore,  a  prescribed 
course  of  study  requires  the  learning  of  so  many  numbers 
that  the  natural  means  of  memory  are  insufficient,  this  is 
a  sign,  not  that  a  system  of  mnemonics  is  necessary,  but 
that  the  list  of  numbers  must  be  shortened.  The  method 
of  mnemonics  has  often  been  counted  as  a  third  kind  of 
memorizing,  co-ordinate  with  the  rational  and  the  me- 
chanical methods.  With  reference,  however,  to  the  matter 
in  the  association,  the  mnemonic  method  is  a  subspecies 
of  the  mechanical  memory;  with  reference  to  the  kind  of 
association,  it  is  a  subspecies  of  the  rational. 

That  sometimes  our  most  prominent  educators  fall  into  a  dispar- 
agement of  memory,  hy  veanon  of  restrictbig  it  to  the  mechanical 
form,  is  shown  hy  tlie  following  sentence  from  Dr.  Harris's  preface 
to  Kay's  Memory  in  the  International  Education  Series:  "When  we 
can  see  each  iunnediate  fact  in  the  perspective  of  its  genesis  or  his- 
tory, we  have  no  use  for  memory,  which  preserves  for  us  facts  and 
events  isolated  from  their  producing  and  deducing  causes."  This 
whole  hook  is  a  protest  against  such  a  restriction  in  the  meaning  of 
memory.  To  see  "  each  fact  in  the  perspective  of  its  genesis  or 
history"  is  the  hest  way  of  memorizing  it.  Nearly  all  the  special 
books  on  Memory  restrict  themselves  to  the  cultivation  of  the  me- 
chanical memory,  or  else  advocate  some  artificial  system  of  mne- 
monics. Tliis  is  true  of  Kay's  hook  ahove  mentioned,  and  even  of 
Dr.  Pick's  Memory  and  the  Rational  Means  of  Itirproving  It. 

For  an  account  of  different  systems  of  mnemonics,  see  article 
"Mnemonics,"  Encyclopoidia  Britannica,  and  article  "Memory" 


LEARNING    AND    FOIlGETTING. 


125 


in  Chambers^ s  Kncyclojxedia.  A  very  interesting  l)Ook,  c.ilculated 
to  cure  any  one  of  unbounded  faith  in  any  system  of  mnemonics, 
is  "ioi.sf/k"  Exposed,  by  (J.  S.  Fellows,  \ew  York.  It  contains  a 
full  bibliography. 

Dr.  Ebbinghaus  of  Berlin  investigated  on  himself  some  of  the 
laws  of  mechanical  memory,  and  has  published  his  results  in  a  book, 
Ueber  dus  Gediiclitnis,  Leipzig,  1885.  As  this  work  has  never  been 
translated, 1  I  take  the  liberty  of  presenting  three  of  his  results 
which  seem  to  have  nuist  direct  bearing  on  school  work. 


CLKVK   OF    LEARNING. 


7       12    16  24  36 

in  order  to  learn  x  syllables. 

To  loam  7  nonsense  syllables.  Dr.  Ebbinghaus  found  that  for  him 
it  required  but  once  going  over;  when  this  number  was  increased  to 
12  syllables  it  took  17  repetitions  to  learn  the  list,  16  syllables  required 

1  See,  however,  a  very  good  summary  of  the  book  by  Dr.  Burnliani.in 
tlie  American  Journal  of  Vsycholotpi,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  .">s7-(;o;5.  The  curve 
given  on  p.  VH\  of  this  book  is  not  taken  from  Ebbiughaus,  but  is  con- 
structed from  bis  tables. 


126 


THOUGHT   AND  MEMORY. 


30  repetitions,  and  so  on.  The  curve  is  extremely  steep,  and  sliows 
in  a  very  graphic  way  the  difficulty  the  memory  has  of  mastering 
long  lists.  It  should  be  added  that  when  lists  were  chosen  in  which 
the  syllables  had  a  mkanixg,  and  could  be  thus  asfiociuled,  it  was 
found  the  work  of  learning  was  reduced  to  one-tenth. 

By  committing  lists  of  nonsense  syllables  so  that  they  could  just 
be  reproduced,  it  was  found  that  after  the  lapse  of  only  20  minutes 
58^  as  much  work  was  required  to  recommit  as  to  commit  an  en- 
tirely new  list ;  or,  in  other  words,  42  %  of  the  original  work  was 
lost  by  forgetting.  After  one  hour  this  loss  amounted  to  56%  of 
the  whole.  But  it  was  also  found  that  the  loss  after  this  was  very 
gradual,  so  that  after  6  days  there  still   remained  25^,  and  after 

31  days  there  was  still  a  saving  of  21%  in  the  work  of  relearning. 


CUKVE   OF   FOBGETTING, 


100% 


10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100  110  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  20.0 

after  lapse  of  a;  hours 


Witli  six  16-syllable  lists,  Dr.  Ebbinghaus  found  the  time  saved  in 
relearning,  after  an  interval  of  24  hours,  was  directly  proportional 
to  the  number  of  repetitions  (up  to  64  repetitions)  on  the  preceding 
day.  But  this  saving  amounted  to  only  one-third  as  much  time  as 
the  original  learning  required.  Hence  we  see  the  bad  economy  of 
attempting  to  learn  things  lie/ore  they  can  be  used,  under  the  plea 
that  they  will  be  of  use  later.  One  great  waste  of  memory  in  school- 
work  comes  from  learning  things  before  they  are  needed,  inasmuch 
an  they  have  to  he  relearned  each  time  that  they  are  really  employed. 

James  P.  Downs  of  New  York  has  published  a  series  of  six 


HERBARTIAX    BIIJLIOOKAPHY.  127 

manuals  on  The  Mnnonj.  They  aro,  1,  T/ie  Mastery  of  Memorizing  ; 
2,  Quickiifnx  of  Pcrccjition  ;  8,  Ei/e  and  Kitr  Memory  ;  4,  The  Study 
of  Luit'juatjes ;  5,  Memory  and  Thowj/it;  (i,  The  Memory-Traininij 
of  the  Youmj.  The  titles,  however,  lead  one  to  expect  a  great  ileal 
more  of  lielpfiil  suggestiveness  from  these  books  than  they  actually 
contain.  They  have  some  good  points,  but  are  not  worlii  llieir 
cost  {^')). 

For  the  English  literature  of  the  Herbartian  School  the  reader  is 
referred  particularly  to  Kein's  Outlines  of  Pedui/oyica,  translated  by 
C.  C.  and  Ida  J.  Van  Liew,  Syracuse,  N.Y. ;  C.  W.  Bardeen,  1893. 
This  is  a  Ijook  of  nearly  200  pages,  but  as  thorough  as  anytliing  on  the 
sul)ject  yet  pul)lished  in  Englisli.  It  contains  a  full  bibliograjdiy  to 
date  of  works  in  English  on  Herbartian  Pedagogy.  Of  these  1  should 
name  as  chief:  De  Garmo,  E.stie)itiulti  of  Method,  and  Uerbart  and  the 
Herbartians ;  Ufer's  Introduction  to  the  Pedayoyy  of  Hcrbart,  trans- 
lated by  J.  C.  Zinser;  Ilerbart's  Science  of  Education,  translated  by 
Henry  M.  and  Emmie  Felkin;  Lange's  Apperception,  edited  by  De 
Garmo;  Charles  A.  McMurry's  General  Method.  The  First  Tear- 
Book  of  the  Uerbart  Society  for  the  Scientific  Study  of  Teaching 
contains  valuable  papers  on  Correlation,  Concentration,  and  Culture 
Epochs.  In  these  works  the  reader  will  find  a  fuller  accoimt  of 
"  Method-uuils,"  or  "  Method-wholes,"  "  Formal  Steps,"  etc.  All 
of  these  presuppose  on  the  teacher's  part  a  sympathetic  acquaint- 
ance with  the  facts  of  child  development  and  a  good  stock  of  sound 
common-sense  in  the  correct  application  of  these  ideas. 


CHAPTEK   T- 


Wk  :.  ?  Taken 

fiom  il.  ~      ,      ^  -   iiit*'^'^ 

tional  memorizmg  lational  vepetitioiL  maj  be  made  to  help 
the  mechanical,  cur  even  in  certain  cases  entiiely  take  its 
place.  The  wodk  of  memory  is  here  alone  to  be  consideied, 
and  forchennore  only  that  portion  that  takes  pLauee  in 
schooL  Aii  tie  prfiimimKirjf  procKsses  of  aeymsifkiH  trill  be 
prtsmpposxd.  In  those  subjects  nsually  classed  as  thGughtr- 
stmdifs  in  contrast  to  expiession-stndies,  it  is,  of  course,  the 
cc:  Terial,  and  hence  the  first  formal  step,  \rhich 

re^  ;  most  diilL  Of  the  following  examples,  there- 
f cse,  all  those  taken  from  thooght-stadies  refer  exclusively 
to  the  material  of  observation. 

First  Exjlmplk  —  faiem  jfrom  history. 

Tae  sioiy  may  be  any  one  the  reader  chooses,  provided 
it  is  a  metiioid-Trhole.  We  will  suppose  that  the  oral  pre- 
sentation of  the  matter  by  the  teacher,' including  the  inter- 
woven explanatory  discussion,  has  been  finished,  and  the 
i^:x.'  ^r  has  now  the  duty  of  seein?  that  the  same  is  ade- 
impressed  on  the  memory. 

'  .ii  will  be  the  method  pursued  by  a  teaeler  who 
:__i:c5  use  of  the  mechanical  memory  exclusively  ? 

We  must,  however,  first  come  to  an  understanding  of 
what  is  exactly  meant  by  the  expression  mechanical  mem- 

12S 


METHOD   OF    MECHANICAL   DKILL.  129 

ory,  or,  in  otlior  words,  how  nnu-h  place  there  is  liere  for 
mechanical  association.  In  liist(Jiy  and  literature  the  very 
words  used  have,  to  be  sure,  a  certain  value  ;  but  we  will, 
nevertheless,  assume  that  the  teacher  has  no  intention  of 
requiring  a  literal  commitment  to  memory,  but  agrees  with 
us  in  thinking  that  the  pupils  should  use  their  own  words 
in  rehearsing  the  facts  of  historyJ  Thus,  then,  the  me- 
chanical memory  of  the  words  used  is  excluded.  Hence 
we  have  to  do  only  with  the  material  facts  of  history. 
These  form  objectively  a  definite  sequence  in  the  story  as 
related,  and  yet  not  an  accidental  sequence,  but  one  that  is 
determined  by  the  causal  connection  of  the  events.  Now 
in  so  far  as  the  pupils  have  understood  this  connection  at 
the  first  hearing,  the  ideas  have  already  become  associated 
once  rationally ;  but  in  so  far  as  this  connection  has  not 
been  conceived,  the  ideas  have  been  associated  only  me- 
chanically. The  fact,  as  a  rule,  will  be  that  a  portion  of 
the  ideas  have  found  a  rational,  and  the  other  portion  only 
a  mechanical,  association.  But  suppose  the  most  favorable 
case,  namely,  that  in  this  first  immanent  impression  on  the 
memory  the  number  of  merely  mechanical  associations  has 
been  very  small.  How  will  it  be  now  in  case  of  repetition  ? 
In  so  far  as  the  pupils  have  not  the  logical  connection  in 
mind,  this  connection  will  likewise  fail  of  repetition.  And 
hence,  if  the  teacher  does  nothing  to  freshen  up  the 
rational  association,  it  will  indeed  happen  that  only  a 
portion  of   these  rational  associations   are  repeated,  thus 

1  "  I  shall  force  my  daujrliter  to  marry  according  to  her  inclination," 
said  Madame  DeStael,  taught  probaljly  hy  her  own  sad  exporience.  This 
maxim  may  bo  applied  to  recitations  in  the  thought-studies.  The  pupils 
sliould  not  only  be  alUwed,  but  even  strongly  encourapeil,  to  use  their 
own  words  in  recitation.  Of  course  this  encouraging  must  not  dcgeue- 
rate  into  command,  for  then  freedom  would  bo  lost  again. 


130  THOUGHT   AXD   IVIEMORY. 

increasing  tlie  nuiuber  of  mechanical  associations  in  the 
same  degree.  This  will  be  especially  true  with  the  weaker 
pupils.  "With  this  preliminary  explanation,  it  will  now  be 
possible  to  say  how  the  expression  '<  mechanical  repeti- 
tion "  is  to  be  understood.  It  means  that  in  such  case  the 
teacher  does  nothing  to  renew  and  deepen  the  concejjtion  of 
the  connection  of  the  ideas,  but  restricts  himself  to  a  mere 
drill  of  the  concrete  ideas  in  the  given  sequence. 

Eeturning  now  to  the  above  question,  we  shall  follow 
the  method  of  mechanical  memory  in  detail. 

To  begin  with,  the  teacher,  of  course,  will  mentally 
divide  the  story  into  smaller  divisions.  But  this  is  done 
only  in  the  mechanical  sense,  and  therefore  not  for  the  sake 
of  disposing  the  subject-matter  logically,  but  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  giving  the  pupils  conveniently  small  portions. 
Accordingly,  then,  these  divisions  will  not  be  provided  with 
special  headings.  For  this  method  does  not  require  the 
pupils  to  think  of  these  divisions  as  members,  but  only  as 
pieces,  and,  of  course,  broken  bits  need  no  names.  Hence 
in  the  division  of  the  subject-matter  these  pupils  take  no 
part. 

And  now  the  memorizing  begins,  namely,  with  the  first 
paragraph.  The  teacher  presents  the  matter  once  more, 
either  orally  or  by  having  the  pupils  read ;  in  case  it 
seems  necessary,  this  may  also  be  repeated  a  second  time 
perhaps. 

Then  he  calls  upon  one  of  the  abler  pupils  to  repeat 
independently,  and  corrects,  or  allows  the  other  pupils  to 
correct,  whatever  is  in  need  of  improvement ;  thereupon  he 
calls  on  one  of  the  mediocre  pupils  to  repeat,  and  finally 
on  one  of  the  weakest.  Thus  reproduction  and  correction 
are  continued  so  long  as  is  necessary  to  enable  most  of  the 


LOGICAL  DlSPqsmON   BY   TOPICS.  lol 

pupils,  and,  if  })ossible,  even  the  weajter  ones;  Tfc^ac<^(4ln- 
plish  what  is  desired. 

After  this  the  second  paragraph  is  taken  in  its  turn,  in 
the  self-same  way.  But  this  time,  in  reciting,  the  pu^jil  is 
required  to  say  both  paragraphs  together.  The  same  takes 
place  with  every  succeeding  paragraph,  until  finally  the 
majority  of  the  pupils  are  able  to  reproduce  the  entire  story 
Avith  certainty,  and  even  a  certain  amount  of  facility.' 

That  would  be  just  about  the  method  pursued  in  the 
mechanical  memorizing  of  history.  It  is  characterized,  as 
one  sees,  by  the  fact  that  rational  association  in  thought 
is  nowhere  made  use  of.  Compare  with  this  the  other 
method,  which,  in  contrast,  depends  directly  on  the  rational 
association. 

The  first  place  in  which  thought  here  comes  to  the  as- 
sistance of  memory  is  in  dividing  the  story  into  smaller 
sections.  This  division  of  the  subject  takes  place  at  the 
first  presentation  for  greater  ease  in  the  acquisition ;  also, 
with  the  same  purpose  in  view,  the  separate  sections  are 

1  Rector  Dorpteld  records,  in  a  footnote,  how  he  felt,  when  at  the  time 
of  tlio  Regulatives  (1872)  he  first  came  upon  the  practice  of  the  last- 
named  regulation  in  regard  to  repetition.  He  found  the  students  in  a 
Normal  School  trained  to  teach  in  this  way.  He  had  supposed  it  was 
impossible  after  the  introduction  of  Normal  Schools,  to  find  such  per- 
verted ideas  of  teaching.  He  wrote  at  that  time  in  the  Evangelical 
School  Journal :  — 

"  Does  it  not  seem  as  if  one  had  already  seen  this  sort  of  smart  work 
elsewhere,  and  in  other  connection  before?  Is  not  this  manner  of  com- 
mitting to  memory  precisely  like  that  old  way  of  learning  the  spelling 
lesson,  in  whirli  with  every  successive  syllable  of  a  word  the  preceding 
syllables  had  to  be  again  projionnced,  after  the  manner  of  the  '  house  that 
Jack  built'?  Thus  it  would  go:  te  — e  =  te;  de— i  =  dT,  tedl .: 
o_n_es  =  ofls,  te'dlofls  ;  en  —e  — double  Cs.  ni^ss,  te'dloflsness.  What 
is  here  done  with  tlie  syllables  is  just  as  regularly  done  there  with  the 
sentences  and  paragraphs  of  history." 


132  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

provided  with  a  general  heading,  or  topic.  Thus  we  see 
the  difference  of  the  two  methods  even  in  the  very  first 
step;  for  the  topical  headings  prevent  the  matter  from 
being  cut  up  into  arbitrary  pieces,  and  substitute  instead 
the  logical  disposition  of  the  subject.  Thus  the  sections 
become  actual  members  of  an  organic  whole,  instead  of 
merely  loose  pieces.  Every  heading  is  to  be,  as  much  as 
possible,  in  the  form  of  a  catchword.  For  a  very  good 
instance  of  such  logical  disposition  compare  the  topical 
analysis  by  Dr.  Hill  in  Fiske's  School  History  of  the 
United  States.  Here,  for  example,  the  period  of  the  Rev- 
olution is  divided  into  three  chapters:  I.  Causes  and  Be- 
ginnings, 1763-1776;  II.  The  Winning  of  Independence, 
1776-1783;  III.  The  Critical  Period,  1783-1789.  Under 
I.  are  the  topics  and  sub-topics  as  follows :  — 

a.  Causes  of  III  FecVuuj  bettoeen  England  and  her  Colonies. 

1.  What  was  the  European  idea  of  a  colony,  and  its  object  ? 

2.  \\niat  erroneous  notions  about  trade  existed  ? 

3.  What  was  the  main  object  of  the  laws  regulating  trade  ? 

etc. 

b.  The  Need  of  a  Federal  Union. 

1.  One  great  difficulty  in  carrying  on  the  French  wars. 

2.  An  account  of  Franklin. 
.3.  Franklin's  plan  of  union. 

etc. 

c.  The  ,':>tanip  Act  Paused  and  Repealed. 

1.  The  kind  of  government  needed  by  the  colonies. 

2.  How  Parliament  sought  to  establish  such  a  government. 

3.  The  nature  of  a  stamp  tax. 

etc. 

Fi7\<it  Stage  in  3femorizing.     If  the  first  step  in  acquisi- 
tion (the  concrete  presentation)  has  thus  prepared  the  way. 


THE   LIST    OF    HEADINGS.  133 

the  work  of  memorizing  will  now  begin  as  follows.  The 
first  stage  consists  in  committing  well  the  logical  disposi- 
tion, that  is  to  say,  the  list  of  hmdings.  This  is  done  by 
repetition,  not,  however,  mechanically,  but  thoughtfully. 
The  teacher,  accordingly,  in  the  simplest  possible  manner, 
calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  members  of  this  series 
are  not  accidental  but  causal  in  their  connection.  He 
shows  that  the  Causes  (I.)  of  the  Ilovolutiou  led  to  the 
Winning  of  Independence  (11.),  and  this  was  then  followed 
by  the  Critical  Period  (III.),  lasting  until  a  stable  govern- 
ment could  be  established  again  (IV.).  After  in  this  way 
the  list  has  been  gone  through,  ouce  forward  and  once 
backward,  it  nuiy  be  thoroughly  stamped  on  the  memory 
by  the  following  exercise,  in  which  the  teacher  questions 
and  cross-questions  thus,  —  e.g.,  What  was  the  cause  of  the 
Critical  Period  ?  What  led  up  to  Independence  ?  What 
followed  on  the  Winning  of  Independence  ?  etc.  But  in 
all  of  this  the  pupils  must  be  allowed  opportunity  for  quiet 
deliberation ;  for  the  aim  is  not  to  get  the  answer  as 
quickly  as  possible,  but  to  get  it  by  thinklmj.  If  this 
exercise  is  continued  awhile,  all  the  pupils  will  soon  be 
able  to  say  the  list  both  forwards  and  backwards,  perhaps 
with  facility  already,  and,  at  all  events,  with  certainty. 

This  shows,  in  the  first  stage  of  the  process,  how  thought 
may  re-enforce  memory  through  a  logical  arrangement  of 
topics.  The  help  that  the  memory  receives  is  easy  to  see, 
on  the  one  hand  from  the  arrangement,  and  on  the  other 
hand  from  the  repetition.  The  contents  of  each  section  is 
held  together  by  its  separate  heading,  and  the  story  is  con- 
nected, as  a  whole,  by  the  entire  list  of  headings ;  this  is 
in  both  cases  a  thought-connection.  The  repetition  then 
strengthens  both  of  these  bands,  but  always  retains   its 


134  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

logical  character,  and  hence  this  thinking  seems  to  the 
pupils  like  new  acquisition. 

Second  Stage  of  Memorlziny.  Kow,  then,  can  follow  the 
repetition  of  the  separate  sections.  As  the  reader  will 
remember,  we  described  above  (p.  109)  two  forms  of  repe- 
tition, —  the  one  a  strict  repetition  of  the  original  act  of 
learning,  and  the  other  a  reproduction  in  memory  of  its  re- 
sidts  only.  In  this  case  the  first  or  productive  repetition 
must  take  place,  inasmuch  as  the  matter  is  to  be  re-pre- 
sented exactly,  and  without  weakening  in  its  effect.  In  the 
lower  grades,  therefore,  the  teacher  has  no  other  way  than 
to  relate  the  sections  in  question  once  more  orally,  but  now, 
of  course,  in  a  somewhat  briefer  form.  In  the  middle  and 
upper  grades  such  a  repetition  would  be  tedious  to  the 
pupils  ;  besides,  they  are  justified  in  washing  to  take  a 
larger  part  in  the  work  themselves.  Fortunately,  there  is 
a  way  of  securing  all  of  these  advantages,  and  not  losing 
any  of  those  obtained  by  oral  repetition.  The  teacher  has 
only  to  let  his  pupils  read  the  story  for  themselves  in  their 
books.  For,  first,  the  matter  is  thus  presented  again  just 
as  exactly  as  before;  secondly,  opportunity  is  given  the 
pupils  for  self -activity,  and  tedium  is  avoided ;  and  thirdly, 
their  facility  in  reading  is  also  increased.  It  would,  there- 
fore, be  simply  folly  not  to  accept  these  advantages  when 
they  thus  offer.  That  any  one  should  think  it  unnecessary 
at  all  to  refresh  the  memory  thus  exactly  in  the  one  way 
or  the  other,  I  shall  leave  out  of  consideration  entirely. 
In  this  manner,  then,  the  first  section  is  read. 

This  is  the  place  to  call  attention  to  an  important  point. 
The  advantages  to  be  gained  by  this  reading,  and  in  partic- 
ular its  memorizing  effect,  may  be  very  noticeably  increased 
by  the  introduction  into  it  of  a  thought  element.      This 


TMK    USK   OF   QU KSTIOKS.  135 

may  be  done  by  making  use  of  questions,  i.e.,  by  putting 
analytical  questions,  whose  answer  can  be  reatl  from  the 
book,  thus  converting  the  monotonous  reading  into  a  viva- 
cious dialogue,  as  it  were.  Of  course  the  teacher  must  not 
spare  himself  the  pains  of  preparing  such  questions  before- 
hand, because  they  cannot  be  made  up  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment  in  just  the  fitting  form.  As  already  indicated,  the 
main  object  of  this  is  to  introduce  a  logical  element  into 
the  reailing ;  for  the  question  that  precedes  places  the  con- 
tent of  the  answer  under  a  particular  point  of  view.  But 
it  accomplishes  still  more.  Every  question  is,  as  it  were, 
a  finger-post,  pointing  to  a  definite  place,  and  hence  causing 
a  sharper  apprehension.  Besides  this  the  preceding  ques- 
tion leads  the  pupil  of  himself  into  the  correct  emphasis. 
Counting  all  of  these  results  together  —  thought  element, 
sharper  apprehension,  vivacity,  right  emphasis  —  it  is 
manifest  that  the  resulting  power  of  memory  is  by  this 
means  very  considerably  strengthened.  Whoever  has  once 
tried  the  plan  of  letting  his  pupils  read  in  answer  to 
questions  will  not  want  to  give  up  the  method,  even  if 
its  only  advantage  were  the  increased  vivacity. 

Third  Sfiif/e  of  Blemoriziny.  —  Thus,  then,  after  the  first 
section  has  been  reviewed  in  the  stricter  form,  namely,  by 
repeating  exactly  and  completely  the  original  process,  tbis 
may  be  followed  by  the  reproductive  repetition.  V>\\t  this 
must  not  be  done  by  simply  calling  for  a  recitation  of  the 
whole  section,  and  depending  entirely  on  the  monotonous 
repetition  of  this  command  and  the  equally  monotonous 
repetition  of  the  same  matter  until  gradually  even  the 
Aveaker  pupils  have  gained  a  certain  facility.  To  do  so  in 
this  final  stage  of  memorizing,  where  of  right  quiet  delib- 
eration, freedom,  and  alertness  should  be  the  rule  as  much 


136  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

as  in  the  two  preceding  stages,  would  be  to  cultivate  tedious- 
ness  systematically  ;  it  would  mean  the  renunciation  of  the 
increased  attention,  stimulus,  and  vivacity  resulting  from 
the  use  of  questions  ;  it  would  mean,  in  short,  to  imitate 
the  purely  mechanical  method  before  described.  The  cor- 
rect way  is  for  the  teacher  to  proceed  again  with  analytical 
questions,  i.e.,  to  have  the  reproduction  come  in  answer  to 
questions,  just  as  before  in  the  case  of  reading.  Accord- 
ingly these  questions  for  reproduction  will  cover  the  same 
ground  as  those  questions  for  reading,  or  at  least  they  may 
do  so.  The  particular  forms  of  expression  may  be  changed 
as  much  as  practicable,  in  the  upper  grades,  perhaps,  by 
using  language  that  is  somewhat  more  difficult  and  techni- 
cal. One  may  see  from  what  has  been  said  that  only  such 
questions  are  intended  as  require  a  rather  long  answer; 
they  should  analyze  the  section,  but  not  pick  the  separate 
sentences  to  pieces.  Questions  that  concern  merely  one 
l)ortion  of  a  sentence,  or  a  single  word,  do  not  belong  here 
at  all.  The  reasons  for  tlie  use  of  questions  in  reproduc- 
tion are  the  same  as  for  their  use  in  reading,  and  hence  we 
need  not  repeat  them.  There  is,  however,  in  the  case 
before  us  one  new  reason,  namely,  that  this  method  is 
ensii.'r.  This  carries  with  it  the  further  advantage  that 
the  duller  pupils,  perhaps  even  the  dullest,  can  answer 
independently  at  the  very  first,  thus  relieving  the  teacher 
of  the  tedious  necessity  of  requiring  these  slower  ones  to 
repeat  after  the  brighter  ones.  If  this  Avere  its  only  advan- 
tage, the  questioning  would,  even  on  this  account  alone,  be 
fully  justified  ;  but  with  all  the  other  numerous  advantages 
added,  it  becomes  completely  inconceivable  how  there  can 
bo  any  teachers  wlio  will  give  up  this  way,  and  prefer  to 
torture  themselves  and  their  pupils  with  their  monotonous 


LONG    TItAINS    OF   THOUGHT.  137 

mechanical  memorizing.'  After  the  iirst  section  has  been 
repeated  in  this  way  in  answer  to  questions,  topically,  it 
will  of  course  be  recited  once  more  connectedly,  —  but  again 
not  at  a  mere  word  of  command,  l)ut  in  answer  to  the  topi- 
cal question  contained  in  the  heading.  The  brighter  pupils 
need  not  be  required  to  give  this  final  repetition,  but  only 
the  duller  ones,  as  we  may  take  for  granted  that  the  others 
are  able  to  do  it  after  the  preceding  exercise. 

In  this  way  the  first  section  is  gone  through.  The  suo- 
ceeding  sections  are  then  repeated  in  the  same  way,  first  by 
reading  and  then  by  reproduction  from  memory.  There 
is,  moreover,  in  my  opinion,  nothing  to  prevent  the  pu- 
pils from  reading  the  entire  lesson  at  once,  and  proceed- 
ing by  sections  only  when  they  come  to  reproduce  from 
memory.  This  is,  perhaps,  on  some  accounts,  the  more 
desirable  method,  seeing  that  the  whole  selection  has  been 
])resented  in  its  entirety,  and  the  logical  disposition  has 
likewise  been  memorized. 

The  question  now  remains,  whether,  in  this  method  of 
repetition  by  sections,  some  special  means  does  not  have  to 
be  taken  to  enable  the  pupils  to  recite  the  whole  story  con- 
nectedly. There  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  school  instruction 
should  include  this  in  its  object,  and  should  aim  to  enable 
the  pupils  to  command  lonrj  trains  of  tlioiKjht  and  to  recite 
independently.  If  this  demand  is  understood,  a.<?  it  is  here 
meant  it  should  be,  to  apply  to  only  a  single  recitation  and 


1  It  may  bo  mentioned,  in  passing,  that  this  form  o{  questioning  en- 
ables tlie  teuclier  to  make  use  sometimes  of  tlio  methf.'l  of  "  repeating 
after"  in  quite  a  different  and  really  slhnulatin^  manner.  The  teaelitr 
may,  namely,  now  and  then,  when  it  .seems  desirable,  liave  one  of  tlie 
duller  pupils  repeat  the  question  as  put  to  him.  or  to  one  of  the  l>rii:hter 
ones. 


138  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

for  the  time  being,  and  not  for  all  future  time,  the  task  is 
certainly  not  too  difficult.  But  much  time  will  be  need- 
lessly lost  and  the  teacher  will  be  sorely  tempted  to  recur 
to  the  mechanical  routine,  if  he  knows  that  the  final  exam- 
ination will  likewise  demand  such  ability  of  reproduction. 
The  mechanical  method  accomplishes  this  end,  as  Ave  have 
before  seen,  in  its  own  peculiar  way,  by  repeating  the  first 
section  along  with  the  second,  and  in  this  manner  with 
every  succeeding  section  reciting  all  the  preceding  over 
again.  That  this  means  secures  the  end,  particularly  when 
the  mediocre  and  duller  pupils  are  required  to  repeat  after, 
admits  of  no  doubt.  But  there  is  likewise  no  doubt  at  all 
that  this  procedure  is  most  exceedingly  tiresome  for  all 
concerned,  but  especially  for  the  brighter  pupils.  There  is 
a  second  evil  which  must  not  be  overlooked.  By  the  con- 
tinued precedence  of  the  brighter  pupils,  all  the  others  in 
the  class  are  forced  into  their  particular  mode  of  expres- 
sion, and  thus  the  repeating  after  can  no  longer  be  called 
an  independent  recitation.  If  the  former  used  their  own 
words  freely,  the  others  imitate  their  mistakes  as  well. 
The  three  evils  are,  therefore,  much  tediousness,  restric- 
tion of  free  reproduction  for  the  majority  of  the  pupils, 
and  the  copying  of  a  model  unfit  to  be  imitated.  There  is, 
hoAvever,  fortunately  another  Avay,  Avhich,  though  safe  and 
faultless,  seems  to  suffer  only  from  not  being  known  to  the 
advocates  of  memory -cram.  In  the  main,  it  consists  in 
Avhat  neither  costs  time  nor  makes  the  least  trouble,  be- 
cause all  the  while  this  work  has  already  been  done  in  the 
foregoing  exercises  of  rational  memory,  as  they  have  been 
descriljed.  In  a  word,  it  consists  chiefly  in  the  fact  that 
these  exercises  from  beginning  to  end  have  made  use  of  the 
thhikiiifj  mi-nioi'if.    The  considerably  greater  intensive  power 


HOMK    WORK.  130 

of  memory  h}*  rational  association,  together  with  tlie  vari- 
ous other  advantages  (avoidance  of  tediuusness,  increase  of 
interest,  vivacity,  etc.),  bring  it  about  that  at  this  stage  in 
the  i)r()cess  that  command  of  the  wliole  thought  is  in  the 
main  already  obtained.  Tlie  small  residue  that  must  yet 
be  done  will  consist  in  the  pupils'  reading  the  lesson  over 
at  home,  preferably  aloud,  —  of  course,  by  questions  again 
and  with  regard  for  the  logical  disposition.  This  final 
review  of  the  lesson  is,  in  respect  to  the  ground  covered, 
exact  and  complete ;  in  respect  to  its  character,  since  it 
takes  place  by  questions,  it  is  thoughtful ;  and  it  takes  up 
none  of  the  time  in  school.  This  one  review  at  the  close  of 
the  lesson  is  the  only  work  of  memorizing  that  should  be 
left  for  the  pupils  to  do  at  home,  so  far  as  the  concrete  ma- 
terial is  concerned.  The  practice  thereby  gained  in  read- 
ing is  sufficient  reason  for  requiring  this  work  to  be  done. 

Assuming  that  the  foregoing  exercises  of  the  thinking 
memory  have  done  their  full  duty  —  that  is  to  say:  that, 
first  of  all,  the  immanent  memorizing  has  not  been  want- 
ing which  comes  fron^  the  thorough,  concrete,  oral  presen- 
tation ;  that,  secondly,  each  separate  section  has  been  read 
over  as  well  as  recited  from  memory,  and  that  both  have 
been  done  in  the  thoughtful  way  ;  that,  thirdly,  these 
sections  are  firndy  connected  in  mind  by  the  logical  dispo- 
sition ;  and,  lastly,  that  the  pupils  have  read  them  over 
thoughtfully  once  more  at  home  —  if  this  has  been  done, 
I  say,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  pujnls  of  all  grades  of 
ability  will  have  at  least  as  much  command  in  the  con- 
nected recital  of  the  story  as  the  mechanical  memorizing 
can  accomplish  in  the  same  time,  in  spite  of  its  special 
exercises  for  this  express  purpose.  Those  in  authority, 
unfortunatelv,  have  too  often  been  willing  to  overlook  the 


140  THOUGHT   AND   IVIEMORY. 

deficiency  in  power  to  think  and  the  resnlting  lack  of  in- 
terest in  the  subject,  if  only  the  required  per  cent  was 
obtained  in  examination. 

If,  after  all  tliat  has  been  said,  any  one  still  has  doubts 
whether  this  particular  object,  viz.,  the  ability  to  recite 
connectedly  the  whole  story,  can  be  reached  in  the  way 
described,  it  nevertheless  certainly  does  not  follow  that 
we  are  forced  at  last  to  return  to  the  tedious  mechanical 
method.  For  what  is  there  to  prevent,  if  need  be,  the  repe- 
tition of  any  of  these  exercises,  whether  of  the  reading 
or  of  the  recitation  from  memory  ?  There  is,  however,  to 
be  sure,  a  still  better  means,  which  on  the  one  hand  is  new 
in  form,  and  on  the  other  hand  affords  a  desirable  help  to 
the  weaker  pupils.  It  consists  in  assigning  to  the  brighter 
and  mediocre  pupils  the  presentation  of  the  story  in  writ- 
ing, while  the  teacher  in  the  inean  time  reviews  one  of  the 
preceding  oral  exercises  with  the  duller  pupils.  In  brief, 
my  theory  of  memorizing  does  not  prescribe  how  frequent 
the  repetition  should  be  made,  but  it  does  demand  that 
the  repetition  shall  not  be  mechanical  and,  above  all,  shall 
not  be  tedious  or  tiresome,  but  should  always  make  use  of 
thought  by  means  of  logical  disposition,  and  well-directed 
questions. 

This  is  now  the  place  for  a  brief  summar}-  of  the  char- 
acter and  advantages  of  this  mode  of  memorizing  in  the 
case  of  historical  subjects. 

So  far  as  their  character  is  concerned,  the  repetition  ex- 
ercises above  described  are  by  no  means  a  combination  of 
the  rational  and  mechanical  modes  —  as  my  introductory 
remark  might  have  led  one  to  believe  —  but  on  the  con- 
trary tlioy  are,  from  beginning  to  end,  exclusively  thought- 
ful  in  their  nature.      For  the  mechanical    association  is 


NATURAL   SCIENCE.  141 

never  intentionally  used,  and  tlie  connected  recitation  of 
the  matter  without  questions  occurs  not  as  an  exercise 
in  repetition,  but  only  as  a  final  reproduction  in  the  form 
of  a  test. 

The  advantages  are  as  follows  :  — 

1.  The  association  in  thought  nuikes  the  power  of  mem- 
ory in  the.se  repetition  exercises  intensiveli/  stro7if/er,  thus 
saving  time, — to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that  this  power 
is  extended  to  a  much  greater  number  of  associated  ideas, 
thus  becoming  many-sided  in  the  reproduction. 

2.  Whatever  strength  the  mechanical  association  has  in 
each  repetition  belongs  each  time,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
to  these  thought  exercises  —  as  a  free  gift. 

3.  The  pupils  must  be  constantly  deliberating,  and  are 
therefore  forced  to  keep  their  thoughts  on  the  subject,  and 
pay  attention  to  content  and  expression. 

4.  Tlie  tediousness  of  mechanical  memorizing  is  not 
present. 

5.  The  language  work  receives  a  considerable  advance- 
ment in  facility  of  reading,  which,  moreover,  returns  to 
re-enforce  the  further  learning  of  history.  The  brighter 
pupils  have  besides  an  exercise  in  written  composition. 

G.  Inasmuch  as  fewer  repetition  exercises  are  necessary, 
and  since  those  that  are  used  are  considerably  more  stimu- 
lating and  lively,  and  therefore  more  interesting,  the  dis- 
gxist  and  dislike  for  the  subject  which  is  so  prominent  a 
weakness  of  the  mechanical  routine  is,  so  far  as  possible, 
avoided. 


Second  Example  —  taken  from  the  natural  sciences. 
The  subject  matter  in  the  natural  sciences  is  essentially 


142  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

different  from  that  in  tlie  historical  subjects,  in  so  far  as 
in  the  former  the  new  ideas  arise  as  direct  sense-percep- 
tions, while  in  the  latter  they  must  be  produced  by  means 
of  language  on  a  basis  of  imagination.  In  this  immediate 
apprehension  through  the  senses,  the  natural  sciences 
have  a  great  advantage  to  begin  with.  But  this  advan- 
tage extends  also  to  tlie  memorizing  in  several  ways.  In 
the  first  place,  the  ideas  of  sense  are  stronger  than  those 
produced  by  the  imagination.  Secondly,  a  natural  object, 
in  case  it  is  a  body  or  a  physical  process  that  is  being 
studied,  is  conthmousJ y  before  the  eyes  for  observation,  so 
that  in  this  way  the  separate  characteristics,  so  far  as  they 
are  apprehended  at  all,  have  already  experienced  frequent 
repetition.  Both  circumstances  combined  must  have  the 
result  of  taking  less  time  and  trouble  for  the  voluntary 
commitment  to  memory  than  are  required  for  lessons  in 
history.  But  there  is  still  a  further  advantage.  As  we 
saw  in  the  first  example,  the  different  errors  and  mistakes 
in  memorizing  historical  matter  are  connected  with  the 
fact  that  here  the  ideas  must  be  conveyed  by  language. 
The  agency  of  language  easily  misleads  into  mechanical 
repetition,  and,  moreover,  to  make  use  of  book-learning  in 
the  wrong  place.  In  the  case  of  natural  science  subjects 
the  teacher  is  not  so  liable  to  be  led  into  these  mistakes. 
For  the  logical  disposition  (1st  stage)  almost  forces  itself 
on  him ;  to  refresh  the  ideas  (2d  stage),  he  is  warned  by 
the  very  nature  of  the  subject  to  have  recourse  to  observa- 
tion again ;  and  in  the  succeeding  recitation  from  memory 
(.3d  stage)  the  preceding  logical  disposition  suggests  to 
him  the  desirability  of  judicious  topical  questions.  It  will, 
therefore,  not  be  necessary  to  describe  any  particular  les- 
son in  natural  science,  especially  since  there  are  so  many 


NATURAL  SCIENCE.  143 

branches,  clioiuistry,  physics,  botany,  zoology,  meteorohigy, 
geology,  physical  geography,  and  astronomy,  that  the  differ- 
ences in  the  subject  matti-r  lead  to  many  differences  also  in 
the  method  of  teacliing  and  in  the  appliances  used.  An 
example  taken  from  only  one  of  these  branches  would, 
therefore,  not  quite  tit  any  other,  and  hence  could  easily 
lead  to  misunderstandings.  I  shall  therefore  mention  only 
such  measures  as  either  apply  to  all  the  branches,  or  at  least 
show  plainly  to  what  particular  ones  they  do  belong.  The 
remarks  will  naturally  be  connected  with  the  three  stages 
of  memorizing  above  noted.  In  the  first  stage,  as  we 
know,  the  logical  disposition,  which  the  pupils  have  already 
sketched  in  the  work  of  observation,  is  to  be  committed  to 
memory.  In  describing  a  plant  or  animal  the  logical  dis- 
position, to  be  exact,  must  be  branched  into  main  divisions 
and  subordinate  sections,  instead  of  being  a  uniform  se- 
quence. But  such  a  branched  sequence  may  be  just  as 
easily  retained  as  one  that  is  uniform,  provided  it  is  well 
understood,  —  indeed  it  may  even  be  easier,  since,  in  the 
form  of  the  plant  or  animal,  everything  is  present  to  the 
eyes  at  the  same  time.' 

In  the  second  stage,  where  the  memorizing  of  the  sep- 
arate sections  begins,  the  repetition,  in  order  completely  to 
refresh  the  ideas,  must  fall  back  on  immediate  observation. 
^Vhen  the  most  important  points  have  been  reviewed  in  this 
manner,  the  section  may  then  be  read  for  completeness. 


1  Of  course  it  is  to  be  understood  that  such  descriptions  in  the  lower 
and  middle  grades  must  be  thorou-hly  simple  in  their  nature.  Even  in 
the  upper  grad.s  they  should  not  lose  themselves  in  minute  details,  but- 
ou^ht  constantly  to  have  reference  to  such  characteristics  as  are  of  espe- 
cial importance  either  for  the  life  of  the  livini^  thing,  or  for  its  resthetioal 
bearings,  or  as  a  means  of  recognition. 


144  THOUGHT   AITD   MEMORY 

provided  tlie  matter  is  appropriate  to  such  an  exercise, 
lu  this  case  the  reading  forms  the  transition  to  the  recita- 
tion. The  reading  is.  however,  not  necessary  so  far  as  its 
object  is  merely  to  impress  the  matter  on  the  mind;  for 
natui-al  science  has  an  immense  advantage  in  the  fact  that 
its  ideas  are  obtained  by  direct  observation.  But  the  read- 
ing is,  nevertheless,  useful ;  first,  because  of  the  repetition 
in  a  new  and  different  form  ;  but  secondly,  and  mainly, 
because  the  pupils  are  thereby  better  prepared  for  later 
self-instruction,  since  a  written  description  is  always  more 
difficult  to  understand  than  a  free  oral  explanation.  The 
final  decision,  however,  whether  in  the  natural  sciences  the 
lessons  should  be  read  so  far  as  the  subject  matter  admits, 
does  not  belong  here  in  a  work  on  the  memory,  but  rather 
to  the  subject  of  the  correlation  of  studies.  It  may,  in 
certain  cases,  be  much  better  to  assign  such  reading  to  the 
langiiage  lesson  than  to  that  in  natural  science. 

In  the  second  stage  of  memorizing  the  drawing  of  natu- 
ral objects  has  special  value,  being  indeed  indispensable  as 
a  means  of  exact  apprehension  and  retention.  It  may  per- 
form good  service  even  in  the  history  lesson.  This  work, 
however,  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  proper  and 
regular  instruction  in  drawing. 

The  third  stage  of  memorizing  is  the  recitation  from 
memory.  This  will,  of  course,  be  oral  usually,  but  a  writ- 
ten exercise  at  this  stage  is  recommended,  whenever  the 
teacher  has  to  give  his  attention  separately  to  the  weaker 
pupils,  and  also  now  and  then  as  a  home  exercise  for  the 
entire  class.  It  need  hardly  be  remarked  that  such  repe- 
tition must  be  thoughtful  and  not  mechanical.  Hence, 
wherever  the  logical  disposition  is  insufficient,  the  teacher 
will  find  it  serviceable  to  make  use  of  judicious  sub-ques- 


MEMORIZING   CHOICK   SELFX'TIONS.  14o 

tions.  If,  for  <'xuiii[»lo,  a  })luiit  loaf  \vas  to  Ije  described, 
there  could  be  distinguished  first  the  petiole  and  the  blade, 
and  in  respect  to  the  latter  whetlier  simple  or  compound, 
etc.  Practise  in  connected  recitation  is  not  excluded  by 
this  exercise. 

For  the  written  reproduction,  whether  a  connected  de- 
scription is  intended  or  not,  as  well  as  for  the  review  at 
libme,  printed  questions  for  review  are  desirable.  This 
is  particularly  necessary  in  order  to  render  the  home  re- 
view an  exercise  in  thought,  and  prevent  it  from  degener- 
ating into  book-learning,  that  is  always  half  mechanical, 
and,  in  the  case  of  a  dry  outline,  is  in  addition  as  tedious 
as  it  is  unfruitful.  In  physical  science  these  review  ques- 
tions can  be  and  must  be,  for  the  most  part,  genuine 
exercises  for  application. 

From  both  of  the  above  examples  the  reader  will  be  able 
to  conclude  that,  in  our  opinion,  the  work  of  memorizing 
should  be  done  in  the  school,  exclusively  so  in  the  first  and 
second  stages,  and  for  much  the  greater  part  in  the  third 
stage  of  the  process  also.  This  applies  equally  to  all  the 
subjects  of  instruction.  Only  a  small  and  easily  accom- 
plished residuum  of  work  should  be  left  to  the  private  in- 
dustry of  the  pupil  at  home.  In  this  way  not  only  is 
every  over-burdening  prevented,  but  the  proper  means 
will  thus  be  taken  to  insure  zest  in  the  work  of  memo- 
rizing. 


TlIIUl)    EXAMI'LK. 

Such  studies  are  here  included  as,  in  comparison  with 
the  foregoing  examples,  contain  a  new  element,  in  that, 
besides  the  thoughts  expressed,  also  the  form  of  expression 
is  to  be  learned,  —  such  selections,  therefore,  as  are  to  be 


146  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

committed  to  memory  word  for  word.  Of  course  occasion 
for  such  selections  may  occur  in  almost  any  of  the  subjects 
of  study :  in  literature,  in  history,  in  singing,  etc. 

In  such  a  case,  before  the  pupils  begin  to  memorize  the 
work,  the  thought  content  of  the  selection  should  first  be 
worked  out  by  the  regular  method,  i.e.,  according  to  the 
formal  steps  of  apperception,  viz.,  observation,  thought, 
application.  This  will  insure  not  only  the  understanding 
of  the  general  thought,  but  also  include  the  proper  expla- 
nation of  unfamiliar  words  and  phrases.  Short  pieces  to 
be  committed  to  memory,  as,  for  example,  a  proverb  or 
a  stanza  of  poetry,  which  occur  as  accompaniments  of  a 
history  lesson,  of  course  receive  the  explanation  in  that 
connection. 

The  memorizing  of  words,  apart  from  any  help  derived 
from  their  meaning,  must  depend,  of  course,  on  the  law  of 
simultaneity.  Memorizing  is,  therefore,  in  such  case  me- 
chanical. Since  the  purpose  of  such  memorizing,  just  as 
in  learning  a  song,  consists  in  reaching  the  greatest  pos- 
sible certainty  and  ease  in  reproduction,  and  since  in  this 
case  the  facility,  and  in  part  also  the  certainty  of  memory 
depends  chiefly  on  the  mechanical  association  of  ideas,  the 
drill  in  repetition,  of  course,  must  not  be  given  up  until 
this  result  is  reached.  Taking  thus  much  for  granted,  we 
may  now  enquire  whether,  in  this  case  also,  rational  asso- 
ciation may  not  be  called  in  to  the  assistance  of  mechanical 
memorizing.  This  can  most  certainly  be  done,  and  its  ad- 
vantages are  most  plainly  manifest  just  where  the  mechan- 
ical method  gives  the  most  trouble,  namely,  in  selections 
of  greater  length.  What  the  teacher  can  do  in  this  direc- 
tion may  be  told  in  a  few  words,  after  what  has  been  said 
iu  the  previous  examples. 


MEM0KIZ1N(;    CHOICE   SELECTIONS.  117 

First  Sfii/jc.  JCveii  the  nu'cluinical  inetliod  rccjuircs  the 
selection  to  be  divided  up  into  snudler  sections.  For  the 
sake  of  rational  association  this  requirement  is  so  far  mod- 
ified that  the  sections  must  be  not  mere  fragments,  l)ut 
actual  members;  in  short  that  this  division  of  the  subject 
into  parts  must  be  a  logical  disposition  by  topics.  The 
work  of  memorizing  begins,  then,  by  committing  this  logi- 
cal disposition  with  considerable  thoroughness. 

Second  and  Third  Stages.  In  the  middle  and  lower  grjules, 
each  separate  section  will  now  be  read  and  re-read.  This  is 
essential,  if  for  no  other  reason,  to  gain  the  correct  intona- 
tion and  whatever  else  is  necessary  to  a  good  delivery. 
The  other  exercises  that  go  along  with  this  —  such  as  trial 
recitations  from  memory  by  the  brighter  pupils,  home  re- 
hearsals, etc.,  —  need  no  detailed  description  here.  The 
one  feature  of  the  work  which,  from  our  point  of  view,  is 
the  most  important,  is  that  in  all  of  this  reading  and  reci- 
tation the  logical  analysis  must  ever  he  2^>'esent  in  mind ; 
for  without  this  the  help  to  be  gained  by  rational  associa- 
tion is  lost.  Whenever  a  section  is  read  or  recited,  the 
topical  heading  should  be  given  every  time,  —  whether  by 
the  teacher,  or  by  the  pupil  reciting,  or  by  one  of  the  other 
pupils,  depends  upon  circumstances.  The  same,  of  course, 
is  to  be  observed  when  several  sections  or  the  entire  piece 
are  read  or  recited.  In  a  word,  reading  and  recitation 
should  come  constantly  in  answer  to  questions,  —  which 
implies  that  in  the  case  of  longer  sections  sub-topics  should 
be  inserted  also.  In  this  way  the  association  in  thought 
keeps  pace,  hand  in  hand,  with  the  mechanical  process. 

The  advantages  of  this  manner  of  treatment  have  already 
been  spoken  of.  But  since  the  help  of  rational  association 
is  doubly  necessary  in  such  cases  as  that  just  mentioned, 


148  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

whereas  in  practice  it  is  but  seldom  employed  here,  it  may 
be  well  to  recount  at  least  some  of  those  advantages.  In 
the  first  place,  the  mechanical  repetition  in  this  way  gains 
in  vivacity  and  interest,  and  so  becomes  less  tedious. 
Secondly,  it  becomes  easier,  and  the  retention  is  likewise 
strengthened,  since  two  bands  hold  stronger  than  one  alone. 
In  the  third  place,  the  ideas  are  made  more  capable  of 
reproduction  for  a  further  elaboration  in  thought  at  some 
future  time;  which  fact  is  here  all  the  more  important, 
because  the  continued  drill  of  mechanical  repetition  con- 
fines them  so  firmly  in  its  one-sided  association  that  they 
are  on  this  account  all  the  stiffer  and  less  fruitful  for  other 
combinations  of  thought.  Fourthly,  the  pupils  are  neces- 
sitated to  keep  their  thoughts  constantly  on  the  subject, 
both  as  to  meaning  and  form  of  expression. 


Fourth  Example  —  tali-en  from  arithmetic. 

This  study  is  fortunate  in  allowing  of  diligent  memoriz- 
ing without  the  need  of  mechanical  repetition.  But  there 
used  to  be  one  place  in  arithmetic  that  was  heartily  de- 
tested by  the  pupils  on  account  of  its  tiresome  mechanical 
memorizing ;  and  there  are  probably  many  schools  still 
where,  in  this  matter,  the  acquisition  is  more  irksome  than 
is  necessary.  This  part  of  arithmetic  to  which  I  have  ref- 
erence is  the  multiplication  table.  We  will  conclude  by  a 
consideration  of  this  subject,  in  order  to  call  to  mind  how 
these  two  antipodean  methods  of  memorizing  appear  in 
the  field  of  number. 

1.  Wliat  is  the  mechanical  mode  of  drill,  for  example, 
on  tlic  nuiiilxT  2  in  the  multiplication  table? 

As  a  sensil)le  person,  the  teacher  of  course  would  not  let 


ATUTHMETIC.  14U 

anything  be  committed  to  memory  that  was  not  under- 
stood. Accordingly,  the  numbers  from  1  to  20  have  been 
learned  previously,  we  will  suppose,  on  a  basis  of  concrete 
observation.  Besides  this,  exercises  in  addition  and  sul> 
traction  have  already  been  practised  within  this  range. 
Now,  a  new  chapter  in  the  difficult  science  of  number  is  to 
be  learned,  namely,  multiplication.  Therefore  the  teaclier 
will,  of  course,  provide  for  the  necessary  concrete  under- 
standing of  the  process.  For  this  purpose  he  draws  two 
chalk  marks  on  the  board,  and  then  again  two  more,  thus 
II  +  II;  the  pupils  count  them  up  correctly,  =  4  marks; 
then  he  draws  three  times  2,  then  four  times  2  marks; 
the  pupils  add  again  of  themselves,  =  6,  =  8  marks.  When 
this  has  been  continued  to  ten  times  2,  and  this  addition 
has  been  repeated  several  times,  it  might  be  supposed  that 
the  subject  was  clear  to  the  pupils.  The  next  step  is  to 
introduce  the  new  expression  "times,"  and  so  translate 
the  exercises  in  addition  into  multiplication.  Thus  much 
being  accomplished,  and  therefore  all  the  requirements  of 
concrete  instruction  having  been  fulfilled,  the  work  of  com- 
mitting the  columns  of  the  multiplication  table  could  now 
begin.  The  mechanical  way  in  which  the  children  jierform 
this  part  of  the  work  is  only  too  well  known. 

2.  Now  contrast  with  this  the  mode  of  i)rocedure  tliat 
makes  use  of  the  rational  memory. 

The  purpose  of  what  follows  is  not  so  much  to  show  how 
to  teach  the  multiplication  table,  for  most  teachers  think 
they  know  that  already,  but  rather  to  call  attention  to  a 
certain  peculiarity  in  the  rational  association  of  numbers, 
and  to  the  pedagogical  results  of  this  in  practice.  The 
purpose  is,  therefore,  more  psychological  than  pedagogical. 
That    which    everyone    thinks    he    know.s    is    not    usually 


150  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

taught,  and  even  the  text-books  on  psychology  are  wont 
to  pass  over  the  subject  in  silence. 

The  concept  of  number  is,  as  was  incidently  remarked 
before,  a  concept  of  relation.  That  is  to  say,  in  the  case 
of  a  number  we  are  concerned  Avith  a  characteristic  of  rela- 
tion, and  that  not  only  in  its  conception  but  also  in  its 
perception,  viz.,  with  the  relation  between  unity  and  plural- 
ity ;  for  example,  the  perception  tliat  the  number  5  is  five 
times  as  great  as  1.  Now,  since  the  characteristic  denoted 
by  the  name  of  the  luunber  is  one  of  relation,  its  concrete 
apprehension  presupposes  always  a  previous  comparison  — 
just  as  the  pitch  cannot  be  distinguished  in  a  single  sound 
by  itself,  but  only  when  two  sounds  of  different  pitch  are 
compared  together.  This  presupposed  comparison  is  one 
reason  why  the  concrete  apprehension  of  a  number  is  not 
so  easy  as  is  generally  thought.  But  there  is  a  second  diffi- 
culty. As  a  characteristic  of  relation,  enumeration  is  not 
a  material  quality  of  a  number,  but  something  entirely  for- 
mal;  in  order  to  grasp  this  formal  characteristic  there  must 
be,  therefore,  first  an  abstraction  of  the  material  character- 
istics. Thus  the  concrete  apprehension  contains  impliedly 
both  the  mental  processes  of  comparison  and  abstraction, 
which  otherwise  only  occur  in  conception.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  in  arithmetic  the  formation  of  the  concept,  i.e.,  the 
transition  from  denominate  to  indenominate  numbers  does 
not  give  children  the  most  trouble,  but  just  this  process  of 
perception. 

This  explains  why  it  is  that,  among  savages,  adults  fre- 
quently cannot  count  beyond  ten,  sometimes  not  beyond 
five.  The  concept  of  pure  number  is,  however,  always 
present  even  with  these  people,  at  least  in  its  spontan- 
eous form,  as  soon  as  they  can  count  to  two ;  that  is,  as 


HOW    CHIILUUEN    COUNT.  l";! 

soou  as  they  are  in  possession  of  two  perceptions  of  number. 
So,  too,  with  our  own  children ;  nearly  every  parent  is  at 
first  probably  so  astonished  at  the  arithmetical  stuj)idity 
of  his  first-born  as  to  have  serious  doubts  whether  the  child 
will  ever  grow  up  to  count  to  a  hundred.  Preyer's  child  at 
twenty-nine  months,  although  he  could  talk  well  enough, 
and  say  over  the  numbers  up  to  ten,  could  not  apj)ly  even 
"  two  "  and  ''  three  "  correctly.  At  this  period,  however, 
he  was  taking  his  own  method  of  learning,  —  a  very  sug- 
gestive method,  by  the  way,  —  and  was  counting  every- 
thing by  ones.  He  would  put  up  a  ninepin,  and  say 
"  one,"  then  another,  and  say  "■  one  more,"  then  a  third, 
"one  more,"  and  a  fourth,  aud  so  on,  each  time  counting 
"  one  more,"  although  not  naming  the  sums.  A  little  girl 
of  two  and  one-half  years  that  I  know  uses  similarly  the 
expression  "more  ball"  for  each  additional  ball  in  counting 
by  ones.  1  tried  in  vain,  by  the  use  of  objects,  to  teach  a 
little  niece  of  mine,  when  she  was  two  and  one-fourth  years 
old,  to  distinguish  "  one "  and  "  two."  She  was  bright 
and  eager  enough,  but  she  could  not  get  it  right  half  the 
time.  Another  little  girl  of  three  and  one-fourth  years, 
who  can  entertain  you  with  stories  and  talk  by  the  hour, 
can  say  the  numbers  up  to  twelve  in  order  without  trouble, 
but  cannot  yet  discriminate  in  the  use  of  "  three "  and 
<'  four."  In  the  case  of  weak-minded  children  this  is  more 
apparent  still.  Ireland  reports  a  boy  ten  years  old,  at 
the  Larbert  Institution,  who  knew  all  the  colors,  and 
was  learning  the  alphabet.  He  formed  an  estimate  of 
the  character  of  those  around  him,  and  had  some  notion 
of  moral  relations.  He  talked  volubly  on  childish  sub-' 
jects,  but  was  so  deficient  in  arithmetical  power  that 
he  seemed  "at  nine  years  of  age  to  have  no  conception 


152  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

even  of  a  unit.  He  would  say  that  he  had  three  heads, 
touehiug  his  head  several  times  with  his  fingers."  The 
following  year  he  mastered  the  idea  of  two,  and  could 
count  cautiously  up  to  three.  Verily,  there  is  a  great  deal 
more  than  mere  memory  involved  in  learning  the  multipli- 
cation table. 

The  perception  of  a  plurality,  for  example,  of  the  num- 
ber 6,  is  not  completed  by  a  comparison  with  unity  alone ; 
in  order  to  be  entirely  clear  and  perspicuous,  the  comparison 
must  be  made  with  all  the  intervening  numbers  also.  Full 
perspicuity  is,  however,  not  secured  even  by  this.  Side  by 
side  with  the  building  up  or  synthesis  of  a  number,  its 
analysis  must  likewise  be  perceived ;  and,  in  the  former 
case,  its  composition  by  multiplication  as  well  as  by  addi- 
tion, in  the  latter  case  its  decomposition  by  division  as  well 
as  by  subtraction.  The  division  must  appear  likewise  in 
both  the  form  of  finding  the  number  of  equal  parts,  and 
that  of  finding  the  size  of  the  equal  parts  into  which  a 
quantity  may  be  divided.  Now,  to  be  sure,  what  the  pupil 
actually  perceives  in  the  synthesis  of  a  number  by  addition, 
and  in  the  analysis  into  the  same  parts  of  the  same  number 
by  subtraction,  is  exactly  the  same  in  the  two  cases ;  but 
each  operation  has  a  different  result  and,  moreover,  a  dif- 
ferent way  of  expression  in  language.  It  is,  however,  just 
this  difference  in  the  way  of  expressing  the  process  that 
makes  the  second  operation  seem  like  a  new  one  to  the 
pupils,  and  hence  causes  the  difficulty  in  understanding. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  other  corresponding  operations. 

Now  what  conclusions  can  we  draw  from  all  this  regard- 
ing the  proper  method  in  arithmetic,  so  far  as  concerns 
numerical  relations  only  ? 

First,  of  course,  this,  that  every  number  must  be  com- 


CONCLUSIONS   AS   TO    I'KOl'Hk    Ml  IT  HOD.  153 

])arefl  not  only  with  unity,  but  with  all  i)receding  numbers, 
and  that  this  cuniparisou  must  be  by  all  four  rcsp.  five 
fundamental  operations. 

Secondly,  this,  —  and  here  we  return  to  the  question  of 
the  right  mode  of  memorizing,  —  that  if  the  pupils  are  to 
learn  arithmetic  in  the  easiest,  quickest,  and  most  fruitful 
way,  thou  they  must  everywhere  uiemorize  by  thought,  and 
never  mechanically.  This,  of  course,  is  just  as  true  of 
addition  and  subtraction  as  it  is  of  multiplication.  That  is 
to  say:  we  sliould  never  attempt,  by  means  of  mechanical 
association,  to  have  the  pupils  impress  on  their  minds  the 
result  of  a  problem ;  for  the  full  value  of  arithmetical  exer- 
cises does  not  lie  in  the  quick  retention  of  their  answers, 
but  in  always  solving  the  problems  by  thinkinfj,  i.e.,  by 
clear,  self-confident  perception.  For  the  perspicuity  thus 
gained  in  the  perception  of  numbers  involves  everything 
else,  knowledge  of  them  as  well  as  skill  and  facility  in  their 
use.  The  retention  of  results  in  any  other  way  than  by 
thought  is  force-work,  resulting  in  precocity  of  facility  at 
the  cost  of  genuine  knowledge,  and  in  the  end  the  learning 
of  arithmetic  will  be  made  difficult  and  slow. 

Still  a  third  monition  follows  from  the  discussion  aliove. 
If  the  pupil  has  perceived  the  synthesis  of  a  number  by 
the  addition  of  all  the  various  combinations  of  its  constitu- 
ent numbers,  there  is  properly  nothing  more  left  for  him 
to  understand  about  this  number.  For  he  will  be  able  at 
once  to  solve  all  problems  in  the  other  fundamental  opera- 
tions with  this  number,  provided  they  are  presented  to  him 
in  known  terms,  that  is,  objectively.  What  he  has  to  learn 
new  is,  in  reality,  only  the  new  expressions  for  these  dif- 
ferent operations.  Of  course  this  includes  the  practice 
also  which  is  necessary  for  fiu-ility  in  operating  with  these 


154  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

expressions.  This  being  so,  it  follows  in  teaching  that 
every  succeeding  comparison  of  this  number  with  its  com- 
ponent numbers  in  subtraction,  multiplication,  etc.,  at  first 
must  be  expressed  in  terms  already  familiar  to  the  pupils, 
to  insure  facility  of  perception  when  the  new  expression 
shall  be  given.  They  should  not  be  allowed  to  get  the 
idea  that  decomposition  of  a  number  by  subtraction,  etc., 
is  anything  new  to  be  learned.  If  this  mistaken  idea  is 
once  allowed  to  form,  they  become  confused  by  the  new 
expressions,  and  in  this  way  the  subject  is  unnecessarily 
made  twofold  more  difficult. 

As  a  fourth  inference,  this  is  to  be  mentioned.  The  ap- 
prehension of  numbers  by  perception  is  so  important  and 
critical  alike  for  their  understanding  and  for  facility  in 
their  use,  that  so  soon  as  the  numbers  in  the  short  range 
^rom  1  to  20  are  altogether  really  clear  through  and 
through  in  all  their  relations,  the  chief  work  for  the  entire 
range  of  numbers  is  already  accomplished,  both  as  to  abil- 
ity to  understand  as  well  as  for  facility  in  their  use.  Let 
the  teacher  stoj)  and  just  think  for  a  moment  ivhat  that 
imjAles. 

"We  proceed  now  to  describe  the  method  of  teaching  the 
multiplication  table  by  the  use  of  the  rational  memory. 
For  the  sake  of  comparison  with  the  mechanical  method 
we  will  suppose  that,  as  before,  addition  and  subtraction 
have  been  carried  through  the  whole  range  of  numbers  to 
twenty  before  multiplication  and  division  are  taken  up. 
By  rights,  of  course,  as  before  remarked,  each  number 
should  be  carried  through  all  four  operations  from  the 
beginning. 

Tlie  difference  between  the  two  methods  shows  itself  at 
the  first  step,  in  the  objectivation  of  multiplication  by  the 


COMPARISON    or   THE   TWO    WAYS.  155 

addition  of  like  quantities.  This  difference  appears  in  two 
ways.  Tlie  objectivation  oeeiirs,  of  (•f)urse,  in  botli  (  ases ; 
but,  whereas  the  meehanieal  teaelier  goes  over  at  once  to 
new  expressions  for  multiplication,  and  leaves  the  drill  of 
repetition  till  later  to  be  cai-ried  out  in  this  new  form,  the 
more  thoughtful  teacher  would  begin  this  drill  immediately 
in  the  form  of  addition.  And  also,  whereas  the  former 
in  his  succeeding "  exercises  aims  at  impressing  on  the 
mind  only  the  answers  (products),  the  latter  gives  his  at- 
tention constantly  to  the  repetition  of  the  act  of  thought 
(perception),  knowing  as  he  does  that  the  results  will  come 
of  themselves.  Accordingly  he  asks,  always  in  the  forms 
of  addition,  how  much  is2  +  2  +  2  +  2  +  2?2  +  2  +  2? 
etc.,  at  random,  and  not  in  the  order  of  the  table.  He  is 
not  so  much  concerned  to  have  the  pupils  answer  as  quickly 
as  possible,  as  he  is  to  have  them  keep  pace  with  him  and 
give  the  sum  correctly,  while  he  slowly  gives  out  the  quan- 
tities to  be  added.  For  the  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
pupil  should  be  nothing  but  a  repeated  act  of  thought ;  and 
in  order  to  secure  this,  and  prevent  the  so-called  "  learning 
by  heart,"  the  teacher  departs  from  the  regular  order  in 
his  questions,  and  by  speaking  slowly  allows  the  pupils 
time  for  deliberation.  This  thoughtful  r(>petiti<m  is  con- 
tinued, orally  and  in  writing,  until  a  certain  amount  of  fa- 
cility is  acquired.  It  is  not  necessary  to  increase  this 
facility  to  dexterity,  because  these  exercises  will  occur 
again  in  many  different  forms;  besides,  to  continue  too 
long  in  one  and  the  same  form  would  also  become  tedious. 
The  next  modification  is  with  the  use  of  expressions  for 
subtraction.  The  teacher  asks.  How  many  are  left,  if  one 
takes  away  2  marks  from  4  nnirks?  if  one  takes  away  from 
6  marks  2  marks,  and   then   2  marks   more?  etc.     After 


156  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

this  subtraction  has  been  continued  in  the  sequence  indi- 
cated as  well  as  at  random  for  awhile,  the  third  form  is 
introduced  with  expressions  indicating  multiplication.  I 
say  "  indicating  multiplication  "  because  the  children  ought 
not  to  regard  multiplication  as  a  new  mode  of  reckoning, 
but  only  as  another  form  of  expression  for  an  already 
known  thing,  viz.,  the  addition  of  equal  quantities.  Much 
depends  on  this,  because  one  should  seek  to  make  a  new 
work  easier  for  them,  rather  than  more  difficult.  The 
only  thing  new  at  present  is  the  expression  "  times,"  and 
this  gives  no  trouble.  The  teacher  asks:  II  +  II  -f-  1 1  are 
how  many  times  2  marks  ?  and  so  on  with  other  similar 
examples.  Thereupon,  the  already  familiar  exercise  may 
be  taken  up,  using  the  new  exj)?-esslo7i :  How  much  is  3 
times  2  ?  4  times  2  ?  etc. 

After  this  form  also  has  been  practised  awhile  in  ascend- 
ing and  descending  order,  and  at  random,  always  being 
careful  to  ffive  time  for  thought,  the  transition  to  division 
may  be  made  by  using  the  expression  *'  times "  first  for 
the  already  familiar  decomposition  by  subtraction ;  for  ex- 
ample, how  much  is  left  if  you  take  away  from  8  once  2, 
two  times  2,  three  times  2  ?  etc. 

Finally,  the  same  exercise  appears  in  the  fourth  form, 
with  expressions  for  division  (but  only  in  the  sense  of  be- 
ing contained,  not  in  the  sense  of  dividing  into  parts). 
Ask :  6  is  how  many  times  2  ?  8  is  how  many  times  2  ? 
etc.  Further,  in  order  to  introduce  the  new  expression 
"  is  contained,"  use  this  form  of  question :  If  you  have  6 
apples  in  your  pocket,  how  many  times  are  2  apples  con- 
tained therein  (i.e.,  in  your  pocket)?  Again:  how  many 
two-cent  pieces  must  one  take  in  order  to  have  ten  cents  ? 
etc.  This  should  be  carried  out  with  still  other  forms  of 
expression. 


ALL    FOUR   OPERATIONS.  1^7 

'Now,  if  the  processes  of  aiithiuetic  involved  in  learning' 
the  nuiltiplieation  table  have  been  repeated  thoughtfully  in 
this  fourfold  form,  there  can  be  no  doubt  at  all  that  the 
products  will  be  better  committed  to  memory  than  would 
be  possible  through  learning  them  by  heart  mechanically. 
And  not  only  is  this  purpose  fultilled,  but  all  tediousness 
is  avoided,  since  the  pupils  are  constantly  kept  thinkiivg 
and  therefore  interested.  Besides,  this  work  has  given 
the  pupils  but  little  trouble ;  and  finally,  what  is  more  im- 
portant than  all  the  rest,  the  numbers  from  1  to  20  —  so 
far  as  concerns  their  composition  and  decomposition  l)y 
the  nundjer  2  —  have  become  thoroughly  clear  to  them 
in  thought,  including  therefore  facility  in  practice. 

One  more  point  requires  attention.  For  the  sake  of  com- 
parison we  have  presupposed  that  addition  and  subtraction 
were  learned  throughout  the  whole  range  of  numbers  l)e- 
fore  multiplication  and  division  began.  This,  however, 
brought  us  to  the  difficulty  of  not  being  able  to  complete 
the  subject  fully.  For  while  we  could  take  up  the  case  of 
one  number  containing  another,  the  division  of  a  quantity 
into  equal  parts  could  not  be  treated  until  the  pupils  could 
use  "  times  "  3,  4,  etf.,  up  to  10.  This  difficulty,  therefore, 
shows  us  that  this  presupposed  restriction  to  axldition  and 
subtraction  would  be  a  mistake.  A  second  mistake  is  also 
shown  in  the  fact  that  multiplication  and  division  were 
treated  of  even  numbers  only,  which  restriction,  however, 
■was  not  at  all  necessary.  As  already  indicated,  tlie  theo- 
retically right  way  would  be  to  treat  all  four  fundamental 
operations  at  every  step;  or,  more  exactly  expressed,  to 
compare  every  number  with  the  lower  numbers  in  all  four 
rrsj>.  five  fundamental  ways.  By  leaving  multiplication 
and   division   until    addition   and    subtraction    have    been 


158  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

finished  throughout  the  table,  the  difficulty  of  thought  is 
increased  both  in  understanding  and  in  memorizing  the 
new  processes.  The  restriction  to  addition  and  subtraction 
may,  nevertheless,  have  a  certain  amount  of  justification 
in  so  far  as  it  is  made  to  apply  to  the  very  first  numbers 
—  say  from  1  to  6.  But  in  the  case  of  6  or  8  the  two  neg- 
lected operations  must  certainly  be  made  up  immediately, 
and  with  every  succeeding  number  all  four  operations 
should  be  treated  together. 


CHAPTER   YI. 

SUMMAKY    AND    CONCLUSION. 

Aftkr  the  foregoing  psychological  and  pedagogical  in- 
vestigations, we  may  now  stop  and  look  back  over  the  field 
and  see  clearly  how  thought  and  memory  are  related  to 
each  other  in  the  work  of  instruction  —  as  well  in  regard 
to  the  peculiar  significance  of  each  for  the  development  of 
the  mind,  as  in  regard  to  their  interrelation  and  mutual 
re-enforcement. 

Thought  is  necessary,  along  with  observation  and  imagi- 
nation, in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  ;  and  its  particu- 
lar office  here,  in  distinction  from  that  of  observation  and 
imagination,  is  the  production  of  hi<jlier  forms  of  knowl- 
edge. 

The  office  of  memory  is  to  retain  the  ideas  thus  acquired, 
or,  more  exactly,  to  make  them  easy  of  reproduction,  i.e., 
to  furnish  thought  the  material  from  which,  along  with 
new  perceptions,  it  can  create  new  and  higher  products  of 
knowledge  —  including  the  carrying  out  of  these  ideas  in 
practice. 

The  two  activities,  accordingly,  bear  the  same  relation 
to  each  other  in  their  importance  as  do  earning  and  saving, 
or  gaining  and  preserving.  But  since  this  preservation  is 
not  a  purpose  in  itself,  but  is  only  for  the  sake  of  mak- 
ing possible  the  enrichment  and  practical  utilization  of 
one's  i)Ossessions,  we  may  also  say  :  tlunight  and  memory 
bear  the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  do  end  and  means, 

159 


160  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

or  as  do  master  and  servant.  This  comparison  will  also 
define  their  relative  rank  in  the  work  of  culture  and 
education. 

The  same  consideration  will  likewise  serve  to  determine, 
as  regards  their  mutual  service  one  to  the  other,  what 
assistance  the  memory  should  render  to  thought.  The 
memory  has,  indeed,  notlibuj  else  at  all  in  the  wide  world  to 
do  hut  to  he  of  service  to  thought.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
thought  cannot  make  any  progress  unless  the  servant  mem- 
ory is  continually  at  hand.  Memory  must,  therefore,  follow 
constantly  at  the  heels  of  the  master,  and  not  lag  behind, 
leaving  the  master  to  proceed  alone. 

It  has  frequently  happened,  in  the  history  of  education, 
that  this  relative  rank  of  thought  over  memory  has  misled 
into  a  serious  error  with  regard  to  their  relation  in  service 
to  each  other.  Thus,  when  many  teachers  esteem  thought 
higher  than  memory,  they  are,  of  course,  entirely  right,  in 
case  this  is  meant  merely  as  the  relative  rank  of  the  two 
processes ;  but  if  in  practice  they  neglect  the  memory,  they 
are  terribly  foolish, — just  as  foolish  as  one  who  thinks  he 
will  gain  his  purpose  without  attending  to  the  means  of 
accomplishing  it,  or  as  a  master  who  lets  his  servant  starve, 
and  still  believes  he  will,  nevertheless,  receive  good  ser- 
vice. This  error  Avas  long  ago  recognized,  as  indicated  in 
tlie  Jesuit  maxim,  "  repetitio  mater  studiorum  est.''  This 
statement  expresses  a  truth,  but  is  very  far  from  express- 
ing the  whole  truth.  Hence  it  does  not  seldom  happen 
that  those  who  like  so  much  to  quote  this  maxim  fall  into 
more  numerous  and  worse  errors  in  regard  to  thought  and 
memory  than  the  others  do  to  whom  these  are  so  willing 
to  give  advice.  These  mistakes  made  by  the  partisans  of 
memory  will  be  plainly  recognized  if  we  now  reverse  the 


SUMMAIIY    AND   CONCLUSION.  101 

relation,   and    considur    the   ht'lp   alfurdud    to    memory   by 
thought. 

First  ill  iini)Ovtauce  comes  immain'iit  meiuoriziiij;  (p.  luG; 
—  as  distinguished  from  the  intentional.  Its  sui»eriority 
is  owing  on  the  one  hand  to  the  faet  that  this  form  makes 
use  almost  entirely  of  rational  association,  and  on  the  other 
hand  that  it  costs  no  time.  The  work  of  immanent  memo- 
rizing is,  indeed,  accomplished  by  the  industrious  master 
'< thought"  —  even  in  those  cases  in  which  it  depends  on 
an  appropriate  arrangement  of  the  course  of  stud).  The 
servant,  memory,  does  not  need  to  move  a  finger,  and  yet 
afterward  enjoys  the  fame  with  ignorant  people  of  having 
done  this  fine  piece  of  work  itself. 

Intentional  memorizing  is  accomplished  by  repetition. 
Thought  may  here  also,  in  case  it  is  called  upon,  render 
important  assistance  by  bringing  under  one  conceptional 
view  the  ideas  which  otherwise  would  be  associated  only 
mechanically  by  repetition.  This  breathes  into  repetition 
the  breath  of  life  in  the  form  of  rational  association.  In 
what  measure  this  is  possible  depends,  of  course,  on  the 
nature  of  the  subject.  Wherever  the  subject  does  not  ne- 
cessarily require  a  mechanical  association,  as  for  example 
in  lessons  for  thought  fjettiug  as  opposed  to  lessons  for 
thought  expression,  repetition  may  be  made  entirely  ra- 
tional. r>ut  even  in  the  many  instances  where  verbal  com- 
mitment to  memory  is  necessary,  ami  where,  therefore, 
mechanical  association  is  unavoidable,  the  rational  means 
of  memorizing  through  logical  disposition  and  questions 
may  afford  very  desirable  assistance.  Nothing  much  re- 
mains, therefore,  exclusively  for  the  mechanical  memory 
but  the  instruction  in  singing,  if  we  except  the  occasional 
learning  of  names  and  nuiul.)ers  in  the  other  subjects. 


162  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

If  we  reckon  together  all  the  assistance  rendered  to 
memory  by  thought :  — 

1.  the    immanent    memorizing  —  in    the    operations   of 

thinking, 

2.  the  exclusively  rational  repetition  —  in  the  study  of 

facts,  in  arithmetic,  etc., 

3.  the  assistance  of  rational  association  —  in  the  case  of 

verbal  commitment  to  memory, 
we  find  the  surprising  result  that  by  far  the  greatest  part 
of  the  work  of  memorizing  is  accomplished  by  thought, 
when  the  right  method  of  instruction  is  followed.  That 
implies,  therefore,  that  memorizing,  which  in  the  mechani- 
cal form  would  be  a  subordinate  piece  of  service,  is  thus 
changed  into  a  noble  and  inspiring  work,  and  thus  brings 
with  it  all  the  other  advantages  before  mentioned. 

The  mistakes  in  method,  resulting  from  a  perverted  con- 
ception of  memory  and  of  its  relation  to  thought,  may  be 
now  clearly  summarized. 

1.  The  first  mistake  is  in  not  being  acquainted  with  im- 
manent memorizing,  or  in  not  making  sufficient  use  of  it. 
This  mistake  occurs  Avherever  the  three  rcsj).  five  formal 
steps  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  are  not  consciously 
or  unconsciously  followed,  and  wherever  the  principle  of 
the  correlation  of  studies  is  not  recognized. 

2.  The  second  erroi-,  generally  associated  with  the  first, 
consists  in  ignoring  the  help  afforded  by  thought  in  the 
case  of  intentional  memorizing,  or  in  not  sufficiently  making 
use  of  the  former,  —  whether  by  neglecting  the  logical  dis- 
position, or  the  secondary  questions,  or  the  appropriate  use 
of  reading,  or  finally  by  committing  all  three  mistakes  at 
once,  —  in  a  word,  by  restricting  one's  self  more  or  less  to 
mechanical  repetition. 


SUMMARY   AND   CONCLUSION.  103 

3.  A  third  mistake  is  one  tliat  those  iu  authority  liave 
contributed  to  spread.  It  is  the  view  tliat  restricts  the 
idea  of  memorizing  to  mean  tlie  eommitment  to  memory 
of  words  only.  In  sueh  case  it  seems  not  to  be  known,  or 
else  to  be  totally  ignored,  that  first  and  foremost  the  ideas 
themselves,  concrete  and  abstract,  for  which  the  words 
stand,  must  be  memorized.  It  is  furthermore  not  known, 
or  else  ignored,  that  not  only  ideas,  but  also  feelings  and 
acts  of  the  will,  yes,  even  actions,  must  be  memorized 
chiefly  through  repetition.  In  the  case  of  actions  tliis 
memorizing  is  generally  called  habit.  Neglect  in  this  mat- 
ter has  esijecially  serious  consequences  for  the  formation 
of  character,  but  for  the  present  we  will  restrict  ourselves 
to  the  intellect  only.  The  falsity  of  the  view  referred  to 
appears  not  only  in  the  material  memorized,  but  as  well 
in  regard  to  the  method  of  memorizing.  For  the  confine- 
ment of  the  attention  to  the  form  of  expression,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  material  ideas,  prevents  of  itself  the  proper 
appreciation  of  immanent  memorizing.  Nor  is  there  much 
likelihood  that  sueh  a  one-sided  view  will  make  appropriate 
use  of  the  means  for  rational  association  in  repetition,  but 
it  will  rather,  on  the  contrary,  prefer  the  mechanical  way. 

Both  the  first-named  errors  above  alluded  to  characterize 
the  work  of  momorif-cnnn,  wherever  found.  It  neglects 
the  iise  of  immanent  repetition,  and  ignores  the  means  of 
rational  association ;  or,  in  one  word,  it  makes  ex(dusive 
use  of  the  mechanical  memory.  The  third  and  last-named 
error,  of  restricting  the  idea  of  memorizing  to  mean  the 
commitment  to  memory  of  a  particular  form  of  language, 
is  not  necessarily  involved  in  cramming;  but  when  the  two 
are  associated  together,  the  resulting  method  is  doubly 
bad. 


164  THOUGHT  AND  MEMORY. 

A  mistake  of  another  kind  is  still  to  be  mentioned  here, 
which,  however,  is  fortunately  fast  dying  out.  May  we 
hasten  the  day  of  its  burial !  Wherever  it  is  still  alive  it 
makes  its  presence  known  by  special  "  exercises  for  mem- 
ory," separate  ••  memory  lessons,"  and  similarly  separate 
''  thought  exercises,"  and  tliirdly,  what  is  still  very  com- 
mon, separate  ^'  object  lessons."  Indeed,  all  of  these  exer- 
cises, in  many  instances,  have  been  incorporated  into  the 
coiu'se  of  study  as  if  they  were  so  many  separate  subjects 
of  study.  The  origin  of  this  mistaken  notion  is  undoubt- 
edly the  false  idea  taught  so  industriously  by  the  old 
psychology,  according  to  which  each  class  of  mental  phe- 
nomena or  activities  was  ascribed  to  a  separate  faculty  or 
power  of  the  mind.  Of  course  this  is  as  smart  as  it  would 
be  in  botany,  for  instance,  to  talk  about  a  root-force,  a  tuber- 
forming  force,  a  branching  force,  a  tendril-forming  force,  a 
tliorn-forming  force,  a  leaf-forming  force,  a  flower-forming 
force,  etc.,  etc.  It  is,  in  fact,  just  what  the  old  heathen 
mythology  did,  when  it  ascribed  every  different  kind  of 
phenomena  in  nature  to  a  special  and  independent  divinity. 
The  psychological  mistake  of  supposing  there  were  inde- 
pendent mental  faculties  led  naturally  to  the  pedagogical 
one  of  supi)osi]ig  that,  by  exercising  any  of  these  faculties 
on  one  particular  subject  matter,  they  would  be  trained 
for  use  on  everi/  occasion,  just  as  a  knife  may  be  sharpened 
by  rulj])ing  on  one  particular  body,  and  yet  may  be  used  to 
cut  any  other  substance  as  well.  That  this  theory  is  a 
pure  superstition  might  be  seen  without  help  of  the  new 
psychology,  because  it  was  well  known  and  could  not  be 
doubted  that  an  understanding  of  mineralogy  did  not  pro- 
duce an  understanding  of  botany  nor  an  understanding  of 
zoology;  that  a  mathematical  understanding  was  far  from 


SUMMARY    AND   CONCLUSIOX.  1G5 

being  a  musical  miderstanding  as  well ;  tliat  tlie  understand- 
ing of  theology  did  not  bring  with  it  an  understanding  of 
pedagogy,  etc.  But  false  opinions  grown  old  are  difficult 
to  eradicate,  and  the  presence  of  the  "object  lesson "  in 
many  courses  of  study  and  works  on  pedagogy  is  a  speak- 
ing proof  of  this  fact. 


In  conclusion,  tlie  doctrine    of   this   book  may  be  thus 
summarized  :  — 

I.  In  school  Inst  met  ion  tlie  memoky   is  fundamental  in 
its  importance  ;  but, 

II.  Thought  is  tlie  sole  purj)ose,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  very  best  means,  of  do  in  j  the  work  of  mem  art/. 


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y 


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Jambs,  William:  The  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  I.,  pp.  689. 
Vol.  II.,  pp.  70i.  American  Science  Series.  New  York:  Henry- 
Holt  &  Co.,  181)0. 

Kay,  David:  Meino7'y,  ichat  it  is  and  how  to  improve  it.  Vol.  8  of  In- 
ternational Education  Scries,  jip.  334.  New  York:  D.  Appleton  & 
Co.,  1888. 

Ladd,  CiEORGE  T. :  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology.  A  Treatise 
of  the  Activities  and  Nature  of  tlie  Mind  from  the  physical  and 
experimental  point  of  view.  pp.  G96.  New  York:  Charles  Scrib- 
ner's  Sons,  1892. 

Psychology,    descriptive    and    explanatory.      A    Treatise    of    the 

Pheuomena,  Laws,  and  Develojjment  of  Human  Mental  Life.  pp. 
G7G.    New  Y^ork:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1894. 

Lange,  Karl  :  Apperception.  A  JNlonograph  on  Psychology  and  Peda- 
gogy. Translated  by  the  Herbart  Club  and  edited  by  Charles 
DeGarmo.    pj).  279.    Boston:  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  1894. 

LiNDN'ER,  GusTAV  ADOLF :  Manuul  of  Empirical  Psychology.  Trans, 
by  Charles  De  Garmo.     pp.  274.     Boston:  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  1890. 

McMuuRY,  Charles  A. :  The  Elements  of  General  Method.  Based  on  the 
principles  of  Herbart.  2d  edition,  iip.  201.  Bloomington,  111. :  Pub- 
lic-School Publishing  Co.,  1893. 

The  First  Year-Book  of  the  Herbart  Society  for  Scientific  Study  of 

Teaching.  Prepared  for  discussion  at  the  Denver  Meeting  (1895)  of 
the  National  Educational  Association.  Edited  by  Charles  A.  Mc- 
Murry,  Secretary  of  the  Society,  pp.  139.  Bloomington,  111. :  Public- 
School  Publishing  Co.,  1895.  [It  contains  four  papers:  (1)  Most 
Pressing  Problems  concerning  the  Elementary  Course  of  Study,  by 
President  Charles  De  Garmo;  (2)  Concentration,  by  Dr.  Frank  M. 
McMurry;  (3)  The  Educational  Tlieory  of  the  Culture  Epochs, 
viewed  historically  and  critically,  by  Dr.  C.  C.  Van  Liew;  (4)  Plan 
of  Concentration  for  the  first  four  years,  by  Mrs.  Lida  B.  McMixrry.] 

Mill,  James:  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mind.  Edition 
by  Jolin  Stuart  Mill.  Vol.  I.,  pp.  453.  Vol.  II.,  pp.  403.  2d  edition. 
London:  Longmans,  Green,  Reader,  and  Dyer,  1878. 

Mnkmojjics:  in  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  and  Memory  in  Chambers's 
Encyclopaedia. 

MiJLLKR,  Max:  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language  delivered  at  the 
Royal  Institution  of  Great  Britain  in  18r)l-.3.  Fifth  edition.  Vol.  I., 
I)p.  4.")9.    Vol.  TI.,  pp.  000.     London :  Longmans,  Green,  &  Co.,  1864-6. 

I'k'K,  Edward:  On  Memory  and  the  Rational  Means  of  Improving  it. 
Loiulon:  18(;2. 


REFERENCE   LIST.  lOH 

I'reyku,  "NV.:  Mental  Devclopninit  in  (he  Child.  Trans.  l>y  Jl.  NV. 
Brown,  pp.  170.  Vol.  24  of  Intornalionul  Etlucatioii  Series.  New 
York:  D.  Appletou  &  Co.,  LSiW. 

The  Mind  of  the  Child.  Part  II.  Tlio  Develo[»ment  of  tlie  Intel- 
lect. Ob.servatibns  concerning  tlio  mental  development  of  the  Imniiiii 
being  in  the  first  years  of  life.  Trans,  by  H.  AV.  iSrown.  Vol.  0  of 
International  Education  Series,  pp.  317.  New  York:  D.  Appleton 
&  Co.,  18'.t;!. 

R.VDKSTocK,  Paul:  llnbit  and  Its  Importance  in  Education.    An  Es.say 

in  l*edag<igical  I'.sycbology.     Translated  from   tbe  CJermau  of  Dr. 

Paul  Uadestock  by  F.  A.  Caspari ;  with  an  Introduction  by  G.  Stanley 

Hall.    pp.  117.    Boston;  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  l.SHy. 
Rein,  W.  :    Outlines  of  Ptdagogivs.     Trans,  with  additional  notes  by 

C.  C.  and  Ida  J.  Van  Liew.     pp.  19'.t.     London:  Swan  Sonnenscheiu 

&  Co. ;  Syracuse,  N.  Y. :  C.  "SV.  Bardeen,  18i);>. 
RiBOT,  Th.  :    German  Psijcholorpj  of  To-dnij.     Trans,  by  James  Mark 

Baldwin,  with  a  preface  by  James  McCosh.     pp.  ;i07.     New  York: 

Charles  Scribncr's  Sous,  18.S(j. 
Dii^eases  of  Memory :  an  essay  in  the  positive  psychology.     Trans. 

by  "W.  II.  Smith,     pp.  20'J.     Vol.  41  of  International  Scientific  Series. 

New  York:  D.  Appletou  &  Co.,  1893. 
The  Diseases  of   the    Will.      Trans,   by  M.  M.   Snell.      jip.   l.;4. 

Chicago:  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.,  1894. 
The   Psijchology   of  Attention,      pp.   121.      Chicago:    The  Open 


Court  Publishing  Co.,  1890. 
Spencer,    Herbkrt:    The  Principles  of  Psycholof/ij.    Vol.  I.,  pp.  (VJO. 

Vol.  II.,  pp.  G48.    London:  Williams  and  Norgate,  18S1. 
Stout,  G.  F.  :  The  Ilcrharlian  Psychology.     In  "  Mind,"  Nos.  51  and  52, 

Vol.  XIII.     London:  Williams  and  Norgate,  1888. 
Sui.r.T,  James:  Outlines  of  P.<yrhoh>gy,  with  special  reference  to  the 

Theory  of  Education,     pp.  711.     New  York:  D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  1892. 
The  Human  Mind.     A  Te.\t-book  of  Psychology.    2  vols.,  pp.  .">()1 

and  .393.     New  York :  D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  1892. 
Uker,  Chr.  :  Intrvdurtiiin   to   the    Pedagogy   of  Ilerbart.      Authorized 

translation  from  the  fifth  German  Edition,  under  the  auspices  of  the 

Herbart  Club,  by  J.  C.  Zinser.     Edited  by  Charles  De  Garmo.     pp. 

123.    Boston:  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  IS'M. 
Ziehen,  Theodor:  Introduction  to  Physiological  Psychology.     Trans. 

by  C.   C.    Van   Liew  and   Otto  Beyer,     pp.   2.*<4.      London:    Swau 

Sonnenschcin  &  Co..  1892. 


Education, 


For  descriptions  uf  forthcoming  books  on  Education,  see  announcements  at  end  of 
this  catalogue. 


II7OR  American  Schools  and  American  Scholarship  there  is  no 
more  healthful  sign  than  the  newly-awakened  interest  of  teach- 
ers in  all  that  pertains  to  successful  work  and  personal  culture.  At 
the  outset  of  this  great  and  wide-spread  movement  in  favor  of  better 
methods  and  worthier  results,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  practical  side 
01  education  should  be  treated  out  of  all  proportion,  while  its  theoreti- 
cal and  historical  aspects  should  be  somewhat  overlooked.  But  if 
education  is  to  become  a  science  and  teaching  to  be  practised  as  an 
art,  one  means  to  this  end  is  to  gather  and  examine  what  has  been 
done  by  those  who  have  been  engaged  therein,  and  whose  position  and 
success  have  given  them  a  right  to  be  heard.  Another  and  not  less 
potent  means  is,  to  gain  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  psychological 
basis  of  the  teacher's  work,  and  a  familiar  acquaintance  with  the 
methods  which  rest  upon  correct  psychological  principles.  As  con- 
tributions of  inestimable  value  to  the  history,  the  philosophy,  and  the 
practice  of  education,  we  take  pleasure  in  calling  the  attention  of 
teachers  to  our  books  on  Education,  mentioned  in  the  following  pages. 
It  is  our  purpose  to  add  from  time  to  time  such  books  as  have  con- 
tributed or  may  contribute  so  much  toward  the  solution  of  educational 
probleins  as  to  make  them  indispensable  to  every  true  teacher's  library. 

The  following  good  fronts,  and  also  the  opinions  quotetl 
undrr  the  sereraf  ro/unirs,  are  an  earnest  of'  tlu-  ajtjtre- 
ciation  in  trhirh  the  enterprise  is  held  :  — 


Dr.  Wm.  T.  Harris,  Concord,  Mass.  : 
I  do  not  think  ih.it  you  have  ever  printed 
a  book  on  education  ihat  is  not  worthy 
'.o  go  on  any  teacher's  reading-list,  and 
the  best  list.  (AfarcA  26,  1886.) 

J.  "W.  Steams,  Pro/,  of  the  Science 
and  Alt  of  Teaching,  Cniv.  of  Wis.: 
Allow  me  to  say  that  the  list  of  books 
ivhich  you  are  publishing  for  -uc  use  of 

113 


teachers  seems  to  me  of  exceptional  ex- 
cellence. I  have  watched  the  growth  of 
the  list  with  increasing  pleasure,  and  I 
feel  that  you  have  done  a  service  of  great 
value  to  teachers.  \May  26,  1886.) 

N.  M.  Butler,  Pres.  of  Nnv  York 
City  Coll.  for  I'tiiining  of  Tfiu/iers  :  I 
am  greatly  interested  in  your  series  of 
pedagogical  publications. 


EDUCATION.  117 


Apperception. 

A  Mono^aph  on  Psychology  and  Pedagogy.  By  Dr.  Karl  Lange.  Trans, 
lated  by'the  following  named  members  of  the  Herbart  Club:  Elmer  E.  Brown, 
Charles  De  Garmo,  Mrs.  Eudora  Hailmann,  Florence  Hall,  George  F.  James, 
L.  R.  Klemm,  Ossian  11.  Lang,  Herman  T.  Lukens,  Charles  A.  McMurry, 
Frank  McMurry,  Theo.  B.  Noss,  Levi  L.  Seeley,  Margaret  K.  Smith,  and  edited 
by  Charles  De  Garmo,  President  of  Swarthmore  College.  Cloth.  279  pages. 
Retail  price,  gi.oo. 

THIS  is  perhaps  the  most  popular  scientific  monograph  on  education 
that  has  appeared  in  Germany  in  recent  times.  It  has  the  rare 
merit  of  being  at  once  thoroughly  scientific  and  intensely  interesting 
and  concrete.  Not  a  little  of  its  value  arises  from  the  fact  that  it 
approaches  the  problems  of  education  along  the  highway  that  teachers 
must  actually  pass  in  order  to  solve  them.  Its  standpoint  is,  in  brief, 
the  living,  developing  mind  of  the  child  itself.  Apperception  is  a 
single  word  comprehending  the  whole  complex  of  processes  known  as 
mental  assimilation.  It  is  here  considered  in  its  original  nature,  and 
in  its  application  to  instruction  and  moral  training,  both  as  regards  the 
developing  child,  its  interests,  powers,  and  mental  stores,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  selection,  arrangement,  and  methodical  treatment  of 
the  subject-matter  of  instruction,  on  the  other.  The  scientific  value 
of  the  volume  is  enhanced  by  a  somewhat  extended  chapter  on  the 
history  of  the  term  Apperception,  found  at  the  close  of  the  book. 
The  prediction  is  not  unwarranted  that  this  unpretentious  monograph 
will  awaken  more  universal  interest  and  stimulate  more  educational 
thoughts  than  any  other  single  work  that  has  been  issued  in  the 
United  States  during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  for  it  ushers  in  a 
new  epoch  in  the  popular  study  of  education  in  this  country,  that  of 
scientific  treatment  enriched  by  a  vast  wealth  of  concrete,  interesting 
material.  In  it  science  has  become  popular  treatment,  and  popular 
treatment  scientific  exposition. 


Edw^ard  T.  Pierce-  Prin.  of  Nor- 
mal School,  Los  Angeles,  Cal.:  I  am 
more  than  pleased  with  the  book.  It  is  a 
fascinating  book  to  a  teacher  who  is 
sear:hing  after  truth.  I  shall  not  only 
recommend  it  to  teachers,  but  urge  them 
to  get  the  book.  {Nov.  25,  1893.) 

L.  B.  Klemm,  of  the  Bureau  of  Edu- 


cation, Washington,  D.  C:  There  are  few 
educational  books  on  the  American  mar- 
ket that  come  up  to  this  in  usefulness. 
It  has  qualities  which  will  make  it  a 
favorite  text-book  in  Normal  Schools  and 
other  pedagogical  institutions.  The  little 
book  will  be  hailed  with  delight,  and  justly 
so,  by  the  great  number  of  teachers. 

{Aug.  23,  1893.) 


ii8  EDUCATION. 


Manual  of  Empirical  Psychology. 

An  authorized  translation  from  the  German  of  Dr.  G.  A.  Lindner,  by  Charlei 
De  Garmo,  PhD.,  Professor  of  Modem  Languages  in  Stale  Normal  I'mvep 
sity,  111.    Cloth.     274  pages.     Price  by  mail,  gi. 10.     Introduction  price,  ?i. jo. 

nPHIS  is  the  best  Manual  of  Psychology  ever  prepared  from  the 
-*■  Herbartian  standpoint,  which,  briefly  characterized,  is  the 
standpoint  of  pedagogics.  No  other  school  of  psychologists  ha-; 
thrown  so  much  light  upon  the  solution  of  the  problems  arising  in  tht 
instruction  and  training  of  youth  ;  and  no  other  author  of  this  school 
has  been  so  successful  as  Lindner  in  compact  yet  comprehensive  and 
intelligible  statement  of  psychological  facts  and  principles.  The  book 
is  what  its  name  indicates,  a  psychology  arising  from  the  given  data 
of  experience;  yet  there  is  no  psychology  in  English  which  does  so 
much  toward  arousing  an  intelligent  interest  in  the  advanced  depart- 
ments of  rational  psychology  and  philosophy  in  general. 

That  an  effective  educational  psychology  must  be  based  upon  ? 
concrete  experience,  rather  than  upon  the  a  priori  forms  of  mind  is 
reasonably  evident,  but  Lindner  is  more  than  a  mere  recorder  of  ex 
perience.  He  unfolds  his  subject  as  a  true  inductive  science,  never 
losing  sight  of  the  organic  development  of  mental  life.  This  gives 
him  a  great  pedagogical  significance.  Again,  he  is  always  interesting. 
His  explanations  are  lucid,  pointed,  and  self-consistent,  while  every 
department  of  science  and  of  experience  has  yielded  its  choicest  facts 
to  enrich  the  contents  of  the  book. 

The  work  is  especially  recommended  for  normal  schools,    reading 
circles,  and  higher  institutions  of  learning. 


G.  Stanley  Hall,  Pns.  of  Clark 
Univ.,  I  V'orcesUr,  A/itss.  :  The  practical 
applicability  of  this  stand-point  and  book 
makes  its  merits. 

G.  Williamson  Smith,  Pres.  of 
Trinity  Coll.,  l/ttrtfjni,  Conn.  :  It  is  an 
original  work,  on  well  conceived  principles 
and  carried  on  by  methods  of  induction 
approved  by  all. 

F.  Louis  Soldan,  Prin.  St.  Louis 
Normal  ami  hi:;h  School:  Lindner's 
Psychology  is  one  of  the  best  works,  if  not 
the  best,  of  the  vigorous  school  to  which 
he  belongs.  Tlie  translation  is  an  im- 
provement on  the  originaL 


W.  H.  Councill,  Prin.  State  Nor- 
mal ami  Industrial  School,  Ala. :  The 
work  possesses  every  merit  necessary  to 
give  it  a  permanent  place  among  thehigb* 
est  order  of  te.xt  books. 

G.  S.  Albee,  Pres.  State  Normal 
School,  Oshkosh,  \  Vis.  :  Only  the  most 
original  and  realistic  t&nchers  have  been 
able  to  obtain  results  in  class  work  which 
lifted  the  study  of  psycholog>'  above  con- 
tempt. This  key-note  of  the  best  and 
most  definitely  tnie  teaching  appears  upon 
nearly  every  page  of  Lindner.  The  author 
may  congratulaie  himself  th.^t  his  .Vmeri* 
can  editor  was  a  dear-minded  psychologist 


EDUCATION. 


119 


TJic  Essentials  of  MetJiod. 


Revised  Edition.  A  discussion  of  the  essential  forms  of  right  method  in  teach- 
ing by  Charles  De  Garmo,  Ph.  D.,  President  of  Swarthmore  College.  Cloth. 
133  pages,     Retail  price,  65  cents.     Special  price  for  class  use. 

THIS  little  volume  is  an  initial  work  in  the  science  of  methods,  no 
attempt  of  its  kind  having  previously  been  made  in  English.  It 
assumes,  therefore,  an  importance  and  significance  which  are  not 
measured  by  its  .size  or  price. 

It  comprises  three  parts:  i.  The  psychological  basis.  This  con- 
sists mostly  of  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  individual  and  the 
general  notion,  and  of  the  true  nature  of  mental  assimilation,  or  ap- 
prehension;  2.  The  necessary  stages  of  rational  methods  as  deter- 
mined by  the  psychological  basis.  We  have  here  an  exposition  of  the 
functions  of  observation,  of  generalization  and  of  the  application  of 
generalizations  m  fixing  and  utilizing  knowledge  ;  3.  Practical  illustra- 
tions, showing  how  the  teacher  may  consciously  observe  these  stages  in 
his  dail v  work  in  the  school-room .  The  Revised  Edition  gives  both  a  pop- 
ular and  a  scientific  explanation  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  Apperception. 

Experience  shows  that  the  book  is  admirably  adapted  to  training- 
classes  in  normal  schools,  and  to  city  or  village  reading  circles, 
while  no  live  teacher  can  afford  to  remain  partially  or  wholly  uncon- 
cious  of  what  it  reveals. 


J.  W.  Stearns,  I>h.T>.,Prof.  of  Pe- 
dai;cgy,  in  [Visconsin  State  Univ. :  It  is 
the  first  real  step  toward  the  development 
of  a  science  of  methods  in  this  country. 

B.  A.  Hinsdale,  Prof,  of  Pedagogy, 

niv.  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor:  A  very 
good  book  indeed  for  students  of  educa- 
tional science.  I  show  my  opinion  of  it 
by  putting  it  on  a  short  list  of  buoks  that 
I  recommend  to  teachers. 

T.  H.  Balliet,  Suft.  of  Schools, 
Springfield,  Mass.:  1  think  it  has  as 
much  sound  thought  to  the  square  inch  as 
anything  I  know  of  in  pedagogics. 

Geo.  Morris  Philips,  Ph.D.,  Prin. 
State  Normal  School,  West  Chester,  Pa.: 
An  unusually  excellent  little  book ;  there 
can  be  no  question  of  its  merit. 


J.  C.  Greenough,  Prin.  of  West- 
field  Normal  School,  Mass. :  A  small 
book  but  a  great  work.  One  of  the  best 
pedagogical  books  ever  published  in  the 
English  language. 

M.  L.  Seymour,  Prof,  in  State  Nor' 
vial  School,  Cliico,  Cal. :  It  is  a  book 
without  a  peer  or  rival  in  the  discussion 
of  the  underlying  principles  of  methods  in 
teaching.  It  shoidd  be  the  daily  compan- 
ion of  every  teacher  t<ntil  fully  assimif 
lated. 

R.  G.  Boone,  Prof,  of  Pedagogy^ 
Univ.  of  Ind.:  It  seems  to  me  very  sug- 
gestive and  along  right  lines  as  counteract- 
ing the  wide-spread  tendency  to  adopt  de- 
vice and  formula.  It  promises  teachers  a 
rich  return  for  the  most  careful  peruaaL 


EDUCATIOX. 


The  Science  of  Education. 

Translated  from  the  Gernmn  of  Hkriiart  by  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Fki.kin.     With  an 
introduction  by  Oscar  Drowning.    26S  pages.     Clotli.     Retail  price,  ?i. 00. 

HERi;.\kT  began  the  study  of  education  and  of  the  human  mind  ;is 
a  private  tutor  of  boys  of  gentle  birtli  and  nurture  intended  to 
receive  the  higher  education.  His  experiences,  tliereforc  —  and  with 
him  theory  and  practice  always  went  hand  in  hand  —  are  of  especial 
value  to  teachers  in  public  schools. 

"  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Felkin  deserve  the  thanks  of  all  who  are  interested 
in  education  by  making  these  writings  of  Hcrl>art  accessible  to  English 
readers.  They  have  accomplished  their  work  with  the  greatest  care 
and  self-denying  zeal.  The  tran.slation  is  as  readable  as  is  consistent 
with  an  exact  rendering  of  the  original.  If  it  is  carefully  studied,  as  it 
ought  to  be,  tlierc  will  be  no  difficulty  in  understanding  it.  Their  in- 
troduction is  probably  the  best  account  of  Herbart  which  has  appeared 
in  our  tongue."  —  J'roiii  Mr.  Brow/u'itifs  Iittrodmtioii. 


L.  B.  Klemm,  of  the  Bureau  of 
Education,  Washington,  D.  C:  It  is  with 
pardonable  admiration  for  your  "  pluck  " 
that  1  lay  down  Ilerbart's  .Science  of  edu- 
cation after  a  thorough  examination.  I 
say  "  pluck,"  because  it  certainly  needs  a 
good  deal  of  aggressive  courage  to  offer 
the  teachers  of  America  such  a  work  for 
professional  study.  The  book  is  happily 
introduced  by  t!ie  chapter  on  the  life  of 
Herbart,  his  pliilosophy  and  principles  of 
education,  and  the  two  analyses  by  the 
transl.-itors.  They  offer  a  very  convenient 
key  to  the  treasures  of  Herbart's  book. 
I  like  the  transl.ilion ;  have  compared 
whole  pages  with  the  original,  and  am 
well  pleased.  It  is  a  very  creditable  work. 
As  a  member  of  the  profession  of  teachers, 
I  offer  you  my  gratitude  for  this  publica- 
tion. {.Sept.  25,  1S93.) 

S.  G.  Williams.  Professor  of  Phi- 
losophy, Cornell  University,  Ithaca, 
N.Y.:  I  have  read  the  book  carefully  and 
compared  portions  with  the  original,  and 
I  feel  that  you  deserve  the  thanks  of 
English    speaking    teachers    for  placing 


within  their  reach  the  work  of  this  leader  of 
modern  German  pedagogic  thouglit.  The 
translation  is  so  nc.-it  and  so  true  to  the 
original  that  it  not  infrequently  makes 
the  concise  and  somewhat  poetic  diction 
of  the  author  more  readily  comprehensible 
than  the  original.  {Oct.  16,  1893.) 

Educational  Courant,  Louisville, 
Ky.:  It  is  a  work  that  no  educator  can 
afford  not  to  read  and  study.  The  volume 
will  influence  our  theory  and  practice  for 
years  to  come,  and  he  who  remains  ig- 
norant of  its  contents  can  justly  be  ac- 
cused of  wilful  ignorance  of  what  most 
I  intimately  concerns  him. 

'  Science,  Neu<  York:  Following  the 
entertaining  sketch  of  Ilerbart's  life  the 
translators  have  given  a  review  of  Her- 
bart's philosophy,  together  with  a  synop- 

I  sis  of  the  two  works  which  follow  and 
form  the  ])rincipal  portion  of  the  book. 
The  review  has  cvidentlybeen  written  from 
a  tliorou'^li  acquaintance  with  Ilerbart's 
writings  and  is  an  additional  aid  to  our  un- 
derstanding of  his  principles. 


EDUCATION.  123 


TJic  Educational  Ideal ; 

An  outline  of  its  growth  in  modern  times.  By  James  P.  Munroe.  Cloth.  268 
pages.     Retail  price,  5*1.00. 

THIS  work  is  prepared  to  meet  the  demand  for  a  book  which  shall, 
in  brief  compass,  present  a  concise  and  well  proportioned  view  of 
the  historical  development  of  the  educational  principles  which  underlie 
the  aims  and  methods  of  modern  teaching. 

The  book  deals  with  the  successive  leaders  in  thought,  beginning 
with  the  Renaissance,  who  have  most  strongly  directed  the  educational 
aim  towards  its  highest  modern  development.  The  chapters  are 
biographical  only  as  far  as  is  necessary  to  give  to  these  leaders  a 
human  interest,  the  object  being  to  deal  with  the  broad  principles 
upon  which  the  development  of  the  educational  ideal  has  rested,  rather 
than  with  specific  pedagogic  methods.  By  means  of  the  material 
furnished  in  the  book  it  will  be  easy  for  anyone  interested  in  educa- 
tional questions  to  pursue  an  extended  study  of  the  whole  or  of  a  par- 
ticular part  of  the  historical  period  which  the  volume  covers. 

CONTENTS.  Chap.  1,  Introduction;  II,  Rabelais.  —  The  Revolt  against  Medise- 
valism  ;  111,  Francis  Bacon.  —  The  Revolt  against  Classicism  ;  IV,  Comenius. —  The 
Revolt  against  Feudalism;  V,  Montaigne  and  Locke. —  The  Child  has  Senses  to  be 
trained;  VI,  The  Jansenists  and  Fenelon.  —  The  Child  has  a  Heart  to  be  developed  ; 
\'II,  Rousseau.  —  The  Child  has  a  Soul  to  be  kept  pure;  VIII,  Pestalozzi  and 
Froebel.  —  Senses,  Heart,  and  Soul  must  be  educated  together  ;  IX,  Women  in  Educa- 
tion —  Education  leads  to  and  from  the  Family ;  the  Home  is  its  Unit ;  X,  Sum- 
mary.    Bibliography.     Index. 

Introduction  to  the  Pedagogy  of  Herbart. 

By  Charles  Ufer,  authorized  translation,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Herbart 
Club,  by  J.  C.  Zinser  ;  edited  by  Charles  DeGarmo,  President  of  Swarthmore 
College.    Cloth.     131  pages.     Retail  price  90  cts. 

THfl  Herbart  Club  heartily  recommends  this  little  volume  as  a  clear 
and  useful  introduction  to  Herbart's  system  of  pedagogy.  It 
gives  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  whole  field  of  pedagogy  as  based  upon 
psychology  and  ethics.  It  discusses  with  considerable  fulness  such 
topics  as  the  following:  The  Development  of  Interest,  the  Choice  of 
Studies,  the  Culture  Epochs  and  Concentration,  Methods  of  Teaching 
—  The  Formal  Steps,  and  Moral  Training. 

In  part  IV  the  author  gives  us  some  extended  illustrations  of  the 
manner  in  which  History,  Language,  Geography,  Nature  Study,  Arith- 
metic, Geometry,  and  Drawing  can  be  unified  by  concentration. 


128  EDUCATION. 


The  Stiiiienfs  Froebcl. 

By  William   II.  llERroRD,  late  member  of  the  Universities  of  Bonn,  Berlin, 
and  Zurich.     Cloth.     128  pages.     Retail  price,  75  cents. 

THE  purpose  of  this  little  book,  as  stated  by  the  editor  in  his  preface, 
is  to  [jivc  young  people,  who  are  seriously  preparin;^  themselves 
to  become  teachers,  a  brief  yet  full  account  of  Frocbel's  Theory  of 
Education ;  his  practice  or  jilans  of  method  is  reserved  for  a  second 
part.  This  book  is  adapted  from  Froebel's  Education  of  Humanity 
{Die  Erzieltuiii^  dcr  Mcnschheit),  published  in  1826.  The  editor  has 
tried  to  give  what  is  Froebel's  own  in  English  as  close  as  possible  t. 
the  very  words  of  his  author.  The  book,  in  addition  to  an  Introdm 
tion  treating  of  the  subject  in  general,  has  chapters  on  The  Xursling. 
The  Child,  The  Boy,  and  The  School,  and  summaries  of  the  teachings. 

The  Psychology  of  Childhood. 

By  Frederick  Tracy,  Fellow  in  Clark  University,  with  Introduction  by  Presi- 
dent G.  Stanley  Hall.    Cloth.  183  pages.     Retail  price,  00  cents. 

THE  aullior  has  in  this  work  undertaken  to  present  as  concisely,  yet 
as  completely,  as  possible,  the  results  of  the  systematic  study  of 
children,  and  has  included  everything  of  importance  that  can  be  found. 
Some  of  its  special  features  are  thus  summarized  :  —  ( i)   It  is  the  first 
general  treatise,  covering  the  whole  field  of  child  psychology.      (2)   1 
aims  to  contain  a  complete  summary,  up  to  date,  of  all  work  done  in 
this  field.      (3)   The  work  contains  a  large  amount  of  material,  the  re- 
sults of  the  author's  own  observations  on  children  as  well  as  those  of 
perhaps  a  score  of  very  reliable  observers.      (4)  The  subject  of  child- 
language  has  been  gone  into  with  especial  thoroughness,  from  an  en- 
tirely new  and  original  standpoint,  and  with  very  gratifying  result> 
(S)  A  very  exhaustive  bibliography,  containing,  it  is  believed,  ever} 
thing  of  value  that  has  ever  been  written  on  this  .subject,  is  appcnde<; 

Earl  Barnes,  Department  of  Edu- 
cation, LeliinJ  Stanford  Jr.  University, 
Cat. :  No  book  has  come  from  the  press 


J.  Clark  Murray,  Prof,  of  Philo- 
sophy, M\GHl  University,  A/ontrea/,  Ca- 
nada: In  linglisli  we  have  certainly  no 
original  work  on  the  psychology  of  child 
hood  to  compare  with  it,  and  even  among 
translations  from  Oernian  and  French  there 
is  none  which  shows  such  a  mastery  of  tlie 
whole  subject.  (JVor.  14,  1893.) 


during  the  past  year  which  I  have  been 
so  glad  to  see  as  this  one.  For  ill  of  us 
who  are  carrying  on  courses  in  the  psychol- 
ogy of  children  it  will  prove  an  invaluable 
aid.  (Nai:  23,  1893.) 


EDUCATION. 


T 


A  Laboygfory  Course  in  Physiological  Psy- 

Jiolo'-y.     By  Edmund  C.  Sanford,  Assistant  Professor  of  Psychology,  Clark 

University,  "Worcester,  Mass.     Part  I.     1S7  pages.     Cloth.     Introduction  price, 

90  cents.     By  mail,  i^ 1. 00. 

HE  use  of  the  lal)oratory  in  teaching  psychology  is  indorsed  by 
the  experience  of  the  other  sciences,  by  the  approval  of  the  best 
teachers,  and  by  the  psychological  laboratories  recently  opened  in 
leading  colleges  and  universities  in  this  country  and  in  Europe.  The 
need  of  some  definite  schedule  of  experiments  for  such  work  in  the 
practice  course  in  the  laboratory  of  Clark  University  gave  occasion  for 
the  first  collection  of  the  experiments  here  published  in  a  form  which 
it  is  hoped  will  make  them  useful  to  others.  The  aim  has  been  to 
introduce  the  student  to  the  most  important  facts  and  chief  methods 
of  experimental  psychology  so  far  as  they  are  adapted  to  the  handling 
of  college  men  and  within  a  moderate  expense  for  apparatus.  The 
course  includes  experiments  upon  the  Dermal  Senses,  Static  and 
Kinitsthetic  Senses,  Taste,  Smell,  Hearing,  Vision,  Psycho-physic. 

\^Pc7rt  11  in  Press. 

The  Connection  of  Thought  and  Memory.  • 

A  contribution  ro  pedagogical  psychology.  By  Herman  T.  Lukens.  Honorary 
Fellow  in  Psychology  in  Clark  University.  Based  on  F.  \V.  Dorpfeld's  Mono- 
graph, "  Denken  unci  Gedachtnis."  Published  under  the  auspices  of  the  Herbart 
Club,  with  an  Introduction  by  Dr.  G.  Stanley  Hall,  President  of  Clark  Univer- 
sity.    Cloth.     000  pages.     Retail  price,  ocoo. 

HIS  is  a  Herbartian  book,  showing  how  the  interdependence  of 
thought  and  memory  should  be  realized  in  practice,  followed  by 
illustrations  taken  from  History,  Natural  Science,  Literature,  and 
Arithmetic.  It  is  an  application  of  the  theory  of  Apperception,  and  is 
intended  for  teachers'  reading-circles,  normal  schools,  and  private 
reading.  Being  based  on  the  work  of  Dorpfeld,  which  grew  out  of 
round-table  conferences  with  teachers,  it  may  be  said  to  have  already 
proved  its  helpfulness  for  teachers  in  Germany;  and  the  adaptation  to 
American  ideas  and  conditions,  while  modifying  the  original  in  many 
respects,  keeps  true  to  its  ideal. 

Although  in  the  main  following  Herbartian  principles,  the  book  does 
not  ignore  the  suggestions  of  psychological  work  that  has  been  done 
in  the  last  fifty  years,  but  it  is  in  touch  with  the  latest  approved  ideas 
of  the  present  day.  {/n  Press,  ready  soon. 


T 


HISTORY. 


Sheldon's  United  States  History,  rdr^-mmmar  schools.  Follows  the  "  seminary  " 
or  laboratory  plan.  "  By  it  the  tliild  is  not  robbed  of  the  right  to  do  his  own  think 
ing."     Half  leather,     fi.25. 

Teacher's  Manual  to  Sheldon's  United  States  History.    .\  key  to  the  above 

system      60  cts. 

Sheldon's  General  History.  For  high  school  and  college.  The  only  general  hUtory 
following  the  "  seniin.iry  "  or  laboratory  plan  now  advocated  by  leading  teachers. 
Half  leather,     fi.75. 

Sheldon's  Greek  and  Roman  History.  Contains  the  first  250  pages  of  the  above 
book.     #1.00. 

Teacher's  Manual  to  Sheldon's  History.    Puts  into  the  instructor's  hand  the /•o' 

to  the  above  system.     85  cts. 

Sheldon's  Aids  to  the  Teaching  of  General  History.    Gives  also  list  of  most 

css'.nti.il  hooks  fur  a  n-f'  ri'iUL-  libr.iry.      10  cts. 

Thomas's  History  of  the  United  States.  For  schools,  academies,  and  the  general 
reader.  \  narrative  history  witli  copious  references  to  sources  and  authorities.  Fully 
illustrated.     532  pages.     Half  leather,     fi.25. 

Shumway's  A  Day  in  Ancient  Rome.  With  sg  illustrations,  should  find  a  place 
as  a  supplftiteitiary  reader  in  every  high-school  class  studying  Cicero,  Horace,  Taci- 
tus, etc.     75  cts. 

Old  South  Leaflets.  Reproductions  of  important  political  and  historical  papers,  ac- 
comp;\nicil  by  useful  uutes.  Each,  5  cts.  and  6  cts.  For  lilies  sec  separate  lists.  Per 
hundred,  ?3  fK>. 

Allen's  History  Topics.  Covers  Ancient,  Modem,  and  American  historj-,  and  gives  an 
excellent  list  of  books  of  reference.     121  pages.     Paper.    30  cts. 

Fisher's  Select  Bibliography  of  Ecclesiastical  History.    An  annotated  list  of 

the  most  esseiitiiil  books  lor  a  theological  student's  library.      15  cts. 

Hall's    Method   of   Teaching   History.       "its   excellence   and  helpfulness  ought   to 

s^cun:  it  many  re.iiicrs." —  The  X.itioii.     51.50. 

Phillips'  History  and  Literature  in  Grammar  Grades.    \  paper  read  before  the 

Dcpariment  of  Superintendence,  .It  I'.i  ioklyii,  N.Y.      I'.iper.      15  cts. 


See  also  our  /is/  oj  OUi  Soutk  fyn/Uts. 

D.    C.    HEATH    &    CO..   PUBLISHERS, 

BOSTON.         NEW  YORK.         CHICAGO 


EDUCATION. 

Compayr^'s  History  of  Pedagogy.      "  The  best  and  most  comprehensive  history  of 

Kducation  in  English."  —  Dr.  G.  S.  Hall.     51.75. 
C0mpayr6'S  Lectures  on  Teaching.      "  The  best  book  in  existence  on  the  theory  and 

practice  of  education."  —  Supt.  M  acAlister,  Philadelphia.     $1.75. 

Compayr^'s  Psychology  Applied  to  Education.    A  clear  and  concise  statement 

of  doctrine  and  application  on  the  science  and  art  of  teaching.     90  cts. 
De  Garmo's  Essentials  of  Method.      A  practical  exposition  of  methods  with  illustra- 

live  outlines  of  common  school  studies.     65  cts. 
De   Garmo's   Lindner's   Psychology.      The  best   Manual  ever  prepared  from  the 

Herbartian  standjioint.     Ji.oo. 
Gill's  Systems  of  Education.      "  it  treats  ably  of  the  I,ancaster  and  Bell  movement 

in  education,  —  a  rv/-j'  important  phase."  —Dr.  \V.  T.  Harris.     JS1.2S. 

Hall's  Bibliography  of  Pedagogical  Literature.     Covers  every  department  of 

education.     Interleaved,  *f2. 00.     ^1.50. 
Herford'S  Student's  Froebel.      The  purpose  of  this  little  book  is  to  give  young  people 
preparing  to  teach  a  brief  ytt  full  account  of  Froebel's  Theory  of  Education.     75  cts. 

Malleson's  Early  Training  of  Children.     "The  best  book  for  mothers  I  ever 

read."  —  Elizabeth  P.  Peabodv.     75  cts. 

Marwedel's  Conscious  Motherhood.    The  unfolding  of  the  child's  mind  in  the 

cradle,  nursery  and  Kindergarten,     f  2.00. 
NeWSholme'S  School  Hygiene.      Already  in  use  in  the  leading  training  colleges  in 
England.     75  cts. 

Peabody's  Home,  Kindergarten,  and  Primary  School.    "The  best  book  out- 
side of  the  Bible  that  I  ever  read."  —A  Leading  Teacher.     Ji.oo. 
PestalOZZi'S  Leonard Jind   Gertrude,     "if  we   except   'Emile'   only,   no   more   im- 

RadestOCk'3  Habit  in  Education.  "  it  will  prove  a  rare  '  find'  to  teachers  who  are 
s-ekins  to  ground  themselves  in  the  philosophy  of  their  art."  —  E.  H.  Russell,  Worces- 
ter Normal  School.     75  cts. 

Richter's  Levana  ;  or.  The  Doctrine  of  Education.     "A  spirited  and  scholarly 

book."  — Prof.  W.  H.  Payne.     ?i.4o. 
ROSmini'S   Method   in   Education.     "  The   most  important   pedagogical   work   ever 

written."  —  Thomas  Davidson,     f  1.50. 
Rousseau's  Emile.      "  Perhaps  the  most  influential  book  ever  written  on  the  subject  of 

K.iiicaii<jn."  —  K.  H.  Quick.     90  cts. 

Methods  of  Teaching  Modern  Languages.     Papers  on  the  value  and  on  methods 

of  teaching  German  and  French,  by  i>rominent  instructors.     90  cts. 

Sanford's  Laboratory  Course  in  Physiological  Psychology.      The  course 

includes  experiments  upon  the  Dermal   Senses,  Static  and   Kinscsthetic  Senses,  Taste, 
Smtll,  Hearing,  Vision,  Psychophysic.     In  Press. 

Lange's  Apperception :  A  monograph  on  Psychology  and  Pedagogy.  Trans- 
lated by  the  members  of  the  Herbart  Club,  under  the  direction  of  President  Charles 
DeGarmo,  of  Swarthmore  College,     gi.oo. 

Herbart'S  Science  of  Education.  Translated  by  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Felken  with  a  pref- 
ace by  Oscar  Browning,     fi.oo. 

Tracy's   Psychology    of   Childhood.     This  is  the  first  ^,f«irrai' treatise  covering  in  a 
scientific  manner  the  whole  field  of  child  psychology.     Octavo.     Paper.     75  cts. 
Soil  l>v  inall,  postpaid,  on  receipt  of  price. 

D.    C.    HEATH    &~CO^PUBLISHERS, 

BOSTON.        NEW  YORK.        CHICAGO. 


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